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ABSTRACT. This thesis deals with the set of issues commonly known as the ‘measurement 
problem’ in quantum mechanics. The main thesis is that the problems are best understood as 
typically theoretical problems, in the sense that they are not problems directly concerned with 
the ability of the quantum theory to account for, or represent, actual measurements. This is 
contrary to the standard view that the quantum measurement problem is in fact about how to 
fit theory to experiment.
I explain how I characterise a theoretical problem and argue against claims that quantum 
measurement theory is unrealistic or ineffective because it bears so little relation to actual 
measurement practice: I argue that the quantum theory’s analysis of measurement need not 
be committed to doing for the experimenter what Henry Margenau and other critics think it 
should do. Its principal aim is to answer two questions. First, it tells us what properties are to 
be associated to quantum states; secondly, it tells us what, in the theory, a measurement must 
be if these properties are to emerge.
I then discuss some of the specific aspects of the problem of measurement, in particular the 
results known as insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem and the characteri­
sation of the quantum measurement interactions satisfying standard probabilistic constraints. 
I prove several results here, amongst them characterisations of all interactions jointly satisfying 
the conditions of unitarity and, first, objectification, then secondly, probability reproducibility 
conditions. These are the standard conditions which capture our intuitions about quantum mea­
surement. I show how the results lead to negative consequences with respect to the interpretive 
questions in quantum mechanics.
The discussion of these specific aspects of quantum measurements does, on the other hand, 
suggest a particular strategy for solving the problems. This is found in Arthur Fine’s solution to 
the measurement problem, which is based on the idea of a selective interaction. The discussion 
of Fine’s solution emphasises in general how simply implementing technical strategies is not 
sufficient to solve the measurement problem in quantum mechanics: further arguments must 
be given for why the strategy is appropriate, rather than just mathematically satisfactory. I 
claim that the arguments given by Fine are far from sufficient.
The thesis concludes that, although the quantum theory of measurement is immune from 
Margenau’s critique, and retains a theoretical autonomy, it is still plagued by numerous prob­
lems: the thesis identifies clearly what some of these problems are and considers some solutions, 
most of which, however, raise serious philosophical questions about the interpretation of quan­
tum mechanics.
Contents
Statement of Conjoint Work in Marco Del Seta’s Thesis 5
Acknowledgements 6
Introduction 11
Chapter 1. The Relative Autonomy of Theory: Quantum Measurements and Real
Measurements 20
1. Quantum measurement and the real world 20
2. How far do the criticisms go? 25
3. The ‘relative autonomy’ of the quantum theory of measurement 30
4. Conclusions 37
Chapter 2. Measurements and Insolubility Proofs 39
1. A statement of the problem 39
2. A ‘proof’ 48
3. Insolubility proofs and Real Unitary Evolution 63
4. Insolubility without probability 75
5. Insolubility proofs in the case of unsharp pointer observables 82
6. Conclusions 90
Chapter 3. Describing Measurement Interactions in Quantum Measurement
Theory 95
1. Some introductory remarks and definitions 96
2. The contractive partially isometric evolution and its completion in system-
apparatus measurement interactions 103
3. Partially isometric contractive mappings in the density operator formalism 112
4. The problem of completion for mappings on 7^ + (Us 0  %m) 118
5. Some informational results for mixed initial apparatus states 121
6. Conclusions
CONTENTS 4
131
Chapter 4. Algebraic Approaches in
Fine’s Solution to the Measurement Problem 134
1. Fine’s Solution to the Measurement Problem 135
2. Algebraic Quantum Theory and Fine’s Solution 139
3. Arguing for the algebraic rationale 150
4. Problems for Fine and Superselection 156
5. Two further problems for Fine’s account 159
6. Conclusions 169
Chapter 5. Conclusions 171
Appendix A. Proofs of Theorems 175
Bibliography 184
Statem ent o f Conjoint Work in Marco D el Seta’s Thesis
I certify that parts of Chapter 3 of my thesis, specifically sections 3.1 and 3.2, describe 
joint work with Gianpiero Cattaneo, of the University of Milan. My share of the work 
in this part of the thesis is 50%.
Marco Del Seta
I confirm that the previous statement, concerning Del Seta’s collaboration with 
Gianpiero Cattaneo, is correct to the best of my knowledge.
Nancy Cartwright
5
Acknowledgements
When I look at the work that makes up this thesis, I can’t help but feel how relatively 
little it reflects who I am now. It is probably common to change considerably over a 
period of four years, to learn new things. Most of the material in this thesis, Chapters 
2, 3 and 4, was initially written (in much worse form) in 1994, and at least in the gist 
of the topics remains the same. It is perhaps normal, then, that I should feel this way. 
The only substantive part of the thesis that is newer is Chapter 1. This reflects how I’ve 
come to think about this work in more recent times, and reflects the serious influence 
that many people have had on me in the meantime. I want to take the occasion to 
thank them and many others.
My interest in philosophy of physics started in an almost incidental manner. Hav­
ing spent my undergraduate years, and a year of masters study, in a mathematics 
department, doing pure and applied mathematics, with not a single person who even 
knew what philosophy of physics was, I could have been excused for missing out en­
tirely. Nevertheless I couldn’t even have dreamt of doing the work I have done without 
the training I received there. What brought me back to philosophy was philosophy of 
mathematics; what brought me to philosophy of physics was participation in a seminar 
organised by the Philosophy of Science Research Students Group (PSRSG) at LSE, 
where Mao Suarez discussed his Masters thesis on Quantum Logic. I am particularly 
grateful to him for this, obviously. He also was a constant source of conversations, and 
has been sorely missed since he has left, for no one else now really works on these topics 
here. The PSRSG taught me philosophy of science at a time when nobody else was 
really doing it; I have learned from the seminars by the members of this remarkable 
group about every manner of topic, and I should mention in particular Samet Bagce, 
Tim Childers, Robin Hendry and Stathis Psillos. It still is the best forum I can remem­
ber for the discussions, the quality of outside speakers when we invited them, and the 
beer sessions.
6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7
My greatest intellectual debt in this thesis is, in different ways, to three people: 
Nancy Cartwright, Gianpiero Cattaneo and Arthur Fine. Nancy for being a supervisor 
and friend, and extremely good at both. Thanks to her I’m just about getting the 
hang of this ‘writing philosophy’ lark. She has also been responsible for me becoming a 
jack of all trades, particularly encouraging me to move into economics. I’m still unsure 
whether this was a wise thing to do at this stage of my career, but it’s been enormously 
fun anyway. Her work in reading and commenting the thesis has been really thorough. 
I wanted to make some jokes about this, but it really wouldn’t be appropriate: any 
mistakes and faults that remain must surely be blamed on me. Gianpiero Cattaneo 
has taught me a fraction of what he knows (I’m still lagging behind with the rest), in 
his inestimable manner: as well as being co-responsible for one of the results in the 
thesis, he has taught me about such things as unsharp observables, fancy functional 
analysis and many other things, and has been a truly enjoyable visitor and friend in 
his many trips to London. Arthur Fine had a whirlwind trip through London in 1994, 
dropped a couple of papers, gave two seminars and that prompted me to write my first 
two papers; it was my first year as a PhD student, I was young and impressionable and 
that was that. Since then I have scarcely met him a couple of times, but I still feel that 
his general attitude to philosophy is one of the ones I respect the most.
More specific debts are to Nancy Cartwright and several people in the Philosophy 
Department, particularly Craig Callender, Cohn Howson, Thomas Uebel and John 
Worrall, for chapter 1; James Cushing commented on a very early version of chapter 2, 
Abner Shimony helped with a more recent one, and Paul Busch was of great assistance 
over email for questions regarding the latter part of that chapter; chapter 3 originates 
from a result worked out in conjunction with Gianpiero Cattaneo, and Mauricio Suarez 
also commented extensively; chapter 4 has been revised with the help of R. I. G. Hughes 
and Nancy Cartwright.
This takes care of the most direct intellectual debts vis-a-vis my thesis. The list of 
“without whom’s” , on the other hand, is another question altogether.
I t’s impossible not to start with my family, whose support has been never ending, 
on the italian side, but also on the english one; I can never thank my parents enough 
for all the support they have given me over the years. My girlfriend, Claudia, has borne 
my moods stoically, in a way that I am infinitely grateful for. Her constant presence, 
here, on the phone, on the email, any which way, has made it all much easier, both
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 8
to work and to forget about work. On which topic, friends of various non-academic 
kinds have been indispensable in getting away from it all: we’ve drunk, eaten, played 
bridge, danced in various of the London establishments and done all sorts of things 
unbecoming of a seriously minded academic. Most of all, we’ve not talked philosophy. 
For that, I thank them.
The Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science has been my home for 
the past five years, first as a student, then as staff. I have enjoyed the academic 
opportunities offered by the place enormously, and it is fair to say that the Centre as a 
whole supervised my work. I talked physics at some time or other with many people. 
Some have helped in a decisive way with my thesis: Jim Cushing and Abner Shimony in 
particular spring to mind. Some have been great company both intellectual and social: 
Teddy Seidenfeld, who was in my office encouraging me during difficult times trying 
to prove a damned result, Lawrence Sklar on trips to Chinatown, Jeff Bub who was 
very helpful with other work I have been doing, and, on many different and pleasant 
occasions, Cristina Bicchieri and David Malament. Many other people have visited the 
centre, and i t’s been a pleasure to know them all. I’m very grateful to all of them, 
especially James Woodward who gave me a wonderful book which I would never have 
been able to find otherwise. I’ve benefited from the presence of many other people 
around the Centre: amongst the students I would like to mention Sebastiano Bavetta, 
Francesco Guala and Towfic Shomar in particular, who have been great friends and 
with whom I have worked a lot in very different fields. Amongst the academics, I 
should mention in particular Mary Morgan, who has been tremendously encouraging 
in my forays in economics, and Margie Morrison. Amongst the colleagues here, I would 
like to thank Rudy Fara for always being there in moments of need.
In the Philosophy Department I have to thank Craig Callender, John Worrall and 
Elie Zahar for reading my material at different times and being of great help to me in 
many other ways. Peter Urbach was instrumental in guiding me through what was not 
always an easy first year in London, during my Masters, and if I have gone on to do 
my PhD it is largely thanks to him. The administrative staff in the Department have 
always been a great help in sorting out the details, and I owe them a lot, too. I must 
not forget Colin Howson and Thomas Uebel, partners in crime, who have spent endless 
hours, good and bad, with me in the Beaver’s Retreat, surely the greatest bar I have 
ever seen in an academic institution anywhere. The conversations there, more often
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 9
gossip and snide remarks than deep philosophy if tru th  be told, have been priceless 
and will, in all likelihood, be irreplaceable. I also want to thank R.I.G. Hughes, to 
whom I had the opportunity to talk about work both in this thesis and outside of it 
with great benefit, and who was also a regular member of the Beaver’s gang during his 
permanence here.
Thanks are also due to several members of the Philosophy Department of the Uni­
versity of Florence, in particular Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara and Roberto Giuntini. In 
my frequent trips to Italy they have proved to be a valuable source of conversations of 
an intellectual nature, and have always been good company in many other ways, too.
The last academic thanks, while clearly not the least, must go to ‘the historians’. 
The term denotes a somewhat heterogeneous group of people from London, Cambridge 
and other places, who have of course spent a lot of time with me in bars, but have also 
done a lot more. They have reminded me of what it is to think historically and taught 
me much more about this, so much so that I now find it very hard to stop doing it. It 
is in large part due to them that I now find it quite difficult to look at my thesis in the 
same way that I did four years ago. I would like to mention, in particular, Rob Iliffe 
and Andrew Warwick from Imperial College as the prime movers for this change. To 
these I should add many others, at least William Ashworth, Clinton Chaloner, David 
Edgerton, Simon Schaffer and undoubtedly many more whose names escape me now.
Finally, I want to thank the London School of Economics for providing me with a 
substantial scholarship during the first three years of my PhD and the Department of 
Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method for topping that up with the Popper Scholar­
ship. I also have to thank Pat Gardner, Theresa Hunt, Frances Townshend, Charlotte 
Savery and many others who have worked in the Philosophy office; amongst the many 
valuable services they have provided for us all, they have organised my job files and 
made sure that I could apply for jobs in the best possible way. The CPNSS also con­
tributed research funds for me, and eventually took over as my prime funder two years 
ago when they offered me a job here. They got their pound of flesh! And it would not 
have been possible to even attempt to do my job here without the constant backup 
of Kate Workman, Dorota Rejman and all the other people who have worked in the 
administrative office for the past five years. I am also grateful to the Centre for His­
tory of Science, Technology and Medicine, and to the Humanities Section, at Imperial 
College. They have employed me to lecture the undergraduate Philosophy of Science
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 10
course there for the last two years, an extremely valuable experience. Again, the ad­
ministrative staff made it all the more simple. My thanks go also to the many people 
who have invited me to contribute talks to seminars and conferences, amongst other 
places in Cambridge, Florence, Maastricht and Chicago. Sometimes I’m embarrassed 
at how messy my material has been when I have given talks on it. It has certainly 
improved enormously as a result of presenting it, and all these experiences have been 
fun and a great help.
Introduction
This thesis discusses the work on quantum measurement from a foundational and philo­
sophical perspective. Its title reflects the status I associate with this work: I want to 
argue that it is a typically theoretical enterprise, concerned with establishing theoret­
ical facts, as opposed to fitting experimental facts to theoretical ones. In order to do 
this, I will both put forward the philosophical argument for this claim, and explain 
and critically analyse quite what the theoretical work I refer to consists of. I will also 
analyse a case where the questions that quantum measurement raises are analysed from 
a point of view that is somewhat opposite to the one I endorse here, in that it seeks 
to rely on experimental facts. As well as raising a number of problems associated with 
the answers this case provides, I hope to show not only how quantum measurement 
is typically theoretical, but also that bringing it closer to experiment is fraught with 
difficulties.
I will begin by outlining the contents of the chapters which follow in the thesis, and 
then make some general comments on its contents.
Chapter 1 argues that the theoretical account of measurement that quantum me­
chanics provides is not about giving realistic accounts of experimental measurements, 
but rather about an attempt to answer questions which emerge in quantum theory. 
The argument is directed against criticisms of the formalism of quantum measurement 
which go back, in some form or other, at least to Maxgenau [64, 66], and which have 
been repeated in some form or other by, amongst others, Park [69] and Chang [22, 23].
The strategy of the arguments against the formalism of quantum measurement 
begins from the fact that projections (or ‘wave function collapses’) either happen, or 
appear to happen. By projection I indicate the well-known phenomenon in quantum 
theory that takes place upon measurement of a physical quantity on a system. In Dirac’s 
original statement [29, p. 5-6], the state of the system undergoes a discontinuous
l i
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transition when such a measurement takes place: it evolves from a superposition of 
states where the measured physical quantities have exact values, to one of these states.
In the standard Hilbert space representation of quantum mechanics, states are 
taken to be one-dimensional projectors on the Hilbert space which models the system 
(or indeed the unit vectors of the one-dimensional subspaces which are the image of 
the projectors). This is usually generalised to include convex combinations of the 
projectors, this whole set representing all the possible states. Elements of this set are 
normally called density operators, and the projections are also called pure states.
Observables, the physical magnitudes of the systems, are usually represented as self- 
adjoint operators on the Hilbert space; eigenstates of these operators are states where 
the physical quantity associated with the operator has a definite value, this value being 
the eigenvalue associated with the eigenstate. Projections over eigenstates of operators 
representing physical observables, together with their algebraic sum, capture properties'. 
in the standard approach to quantum theory a state then has the property represented 
by such a projector (which can be a projector over a subspace of whatever dimension) 
if and only if it itself projects on an eigenstate of the ‘property’. Pure states which are 
not eigenstates of a given observables are said to be in a superposition with respect to 
that observable.
Von Neumann [82, Ch. V] generalises Dirac’s projection postulate in the following 
way. The transition should not necessarily be understood as one from a superposi­
tion to an eigenstate of a measured observable. It is best understood as a transition 
from a projector on a superposition to a non-pure density operator which is a convex 
combination of appropriate eigenstates; this is Von Neumann’s type I  evolution.
The quantum theoretical accounts of measurement assume either that projections 
happen, or that it is as if they happened, so an account of measurement that denies 
that projections take place should nevertheless be able to account for measurement 
results consistent with projections happening.
Margenau first criticised the very idea that projections happened, or seemed to 
happen, drawing on examples from empirical practice. In doing this he would under­
mine the whole approach of the quantum formalism: what use would a theory trying to 
account for projections be, if projections didn’t happen, or happened very rarely, and 
if states changed in a manner that did not mirror what projection postulates claim?
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His most famous example is that of destructive photon measurements: when we 
measure photon polarisation, photons are destroyed, they never end up in eigenstates. 
W hat does the projection postulate have to say about this?
Chang in particular [23] has recently re-emphasised and reinforced this critique, ex­
plicitly directing it to the formalism of quantum measurement in general, and providing 
a number of good examples to prove his point.
My argument claims that this criticism is wrong. Its mistake lies in assuming that 
the aim of the formal account of quantum measurement is to provide a description or 
a calculational tool for all real-life experiments. I claim that the quantum theoretical 
accounts of measurement are designed to account for two questions:
1. What properties can we assign to quantum states?
2. What kinds of evolutions axe appropriate for quantum systems?
I think that in answering these two questions it is not crucial that we maintain a 
close connection to modelling experimental results, for these questions are focused on 
problems of a specifically theoretical nature. In making this claim, it is still necessary 
to explain why theoretical work need not depend on what happens in experiments. I 
will try to make sense of this by arguing for what Lakatos called the relative autonomy 
of theoretical science.
These questions have two traditional answers. The quantum theorist’s answer to 
the first question has been captured by the so-called eigenvalue-eigenstate link, which 
was mentioned above: a state has the property represented by a projector if and only 
if this state projects on an eigenstate of the ‘property’. The answer to the second ques­
tion claims that unitary evolutions, identified by the quantum mechanical Schrodinger 
equation, are the appropriate evolutions for quantum systems. Von Neumann’s type I 
evolutions are problematic, and it would be nice to be able to do without them. For 
one thing they violate historical determinism. As Earman has put it,
Letting W stand for the collection of all physically possible worlds. . .  [the] 
world W  £ W  is Laplacian deterministic just in case for any W ' £ W, if W  
and W ’ agree at any time, then they agree at all tim es.. . .  This concept of 
determinism can be broken down into two subconcepts. A world W  £ W  
is futuristically (respectively, historically) Laplacian deterministic just in
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case for any W ' € W, if W  and W ' agree at any time then they agree at 
all later (respectively, earlier) times. [30, p. 13]
If quantum mechanics admits of Von Neumann’s type I  evolutions, then it clearly 
is not historically deterministic. There will almost always be infinitely many states 
mapped by a type I  evolution to the same final state. If they are to be typical of the 
measurement process, this would make quantum mechanics indeterministic in a  way 
that is not only conceptually problematic, but also problematic for the relationship it 
implies with other theories which do not share this same feature. Can we do without 
these evolutions?
This question is at the root of the work in subsequent chapters of the thesis. The 
second chapter examines in detail why the two traditional answers are not co-existent, 
clarifying and extending the literature on the insolubility proofs of quantum measure­
ment. The starting point here is that we want our measured object to look like it is 
undergoing a type I  evolution, while arguing that this is not really what is going on. 
The answer to this is to enlarge the system under consideration to include the measur­
ing apparatus. Can the evolution be deterministic? Can we assign the right properties 
at the end of the evolution in a way that the eigenvalue-eigenstate link is in some sense 
preserved, while giving rise to the correct properties?
This latter requirement, in the context of the description on the enlarged sys­
tem, is demanded not necessarily of the object system, but at least of the apparatus, 
which records the measured values. In order to ensure that the eigenvalue-eigenstate 
link is applicable to the final state after a measurement has taken place, the unitary 
measurement operator U effecting the measurement has to satisfy the objectification 
requirement. This requirement demands that the final state of the combined system be 
a convex combination of eigenstates of the pointer observable for the combined system.
Is objectification sufficient to guarantee that the right properties are possessed by 
the apparatus subsystem? No; we need some sort of probabilistic condition, too. The 
standard condition that is assumed is the probability reproducibility condition: if the 
object state is such that, upon measurement and projection, it is transformed into 
a certain eigenstate of the measured observable with probability a , then the pointer 
should point to the value associated with that eigenstate also with probability a. The 
problem is that no unitary operator which satisfies objectification can satisfy either the
INTRODUCTION 15
probability reproducibility or any reasonable generalisation of it. That is the core of 
traditional insolubility results.
Chapter 2 will discuss these results. It provides several generalisations of the results 
known so fax. In particular, it proves a characterisation theorem for all unitary opera­
tors satisfying objectification, which allows for a ‘constructive’ proof of insolubility of 
the quantum measurement problem.
In the process of doing this the chapter will try to resolve a long standing conceptual 
controversy between Shimony and Stein on the one hand, and Fine and Brown on the 
other, as to the validity of the latter two’s proof of insolubility, which assumes an 
additional principle, Real Unitary Evolution (RUE). I will show how the technical 
content of RUE is in fact deducible from unitarity and objectification.
I will the provide a preliminary insolubility proof for the case when the pointer 
observable is unsharp. This is a rather delicate question: as I will show, the formal 
statement of an unsharp objectification is not trivial, and it is far from clear that 
insolubility results will continue to hold under all possible conditions of unsharp objec­
tification. I will propose such a statement and go on to prove an insolubility result for 
a restricted set of cases.
It is important to discuss why it is necessary to consider the case of unsharp pointer 
observables. The framework in which unsharp observables axe introduced is slightly 
different from the one outlined earlier for standard observables. Another way of looking 
at observables is as mappings from possible values of physical quantities to projection 
operators, that is as projection-valued measures (PV measures for short). It is possible 
to recover the self-adjoint operators by adding up the projection operators in the range 
of the measure, multiplied by the values associated with them, so that there is a one- 
to-one correspondence between PV measures and self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert 
space. PV measures can be generalised in much the same way that pure states are 
generalised to density operators. Namely, values can be mapped to convex combinations 
of projections, called effects. In this case the projections can be over subspaces of 
dimension greater than one, rather than one-dimensional projections only as is the case 
with states, and the resulting, extended set of observables is known as the set of positive 
operator-valued measures (p o v  measures for short). The set of PV measures is a subset 
of this, known as the set of sharp observables. POV measures which aren’t sharp axe 
known as unsharp. This construction is consistent with states and observables yielding
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probabilities, through the calculation of the trace of the product of the state (as density 
operator) by the appropriate property (as effects).
The generalisation is not only mathematical, but has important physical conse­
quences and applications, too. It was introduced by, amongst others, Davies and Lewis 
[26] in the context of setting up an operational approach to quantum mechanics. Many 
of the physical applications have been extensively discussed by Busch, Grabowski and 
Lahti [13], who show for example how the analysis of the original Stern-Gerlach exper­
iment necessarily involves POV measures. Another important physical aspect of the set 
of POV measures is that it contains unsharp joint position and momentum observables.
It will help to give an example of an experimental setup which is necessarily analysed 
in terms of unsharp observables. This I do in Figure 1, which is taken from a paper by 
Pessoa, which discusses some of the aspects of measurement and unsharp observables 
[70].
6 =  30
6 =  0
F i g u r e  1. A  measurement setup where the detection operators are unsharp
Here a beam of light is separated at the birefrangent prism oriented at 6 =  0 
degrees. The top and bottom components then fall on two further analysers, oriented 
at 6 =  30 and 9 =  45 degrees respectively. The observable representing the fact that 
the particle is detected at D\ or D 2 is resolved as a positive operator valued measure 
which is unsharp: each one of the two detectors receives a fraction of the top and 
bottom components coming out of the first prism, rather than receiving definitely up 
or definitely down photons as would be the case if the observable was a PV measure.
In the case of the measurement problem, consideration of unsharp pointer observ­
ables is particularly important, for it is an open question whether unsharp objectifi­
cation and unitarity will contradict probabilistic conditions, as happens for the sharp 
case. In fact it is pretty much an open question what unsharp objectification precisely
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consists of. The importance of this analysis is that, were it possible to provide a model 
of measurement satisfying these conditions for unsharp observables, this would count 
as a solution of the measurement problem, at least from the formal point of view. 
While my conclusions are sceptical on this topic, it should be stressed that this does 
depend in a fundamental way on the definition that I propose, and defend, of unsharp 
objectification.
Chapter 3 addresses questions connected to probability and measurement in quan­
tum  mechanics. Its aim is to explore to the full the implications of the other assump­
tion made in the previous chapter, namely the probability reproducibility condition. 
I discuss how this condition works with the demand of unitarity of the measurement 
process and more generally, for the case when states are taken to be density operators, 
bijectivity.
The probability reproducibility condition is not the only condition that has been 
proposed in order to capture the probabilistic aspect of a good measurement. While it 
dates back to at least Von Neumann, Fine [35] suggested other, more general condi­
tions: these amount essentially to asking the pointer apparatus to discriminate between 
probabilistically different object states, without asking it to get the probabilities asso­
ciated with the object absolutely right. These are an important conditions to bear in 
mind when discussing insolubility proofs, for they are considerably more general than 
the probability reproducibility condition. However they are problematic in several dif­
ferent ways, as again Fine, and also others, have pointed out, when used to characterise 
actual unitary operators effecting premeasurements. Premeasurements are unitary op­
erators which map an initial state to a semi-final state, so to speak, namely to a state 
which just predates collapse of the wave function. In so-called no collapse interpreta­
tions, these premeasurements are actually all that there is to measurement.
In this chapter I discuss how to define premeasurement interactions that satisfy the 
unitarity and probability reproducibility conditions. I will present a detailed generalisa­
tion of a result by Beltrametti, Cassinelli and Lahti, which fixes the type of interactions 
for the Hilbert space case. I will then explore the question of how to define such map­
pings for the density operator formalism. The question is less straightforward in this 
case, though I will show that when measurements satisfying probability reproducibility 
and a suitable generalisation of unitarity exist, they must be actions on density opera­
tors of the form UTU*, where T is a density operator and U is a unitary operator on the
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composite object +  apparatus system fixed by the result which generalises Beltrametti 
et al.’s theorem.
This result enables us to establish a number of consequences for the density operator 
case concerning the types of unitary premeasurements that will be possible. I will 
show that, if the initial apparatus state is a non-pure density operator, then no Von 
Neumann, repeatable or first kind measurements are ever possible. I will also show how 
there are cases where no unitary premeasurement satisfying probability reproducibility 
is possible at all. I discuss some of the consequences of these cases at the end of the 
chapter.
Chapters 2 and 3 both give characterisations of operators which satisfy objectifica­
tion and the probability reproducibility condition, respectively, as well as being both 
unitary. If we wish to maintain all three of these conditions, then from a formal point 
of view an obvious thing to do is to look for subsets of the set of states where the 
two characterisations agree. This is effectively what superselection approaches to the 
measurement problem do. It is also what Fine does, in a series of recent papers propos­
ing a solution to the measurement problem. I will be examining Fine’s solution and 
comparing it to solutions which adopt superselection rules. The aim of Fine’s solution 
is to consider what measurements actually do. This is of interest, for it is not the usual 
strategy that we find in work on the quantum measurement problem. On the other 
hand, as I argued in chapter 1, it is not entirely clear that this is the aim of the work in 
the measurement problem. This makes Fine’s work doubly unusual, for he is changing 
the question somewhat, as well as offering a different answer.
His solution claims that measurement interactions interact not with the full physical 
details contained in the standard quantum states, but only with ‘aspects’ of these 
details, namely the probabilistic aspects related to the measured object observable. 
This leads him to rewrite the initial states in such a way that they encode only the 
information of these aspects. These states happen to be states for which the standard 
unitary operators satisfying probability reproducibility also satisfy objectification, so 
that the measurement problem can be solved for them.
I think there are basically two kinds of difficulties with Fine’s solution to the mea­
surement problem. The first kind enters into the picture when the formal similarity 
with superselection approaches is taken on board. The similarity becomes more than
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formal, I argue, if we properly explore Fine’s suggestion that we give an algebraic argu­
ment in support of his solution. I explore how the various kinds of difficulties implicit 
in the superselection approach re-emerge in Fine’s approach, and argue that for the 
most part the difficulties are still there.
The second kind is concerned with how the technical device which gives a solution 
of the measurement problem is connected with what Fine claims real measurements 
do. I argue, amongst other things, that the notion of interaction with an aspect faces 
problems in certain kinds of measurement interactions, namely non-ideal ones, and that 
in general Fine is unsuccessful at persuading us that the measurement operators model 
interactions with an aspect, for there are far too many aspects that are captured by 
the standard measurement operators analysed in Chapter 3, which Fine assumes to be 
the appropriate ones to model measurement.
Summing up, Chapter 1 provides an overview of what I take the quantum theory’s 
analysis of measurement to be about, and a defence of this project against criticisms 
that accuse it of falling short of the standards of accurately describing what happens 
in real measurements. Chapters 2 and 3 examine some of the standard conditions that 
are required of the quantum theoretical account of measurement, proving a number of 
new results, analysing some of the debates in the field and raising some new problems. 
Chapter 4 examines a  particular solution that has been proposed by Fine and that 
naturally suggests itself in the light of the preceding analysis. I claim that the solution 
fails both if it is supported by algebraic techniques of quantum mechanics, as Fine, 
suggested, and in general, too.
CHAPTER 1
The Relative Autonom y of Theory: Quantum  
M easurements and Real M easurem ents
Is the quantum theoretical description of measurement empty? If it is, some serious 
consequences follow: a great deal of foundational work is barking up the wrong tree.
There is a long tradition arguing precisely this; the quantum theoretical description 
of measurement is not a theory of measurement when we think about the nature of 
actual physical measurement. In this chapter I want to show how the quantum theory of 
measurement is not empty and can be defended in its current aims from such criticisms, 
by relying on the idea of the relative autonomy of theoretical science. The phrase is 
due to Lakatos (see [60]), but such ideas are present in a  variety of forms in a variety 
of writers.
I will begin by describing an important line of criticism of quantum theories of 
measurement, due essentially to Margenau [66, 65], further discussed by Park [69] 
and, in a  more general form, by Chang [23]. I will then raise some problems for these 
criticisms and show how I think we should understand them. Finally I will claim 
that the critiques do not affect the work done in the quantum theoretical accounts 
of measurement and that it is no bad thing. I will explain this by placing work on 
quantum measurement squarely in the “theoretical”camp, and arguing for the relative 
autonomy of theory.
1. Quantum measurement and the real world
The criticism I want to address is that quantum mechanical accounts of measure­
ment processes do not accurately describe (let alone explain) what happens in real 
world measurements, and that they should therefore be rejected, or that at least their 
role in foundational debates in quantum mechanics should be much reduced.
I will look at two versions of the argument. Margenau is concerned to establish 
the unreasonableness of the projection postulate in its original form (as stated in Dirac 
[29] and further expressed as Von Neumann’s type 1 evolution) as an account of what
20
1. QUANTUM MEASUREMENT AND THE REAL WORLD 21
happens in real measurements. More recent work, such as the paper by Chang, extends 
Margenau’s type of argument to include the two-system interaction picture of measure­
ment, again originally due to Von Neumann; the latter account is what is generally 
termed ‘quantum theory of measurement’ today.
Recall the projection postulate in its original form: we want to measure an observ­
able which has a set of allowed values, represented by eigenvalues {e*} of the corre­
sponding operator 0 , associated with eigenstates {<#}. The projection postulate tells 
us that at the end of the measurement each individual observed system will be in one 
of the states The postulate guarantees, in its usual understanding, that at least 
by the time the measurement is over, if not before, the system has the value that we 
observe it to have upon measurement: it will yield just that value again if the measure­
ment is immediately repeated. Von Neumann generalises the idea to that of a type 1 
evolution of a system [82, p. 351]. Instead of discussing states as one-dimensional sub­
spaces of a Hilbert space, think of the description of states as density operators, where 
a density operator is either a projection onto a one-dimensional subspace (convention­
ally a pure state), or a convex combination of such projections, that is a weighted sum 
with positive coefficients summing to one (conventionally termed a mixed state). Then 
a type 1 evolution is a mapping of a pure state to a mixed state, where projections 
decomposing the final state are projections onto eigenstates of a measured observable.
Extending this story to the interaction picture of measurements requires including 
in the description of the measurement evolution an apparatus system, and studying the 
possible interactions which will yield a final state, after measurement, compatible with 
our observation that the pointer points to a definite value. We assume that the object 
states are rays in a Hilbert space %§, while the apparatus is represented in a Hilbert 
space The measured observable O must be linked up to a pointer observable M, 
so that a pointer being in an eigenstate ifa indicates that the value associated with the 
eigenstate of the measured system observable (pi has been detected. The measurement 
will consist in the first instance of an interaction on the joint system W§ ®'Hm which 
transmits information from the object to the measuring apparatus. Then crucially, we 
will want the final state of the combined object -I- apparatus system to be an eigenstate 
(or perhaps a mixture of eigenstates) of the pointer observable I ® M  on the joint 
system.
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In The Nature of Physical Reality and subsequent work Margenau gives an argument 
against the projection postulate. The claim for which he is most known concerns the 
absurdity of applying the projection postulate to concrete measurement situations. His 
example is that of the measurement of photon polarisation, the very example that 
Dirac [29, p. 8] uses. To measure photon polarisation we place a photocounter next to 
a polarisation prism to record the passage of a photon through the prism. The photon 
is absorbed by the photocounter and leads to the excitation of atoms in an energy chain 
reaction which causes the counter to click. The key fact, for Margenau, is that the 
photon is absorbed. In a sense, then, it ceases to exist. In his famous phrase, “we may 
be pardoned for refusing to discuss the eigenstates of non-entities” [66, p. 377].
The argument is a little more subtle than this. The first part of the argument 
contends that a measurement must yield numerical values. Margenau takes this to be a 
necessary condition: unless an interaction yields a number it is not a  measurement, but 
merely an ‘operation’. Margenau wants to distinguish the latter, ‘qualitative’ activity 
from quantitative ones which produce numbers. The term ‘operation’ for Margenau 
then designates, amongst other things, observations (the kinds of procedures where 
we observe an effect, like the superconductivity effect, without having made a precise 
numerical determination of anything), construction of equipment (like setting up the 
laboratory material for performing an experiment) and, crucially for Margenau, state 
preparation. A state preparation is any procedure which sets up a state in such a way 
that it can be subjected to a measurement, but does not actually produce a number. 
The preparation procedure can generate a statistical ensemble from which the data are 
collected, but it need not, and in general will not, be an act of measurement: we can, 
by filtering photons through a crystal, produce an ensemble of systems prepared in a 
certain polarisation state, but we cannot call this a measurement until the photons 
have been suitably recorded, and a numerical value has been produced.
According to the usual story, when a photon is filtered through a prism, if it emerges 
on the other side a measurement has been performed and the photon must be in a 
polarisation eigenstate, because if another prism with the same orientation is placed 
on its path the photon will still go through the prism: we can tell this, for instance, 
by putting a photocounter on the exit path of the second prism. But according to 
Margenau this story won’t work: the first part of the experiment is a  state preparation, 
and we do not record a numerical value in it. How can we know what state the system
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actually is in at that stage? Well, we could place a photocounter between the first and 
second prism, but then the photon would be destroyed and certainly would not be in a 
polarisation eigenstate. So the projection postulate is an unrealistic assumption.
Chang has extended Margenau’s criticism to the interaction picture of measure­
ments introduced by Von Neumann [82, Ch. IV]. This picture, as mentioned before, 
generalises the analysis by describing a situation where the system upon which a mea­
surement is to be performed (the object system) is placed in interaction with an ap­
paratus, and the two evolve in such a way that the apparatus reproduces, according 
to some specific conditions, the properties of the system. Chang claims tha t measure­
ments, as thus represented, correspond with almost no known real measurement. He 
calls the picture of measurement emerging from Von Neumann’s theory the ‘single­
interaction’ picture: one group of time-indexed unitary operators, all generated by the 
same Hamiltonian, describes a measurement.
Recall that, in quantum mechanics, the dynamical evolution of a system is char­
acterised by the Schrodinger equation which is specified via an energy Hamiltonian, 
the sum of the kinetic and potential energies of the system. Given this Hamiltonian, 
which identifies the kind of interaction one is dealing with, one can calculate for each 
instant of time t  an operator which maps the initial state of the system to the state 
that the system has at t. Such an operator is unitary, and all the operators for different 
times, when taken together, form a continuous group, so that the system changes in a 
continuous way. From this follows that we can think of measurements being realised in 
one single run, the different time-indexed unitary operators telling us what the stage 
of the measurement is at a given time.
According to Chang, the normal situation in the laboratory is that we have many 
more interactions going on in a measurement, and so the picture painted by the quan­
tum theory of measurement is misleading if not downright mistaken. The argument 
is a generalisation of Margenau’s in that it tries to maintain the charge tha t quantum 
theoretical descriptions of measurement are unrealistic, while bypassing some possible 
objections to the Margenau story. I will return to this briefly further on.
Chang argues the point through a variety of examples; the most persuasive one 
concerns Millikan’s experiments which determine the kinetic energy of the electron 
through electrostatic retardation. The context of such experiments is Millikan’s attempt 
to measure Planck’s constant.
1. QUANTUM MEASUREMENT AND THE REAL WORLD 24
The structure of this experiment involves the production of electrons, and the at­
tempt to make them pass through potential barriers of increasing intensity. When 
the electrons begin to pass the potential barrier in large number, it is possible to say 
that the kinetic energy has value equal to the corresponding threshold potential en­
ergy. Chang contends that it is not possible to make much sense of this experiment 
unless many runs are performed. This involves carrying through many interactions, 
with different potential barriers which the electron has to try to ‘overcome’, and these 
different potential barriers lead to different hamiltonians (expressed as a sum of kinetic 
and potential energy), lots of them, not just the single one that the Von Neumann 
interaction picture talks about. Note that we are discussing genuinely different kinds 
of interactions, since the potential energy is actually different for each one, not many 
repeated instances of the same interaction.
Chang further contends that there are grounds, given these examples, for appro­
priating a distinction between notions of measurements, due originally to Park [69]. 
According to Park we have a notion of measurement, Mi, which is theory driven, per­
haps typically quantum mechanical and is “used in stating the values of observables 
possessed by quantum states and objects. This concept would be employed even if 
there were never any laboratory measurements to be described or referred to” [23, p. 
156]. This is what we do, for example, when we theoretically ascribe probabilities for 
certain values to be found upon measurement This is to be distinguished from M2 , 
the second sense of measurement, which is actual physical measurement, the act of ob­
taining certain pieces of information about certain phenomena. This distinction seems 
plausible at least in order to separate what the quantum theory analyses as measure­
ment from the apparently very different practices that constitute the experimentalist’s 
measurement.
It is less clear why we should take M\ seriously, if it fails so conspicuously to make 
contact with real measurements, which he designates by M2 .
The key in answering that question [about the relationship between M \ 
and M2] lies in recognising that it is the final information gained from 
M2 , rather than anything about the process of gaining that information, 
that should stand in some significant relationship to the requirements of 
Mi. [23, p. 158].
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Having argued that the distinction is there, Chang claims that the distinction is best 
interpreted as one between a mediating formalism M\ that can be compared with the 
numerical reports of activities in M 2 . The purpose of the mediating formalism M \ is 
to help bring out some kinds of predictions, or at least numbers, from the quantum 
theory. M 2  tells us what happens in real measurements, which in Margenau’s sense 
produce numbers:
Mi often serves as the conduit of predictions made by the formal the­
ory, and in such cases there is a rather straightforward correspondence 
between the Mi-results and some M 2 -results. For instance, the formal 
theory might make predictions about the energy distributions in certain 
groups of electrons, and M2 -measurements of energy can verify those pre­
dictions. However, often the predictions of the formal theory are couched 
in other terms than Mi results, and in such cases Mi serves at best in 
some intermediate steps in making the predictions. [23, p. 158].
Some predictions of quantum mechanics (energies, for example) will be arrived at thanks 
to M i. The details of how M \ should play this role are left unspecified. In short, 
according to Chang, Mi, the kind of measurement studied in the quantum theory of 
measurement, is at best an occasional, and very peculiar, bridge principle, linking the 
theory with some kind of observation reports or, in the absence of a theory-observation 
distinction, a vocabulary that is ‘antecedently understood’.
2. How far do the criticisms go?
I now want to point out some problems for these critiques, and explain how I 
understand them.
Must quantum mechanical descriptions of measurement be abandoned, as Margenau 
has claimed, or confined to providing occasional predictions, as Chang says?
I want to argue that quantum mechanical accounts of measurement cannot function 
as literal descriptions of all real measurement processes of physical quantities, nor 
should they be understood as bridge principles helping the quantum theory to yield its 
predictions. Insofar as I maintain the first claim I am conceding something to Margenau 
and Chang’s argument. Unlike Margenau and Chang, however, I see this as a first step 
for a proper appreciation of the role of quantum theoretical accounts of measurement, 
rather than as a reason for rejecting these accounts.
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The notion of ‘relative autonomy of theoretical science’ will then form an important 
part of my argument for what quantum theoretical accounts of measurement are and 
why they can legitimately be what they are.
Kronz [54] has pointed out that there are several problems with Margenau’s story. 
Margenau’s concept of non-entity fails to take into account properly what the absence 
of a particle means in the quantum domain. What is there, in particular, to stop us 
considering a state for the absence of a photon, a vacuum state?
Even only as a purely empiricist move, to save the phenomena, this would allow us 
to rescue the theory of quantum measurements from Margenau’s criticism, particularly 
when allied with an obvious generalisation of the projection postulate as a reduction 
not on one system, but on two.
Kronz’s argument goes as follows. Suppose we have an object plus apparatus system 
described by a state p  <3 ifto in the space Hs <S> 'Hm where ip 6 “H§ is the initial state of 
the object and £ “Hm is the initial state of the apparatus. Let the system evolve in 
the first instance by an appropriate unitary evolution U, let’s call it a premeasurement, 
and then suppose that a discontinuous reduction, akin to the projection postulate, 
occurs such that the evolved state U(p <S> ipo) is transformed into a  state which is a 
mixed state for which we can claim that the pointer observable has definite values.
This ‘recipe’ will leave completely unspecified what the final object states might 
be. Roughly speaking, if the final states of the object are eigenstates of the measured 
object observable we can call the measurement ideal. This is the case originally studied 
by Von Neumann. But the possible final object states could all be vacuum states, 
reflecting the fact that the photons have been absorbed in the process of determining 
their polarisation; this does not affect the desideratum that the final state be a mixed 
state where the pointer observable H <8> M  has definite values, a desideratum which 
is guaranteed by the generalisation of the projection postulate in the shape of the 
discontinuous reduction.
Admittedly this opens up another problem: what does it mean to say that we have 
measured an object to have the value e* for observable E  in this case? In the standard 
case, we say that an object system has value e, if, upon measurements being repeated, 
the system always displays e* as a value. This implies that (a) the system is in the 
eigenstate <pi associated with e* (at least in the standard reading of quantum theory). 
Such measurements are called non-disturbing. Non-ideal measurements, on the other
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hand, are measurements for which the final object state is not such an eigenstate. So 
when did the system ever have the value e*? Several answers can be given (see for 
example D’Espagnat’s reading of non-ideal measurements [27, Sec. 18.2]). They seem 
to presume an ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics in D’Espagnat’s sense. 
We can also point out that, insofar as we think that what is important about quantum 
measurement is the recording of probabilistic frequencies of observables’ values in the 
object system, non-ideal measurements are perfectly compatible with this requirement 
(see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this). Furthermore, as we think that it is crucial 
that at least the pointers point to the right values, this is also compatible with non­
ideal measurements. The crucial point here, nevertheless, is that Margenau claims 
that (a) does not hold in real measurements, and that this invalidates the projection 
story. The counterclaim, as expressed by Kronz, is that the fact that (a) does not hold 
does not invalidate the projection story in general: it’s just a matter of recognising 
at what level (whether at the level of an individual system or at that of a composite 
system) the projection postulate applies. What we should replace (a) with is quite 
another question, and one that is addressed by a number of different interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, with which I won’t be concerned here.
When we consider that in fact the vacuum state is much more than a fictional ar­
tifact, but is in fact a  concept much used in Quantum Field Theory, Kronz’s argument 
provides a more than reasonable response to Margenau’s point that the projections are 
empirically undermined by most measurements: if we treat quantum measurements in 
the two-system formalism and adopt a suitable generalisation of the projection pos­
tulate, which guarantees that pointers behave in the right way, while allowing objects 
the freedom to disappear, then the examples that Margenau cites do not empirically 
undermine this picture.
Chang’s examples, however, function as a critique of the two-system formalism 
of quantum measurement as much as of the projection postulate. Kronz’s argument 
can work as a reply to Margenau, but Chang’s point still remains: if there are some 
measurements which do require multiple runs, and thus rely in a crucial way on different 
Hamiltonians to be described by quantum mechanics, then even the two-interaction 
picture, which relies on a single Hamiltonian to describe a measurement, will not work. 
There will be examples of real measurements which cannot be described by it, for 
it requires, as we have just seen in the discussion of Kronz’s argument, that there
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be a unitary premeasurement evolution which initially evolves the state for object +  
apparatus, and this unitary evolution will be generated by a unique Hamiltonian.
There is something important in Chang’s point. That some distinction must be 
drawn between quantum measurement theory and real measurements was apparent all 
the way back to Wigner, and good examples of measurements which are problematic 
in the quantum theoretical account of measurement, formally, methodologically or on- 
tologically, might be actual measurements of mass, or Wigner’s own example, that of 
the experimentalist’s measurement of the cross-section. These are, I think, more in­
structive examples than Chang’s own one if all he wants is to establish that there are 
real measurements for which the quantum theory of measurement has no story to tell.
In fact, the quantum theory of measurement is a theory of how we collect partic­
ular information about certain observables, where ‘observable’ is a technical term for 
a quantity that is represented by linear, Hermitean operators. But what is being mea­
sured when we measure cross-section or mass is a quantity which is not an observable 
in standard quantum mechanics in this sense, i.e. it has no operator representation. 
Yet we measure mass and cross-section all the time, and certainly they are real, routine 
measurements. Quantum measurement theory does not offer descriptions of all the 
possible measurements that one might perform, that much is clear.
Chang criticises M \ , the theoretical notion of quantum measurement, on the grounds 
that it is defective in describing what happens in real measurements. His farther claim, 
as is evident in the quote from his paper reproduced on page 24, is that the role M \ 
plays is one of providing predictions.
But if the quantum account of measurement, denoted by Chang’s M \, is so defective 
in its descriptions of real measurements, on what grounds should we want to use it at 
all as a source of empirical predictions?
We will not be able to use it to predict what states the measured system will end 
in. This is precisely one of the points that is being denied in Chang’s and Margenau’s 
critique of the projection postulate. The projection postulate claims that measured 
objects end up in eigenstates of the measured observable. Real experiments directly 
deny this, as is the case with photon polarisation experiments, or with the repeated 
measurements performed to calculate the electron’s energy in Millikan’s experiment: 
the latter seems to provide no definitive numerical output as to what the final state
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of the electron will be after we have determined its energy, so there is no standard 
prediction for M\ to make here.
The other possibility is that M \ predicts probabilities and eigenstates that are 
measured on object systems. I think that for these cases quantum measurement in­
teractions, as described by M i, do not lead to specific predictions for real systems, 
predictions that could not be arrived at otherwise. Therefore I claim that Mi has no 
role to play over and above the standard quantum theory in making these predictions, 
so if we want to know why this kind of work is important we need to look for something 
different from this.
In order to see this, think of standard Hamiltonians in quantum theory generating 
interactions from which we derive predictions, like the Hamiltonian for the hydrogen 
atom. These are grounded in physical considerations which have a long and established 
tradition. We can use the Hamiltonians to calculate eigenvalues and eigenstates for a 
system like a hydrogen atom, and then calculate the probability of a state of the atom 
having a certain energy, thus generating predictions. We can, for example, calculate 
with this the probability of the direction of an electron scattering off (rebounding off) 
the atom, assumed to be in a definite energy eigenstate to begin with, and of the atom 
returning to a particular energy eigenstate after the collision.
This shows that we do not need to invoke projection postulates or their generali­
sations to predict energy eigenvalues or transition probabilities, it is just not part of 
standard practice in quantum mechanics. What we need to know is the Hamiltonian 
for the former kind of prediction, and the unitary evolution of the system under study 
for the latter. Bom’s paper on collisions in quantum mechanics [8] is a good example, 
amongst many others, for this.
Also, note that measurement interactions are never discussed in terms of the Hamil­
tonians that generate them, unlike the standard cases of interactions just described. 
We look directly for unitary operators which have little physical intuition behind them 
(again this will be evident in the discussion in Chapter 3, and will pose a  problem for 
any discussions of the quantum measurement problem which claim to tell us about how 
measurements really work, as I will illustrate in chapter 4). Therefore, if we are to 
find a notion of prediction in the quantum measurement theory M \ , it is not one that 
follows the standard patterns of quantum theory which are well exemplified by Bom’s 
discussion of hydrogen atom collisions.
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It follows that, if prediction were to be the rationale for taking M i seriously, we 
would need to find out quite what prediction means with M i, as it doesn’t seem to be 
anything that is standardly understood as prediction in quantum theory. However, I 
think that, whatever role quantum theoretical accounts of measurement might have, 
they do not include that of being a source of predictions in quantum mechanics. I will 
try to give some sense of what I see the quantum theory of measurement as doing in 
the next section.
3. The ‘relative autonomy’ of the quantum theory of measurement
Commitment to a precise descriptive account of quantum measurements is at the 
root of Margenau and Chang’s criticism of the quantum measurement formalism. The 
criticism argues that the formalism does not yield such an account. Denying that 
the formalism need to subscribe to this commitment removes most of the force of the 
criticism. Outward commitment to a prediction role for the quantum measurement 
formalism is Chang’s positive argument for the formalism. As I have just argued at the 
end of the previous section, I don’t think that the quantum measurement formalism 
is about yielding predictions. We need to see what it does, then, before we can assess 
whether its role can be fulfilled without commitment to a precise description of real 
measurements.
So what is the role of the quantum theoretical accounts of measurement? I think 
there are two. The first follows from a question posed by Wigner:
[the quantum theorist] has appropriated the word ‘measurement’ and used 
it to characterise a special type of interaction by means of which informa­
tion can be obtained on the state of a definite object. Thus, the measure­
ment of a physical constant, such as cross section, does not fall into the 
category called ‘measurement’ by the theorist. His measurements answer 
only questions relating to the ephemeral state of a physical system, such 
as, ‘What is the x  component of momentum of this atomV  [87, p. 329]
The quantum theoretical account of measurement seeks in the first instance to establish 
the necessary conditions for answering Wigner’s question: “What is the x  component 
of momentum of this atom?” Measurement, for Wigner, is about determining the 
theoretical conditions for properties to be assigned to physical systems and investigating 
the cases in which these conditions are fulfilled. A typical answer to this might require
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that the system be in an appropriate eigenstate, and would then investigate how this 
can come about. Alternatively it might just postulate that properties are assigned 
upon completion of a unitary coupling with an apparatus and impose a  number of 
conditions for this strategy. Note that Wigner distinguishes the theorist’s notion of 
measurement from the experimentalist’s simply because the former is more restricted 
and does not include a number of cases like cross-section. I want to say more: I 
want to claim that the distinction is such that the theorist does not have to worry 
about the conditions that the experimentalist has to deal with, and the practice of 
the laboratory. What makes the conditions theoretical in nature is clear: they are not 
concerned in the slightest with laboratory practices and conditions. So even though 
Wigner’s question looks like one that an experimentalist might ask, there is no concern 
whatsoever with the kinds of things that Millikan, for example, mentions as essential 
conditions for the determination of the photon’s energy: these conditions concern the 
repetition of the experiment several times with successively more refined equipment, 
in order to guarantee an appropriate vacuum in the machine, the least possible direct 
human intervention when shaving off copper from the detector and so on. What I am 
interested in, effectively, is whether Millikan’s concerns should be explicitly reflected in 
Wigner’s.
The second aim of the quantum theoretical accounts of measurement is to address 
the problems of a theory which, if Von Neumann’s projection postulate, or some such 
variation, is accepted, is not, to use Earman’s terminology, historically deterministic at 
the very least.
Again Wigner [87, p. 326] talks of the strange dualism implied by the assumption 
of two types of change of the state vector: evolution with respect to Schrodinger’s 
equation and projection. The latter evolution introduces indeterminism in the theory. 
I understand historical indeterminism more or less in the sense that Earman gives. One 
of the physically possible worlds W  is historically deterministic if, given another world 
W \  if W  and W ' agree at one point, they agree at all past points.
If quantum mechanics admits of projection evolutions, then it is not historically 
deterministic. There will always be infinitely many states mapped by the projection 
evolution to the same final state: for example any two distinct states of the form 
V? =  ot\(p\ -H oi2 ^ 2  will be mapped onto (pi by a projection onto (p\. A similar point also 
holds for Von Neumann’s type 1 evolutions.
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The problems here axe felt because determinism is thought to be a powerful heuris­
tic, or a metaphysically preferable characteristic, of physical theories, and because of 
the problems that arise when quantum theory is to be used or fused with theories that 
are essentially deterministic, such as for instance general relativity. The problem is 
further compounded by the fact that quantum theory offers no internal recipe for de­
ciding when the indeterministic evolutions should apply: renouncing these evolutions 
in favour of determinism would enable us to sidestep this problem, too.
I should stress here that the claim which I will make, that these problems can 
be investigated independently of direct experimental comparisons, does not mean that 
experiments never play a role in theoretical physics. Rather my claim will suggest 
that the role experimental practice plays for theory is not one of the constant guardian 
against the excesses of theory. It would be wrong, however, to deny that much of the 
original source of the debates in quantum mechanics on the nature of measurement 
draws on the results of experiments. Clearly, observation of quantization of energy led 
to the formulation of the idea of a quantum jump. Also our intuitive idea of what 
properties should be assigned to a system is motivated by experimental findings. The 
point is rather that the discussion to which we have been led is by now quite distinct 
from questions about what happens in real measurements of physical quantities.
There are two kinds of approaches for dealing with the second question, related to 
the problem of determinism, for example:
• We can deny that one of the two evolutions, usually the non-unitary, indetermin­
istic projection, is an evolution that quantum states actually undergo. We can 
then attempt to formulate some interpretive algorithm that will provide what 
the rejected evolution provided: this is the strategy associated, for example, with 
relative state and modal approaches to the problem.
• We can try to show that in a more general picture, one evolution reduces to 
the other, or both reduce to an encompassing one: this is the kind of strategy 
associated with decoherence approaches, which also reject indeterministic evo­
lutions, or with generalising the Schrodinger approach, where we treat unitary, 
deterministic evolutions as special cases of non-unitary, indeterministic ones.
There is nothing new in singling out the two questions of property assignment and 
the nature of quantum evolutions, and they do have a place in quantum theory: it is 
by tackling these two issues that we attempt to solve the measurement problem. I do
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not think, however, that discussions of both of these questions requires commitment to 
a precise descriptive account of quantum measurements, nor to the theory of quantum 
measurement as a  tool for deriving predictions.
In fact it is hard to see how concerns about the structure of real measurements 
relate to the questions that quantum theoretical treatments of measurement consider. 
For instance, any final decision about the question of unitary versus non-unitary evo­
lutions would seem to offer little clarification as to whether such evolutions describe 
actual measurement situations. Suppose for example that we were to argue for a res­
olution of the question of determinism in favour of unitary evolutions, and therefore 
purely deterministic evolutions. The implications for the case that Chang discusses, 
for instance, would be minimal; we would still be left with a single interaction picture 
of quantum measurements, and we would still have little grounds for modelling mea­
surements of mass entirely within this framework. We would be, in sum, no closer to 
modelling real measurements by opting for unitary evolutions.
Similarly, it is unclear whether careful modelling of actual measurement situations 
would enable us to make any headway with regards to the two questions suggested 
above. Grant that, in general, accounts of measurement must be modelled with ref­
erence to repeated interactions; with reference to the second question I have outlined, 
would the interactions between photons and detectors be unitary or not? It is hard 
to see anything in Millikan’s measurements providing an answer to this question. Af­
ter all it is an aim of different interpretations of the theoretical accounts of quantum 
measurement that they yield empirically equivalent accounts of data, so nothing in 
the outcome of the Millikan experiment would be able to adjudicate between different 
proposals on the determinism issue. The structure of the experiment itself will suggest 
what Hamiltonian(s) we should adopt to describe it, but this is not where the problem 
is taken to be: the problem with assigning properties, and whether these properties 
come to be in a deterministic fashion or not, arises at the point of observation of the 
final outcome. It is the final outcome, if anything, that suggests why we might need 
a projection postulate: photons click on detectors, and what might this mean for our 
theory? The complications of the experimental setup, aptly described by Millikan as 
“a machine shop in vacuo” [67, p. 361], don’t seem to bear on the question of what 
happens when the detector clicks.
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Fax from establishing the worthiness of such questions, however, their independence 
from the structure of real measurements could be construed as good reason for aban­
doning them. Their legitimacy and relevance, in spite of their remoteness from actual 
measurement practice, can be established by accepting that the relationship between 
theory and experiment is neither dust-bowl empiricist nor so profoundly theory-ridden 
that the distinction between theory and experiment makes no sense, and accepting the 
relative autonomy of theoretical science (and of course of experimental, too).
It was Lakatos who spoke of the relative autonomy of scientific theories, in his paper 
on The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. He took it to be a  historical 
fact that theoretical science had often developed independently of, or with relatively 
tenuous links to, experimental science, and wanted to provide an explanation for this 
within his methodological framework, something that the naive falsificationist view of 
science had failed to do. The idea can also be found in many authors in different guises. 
Recently for instance Galison [44, Ch. 9] has provided an account of how the two 
traditions come together in twentieth century physics, with his attempt to articulate 
the idea of a trading zone; many of his ideas are close to Hacking’s description of 
representational and interventionist scientists [47], though we owe the first articulation 
of a historical project of this kind to early modern historians, along the lines sketched by 
Kuhn [58] in some of his later writings. It is also worth pointing out that it is not only 
historians or ‘historical’ philosophers who have recognised the usefulness of drawing 
such a distinction: Nagel [68, p. 87], for example, gave different characterisations of 
theoretical and experimental laws and argued that the latter have, so to speak, a life 
of their own.
For present purposes two features of the notion of relative autonomy of theoretical 
work are relevant:
1. the use in theoretical research of methods distinct from empirical methods,
2. the attempt to answer different questions.
When viewed from this perspective, criticisms of the kind that Margenau and others 
have made, of the way in which theoretical accounts of measurement miss the mark with 
respect to real measurements, lose their force; on the other hand Wigner’s appropriation 
of the term ‘measurement’ is properly understood and appreciated, as is the substantial 
work devoted to questions to do with the nature of quantum evolutions.
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A case of relative autonomy of theory in action in discussions of quantum mea­
surement is provided by debates on the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
In the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics we assume that the only evolutions 
that are acceptable are deterministic, unitary evolutions. The quantum theory of mea­
surement characterises deterministic premeasurement evolutions (in a manner that I 
will discuss in detail in Chapter 3) satisfying the probability reproducibility condition, 
which guarantees that the probabilistic information contained in the object system is 
transferred to the apparatus system in an appropriate way; they can be taken to char­
acterise, for instance, the evolutions in Kronz’s account which precede the application 
of the projection postulate on the combined system. Modal interpretations can then 
rely on this characterisation as yielding the measurement evolutions themselves. What 
properties should we then assign to the system?
The answer to this question is given by the Kochen biorthogonal decomposition 
rule (originally proposed by Kochen [52],the present formulation is taken from Baccia- 
galuppi [3]):
Basic Rule: Let the reduced state of a system with Hilbert space V, be p, and 
let the spectral resolution of p be p = Then the system possesses a
property P* with probability A?dim(Pj).
K ochen Rule: if % = H 1 <S> %2 is in a pure state \I/, then the properties P / and 
P f  of “H1 and H 2 given by the basic rule are perfectly correlated.
Assuming deterministic, unitary evolutions and the Kochen biorthogonal decompo­
sition rule for assigning properties, we have an answer to both questions which consti­
tute the measurement problem. Is the Kochen rule ad hoc or can we motivate it? The 
rule has a motivation, but not by reference to experimental results. Clifton [24] moti­
vates this rule by showing that it follows from four ‘natural’ axioms. On top of them 
he adds two others, one which ensures compliance with the Kochen-Specker no-go the­
orem (condition 5) and one which guarantees that the question of property assignment 
is answered adequately in the case of measurement (condition 6):
1. For any W  and any U satisfying U W U~l = W  : U\Dei{W)]U~l =  Def(W).
2. For any W  : {P \P W  = 0 or W }  C Def(W).
3. For any W , and any P , P ' G Def(W) : P  © P ' G D e f(W ),P n P ' G Def(W), and 
P x G Def(W).
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4. For any W , there should exist at least some (not necessarily orthogonal) set 
{Pk} of pure states satisfying W  -  Ysk ^ P k  with ^  =  such that for 
every Pk G {P*} : Def{W) C Def(P*)-
5. For any W , there exist sufficiently many noncontextual value states []w on 
Def(TF), and a measure nw  on the set of all such []w’s, such that for any 
pairwise commuting subset {P i,P 2 , • • •} of Def(W)
Tz(PiP2 • ■ • W ) = ^w{\\w\[P\]w  =  [P2W  =  • • • =  1}.
6. For any W , SR(PF) C Def(IF).
Def(W) is the set of projection operators which have a definite value in state W  
and SR(FF) is the set of projections in the spectral resolution of W . Clifton’s justifi­
cation of the axioms is not based on experimental considerations, but rather relies on 
formal arguments that block other options for answering the question. Condition 1, for 
example, is motivated by the need to avoid “that [something] else in addition to W  and 
the Hilbert space H is ‘smuggled in’ to define the definite-valued observables” [24, p. 
49]. On the other hand it is very difficult to imagine which kind of experimental setup 
could be suggestive of this approach to answering the two questions about quantum 
measurement.
The upshot of this example, one of many possible ones, is that quantum theoretical 
accounts of measurements really do address themselves to answering the two questions 
above, and really do so in a manner that is relatively independent of experimental con­
siderations. One way of further characterising the difference I have outlined here has 
been given by Kuhn in two of his papers. In “The Function of Measurement in Modern 
Physical Science” [57], Kuhn argues, like Margenau, that measurement is concerned 
with producing numbers, and with indicating to us what constitutes reasonable agree­
ment between numbers that the theory gives and numbers emerging from experiments 
(as well as having occasional roles of confirming and refuting instances). Millikan’s pa­
per is a good example of this: from the long discussion of what could and could not be 
done with the experimental apparatus we learn what constituted reasonable agreement 
between predicted and measured numbers.
Kuhn assigns quite a different role to an altogether different type of experiment in 
the paper “A Function for Thought Experiments” [56]. Here Kuhn talks of thought
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experiments as exercises which explore the structure of a theory, to eliminate confusions 
in the scientist’s theoretical apparatus:
[ . . .  ] the function of the thought experiment is to assist in the elimina­
tion of prior confusion by forcing the scientist to recognise contradictions 
that had been inherent in his way of thinking from the start. Unlike the 
discovery of new knowledge, the elimination of existing confusion does not 
seem to demand additional empirical data. Nor need the imagined situa­
tion be one that actually exists in nature. On the contrary, the thought 
experiment whose sole aim is to eliminate confusion is subject to only one 
condition of verisimilitude. The imagined situation must be one to which 
the scientist can apply his concepts in the way he has normally employed 
before. [56, p.242]
This is then mitigated, later in the paper, when Kuhn concludes that a thought experi­
ment cannot be directed always and solely to displaying and resolving logical conflicts: 
Though the imagined situation need not even be potentially realizable 
in nature, the conflict deduced from it must be one that nature itself 
could present. The conflict that confronts the scientist in the experimental 
situation must be one that, however unclearly seen, has confronted him 
before. Unless he has already had that much experience, he is not yet 
prepared to learn from thought experiments alone. [56, p. 265]
I read this as saying that the worth of a thought experiment is that we can take some 
problem that has presented a scientist in a laboratory and analyse it as a conceptual 
conflict of perhaps quite a different kind, the answer to which will hopefully shed some 
light both on the theory and on the problematic experimental situation. While Kuhn 
himself admits that this is not a universal characterisation, it seems a fair one to apply 
to most of the work in the quantum theory of measurement.
4. Conclusions
What I have tried to do in this chapter is provide a rationale for quantum theoretic 
accounts of measurements which allows us to sidestep ‘real measurement’ critiques of 
it. Arguments such as Margenau’s and Chang’s purport to show that, on the basis 
of actual experimental practice, foundational debates on the projection postulate and 
on the structure of quantum measurements play a minor, if not nonexistent role, in
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providing a quantum theoretical understanding of measurement. I have argued that 
these criticisms do not apply and that the conclusions they lead to for quantum mea­
surements do not hold: this is because they overemphasise the need for the quantum 
theory of measurement to account for real measurements. Acceptance of a less than 
tight link between theory and experiment allows us to weaken the need for such an 
account and is particularly helpful in the task of providing such a rationale for quan­
tum theoretic accounts of measurements. Nevertheless, the quantum theoretic account 
of measurement is not totally exempt from problems if we accept this weakened link 
between theory and experiment: Chapter 3 will present an example of such a problem 
and contrast it briefly, on page 130, with the examples of this chapter.
The work of people like Lakatos, Kuhn, Nagel and Galison not only draws the 
distinction between theoretical and experimental science, but also shows how this dis­
tinction can function as a positive factor in the development of science, particularly 
when the two come together. This is the position Hacking argues for, and it is well 
exemplified by Galison’s study of Schwinger’s contributions at the MIT Radiation Lab 
during the war. It is to be hoped perhaps that the quantum theory of measurement 
might come to play a more active role in conjunction with experimental physics (as 
has been suggested, for instance, by the discussions on quantum nondemolition mea­
surements [9]), but its role should not be constrained a priori to providing accurate 
descriptions of measurements or to helping to yield predictions, which for instance in 
the case of transition probabilities the quantum theory seems quite capable of providing 
itself.
I have tried to show why we should look at the quantum theory of measurement 
on its own merit, so to speak; it does not mean that the question of what theoretical 
treatment we should give of an experiment like Millikan’s is uninteresting or uninfor­
mative tout court. It will be informative, but such an analysis will not offer much to the 
questions that debates on the measurement problem address. It might, on the other 
hand, tell us a lot about how theory and experiment come together, but tha t’s another 
story.
CHAPTER 2
M easurements and Insolubility Proofs
It has been known for many years that the traditional accounts of measurement would 
not deliver what was required of them: the first well known result on the subject can 
be found in a paper by Wigner [87]. Earman and Shimony [31], Fine [36], Shimony 
[77], Brown [11] and Stein [79] have proved successively more general results. A proof 
by Busch and Shimony [17] has recently shown that the measurement problem cannot 
be solved even when the measured observable is unsharp.
This chapter aims to do three things. It describes, first of all, a simple and intuitive 
insolubility result using facts about the unitary dynamics of non-relativistic quantum 
systems. Secondly, it looks at Fine’s proof [36], subsequently revised by Brown [11] 
and considers whether the philosophical objections to it, concerned with the status 
of quantum mixtures, can be overcome. This discussion will lead to a more general 
result, relying on a weaker form of one of the standard conditions imposed on quantum 
measurement in the discussion of insolubility proofs, and eventually to a characterisa­
tion proof for unitary operators satisfying the objectification conditions for quantum 
mechanical measurements. Finally the chapter tackles the question of insolubility for 
the case of unsharp pointer observables. Some results are obtained for this case: in 
particular the preceding proofs straightforwardly generalise to cases where a particular 
commutativity condition holds. The chapter concludes by assessing the importance 
of these results for the debates on quantum measurement and the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics.
1. A statement of the problem
The quantum theory of measurement works with unitary operators such as, for 
example,
(1.1) W{-)
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operators satisfying requirements of probability transmission and unitarity in measure­
ments. For the sake of convenience I ignore in what follows the time index that would 
normally be associated with these operators, so that W  represents the operator which 
maps the initial state of an object +  apparatus system directly to the final state. Spe­
cific discussion of the details about these measurement mappings and of how they are 
to be characterised is taken up in the next chapter, together with some problems that 
emerge from these characterisations; the problems dealt with here do not need a specific 
discussion of them, but just require a few remarks at this stage.
Operators like W, which act on the tensor space H§ <8> 'him, by definition map pure 
states to pure states. The way to infer the states of systems § and M in this formalism 
is to apply the partial trace technique (the tracing away of one subsystem given the 
density matrix corresponding to the pure state at the end of the interaction).
The operator W  is in fact part of a tradition that goes back to the origins of 
discussions of quantum measurement: it is a generalisation of an operator that can be 
found in the last chapter of Von Neumann’s book on Quantum Mechanics [82]. Some 
refer to it as a premeasurement (for instance by Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt [14]) 
and all interpretations of quantum mechanics agree that (some part of a) measurement 
is captured by operators like it. Some interpretations of quantum mechanics, essentially 
based on Everett’s idea, work with operators such as W  and require nothing more, for 
a measurement to have taken place, than that this operator describes the interaction.
Traditionally, however, it was thought that such evolutions would be problematic. 
The original problem of measurement saw a difficulty with the final state of a mea­
surement interaction being a superposition of correlated object-pointer states. The 
idea with describing a measurement as an evolution over a composite system H§ <8> "Hm 
was to try to describe Von Neumann’s type I evolution (the irreversible ‘projective’ 
evolution from pure states to mixed ones) on a smaller system as a unitary evolution 
over a larger system. It was felt, as we have seen in the previous chapter, that to 
have two different kinds of evolution of a quantum mechanical system was a difficulty, 
compounded by the fact that the projection evolution seemed to occur in accordance 
with criteria of a non-physical character: references to the unavoidably subjective char­
acter of observation, to the necessity of revising our notions of objective reality, to the 
role of the conscious observer, abound in the early literature on quantum measurement
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theory (the locus classicus is of course Von Neumann [82], but see also Wigner [86] 
and London and Bauer [62]).
It is always possible to give a description of a linear contraction on a space 71' as 
the projection on 7C of a unitary evolution on an extension space 7i, with TV C 71 
(see Riesz and Nagy, [72, p. 466]). The operation of mapping an initial pure state 
to a mixture by means of a Von Neumann type I  evolution is indeed a contraction1. 
Von Neumann himself gives a means of constructing unitary mappings on extensions 
of a Hilbert space for the object system, where the extension is interpreted as adding 
a space for the apparatus.
Consider, however, an initial state (p ® £ 7ls® 7l m> <P a superposition of or­
thonormal states (pi, the latter eigenstates of a self-adjoint operator H  representing the 
observable to be measured. The adoption of operators such as W  would yield, when 
applied to states <p <8> V’o* a superposition of final object-pointer states like dpi <g> 'tpi, 
for example. This is unsatisfactory in the sense that it exhibits interference between 
pointer states in the composite system. This precludes an ignorance interpretation for 
the reduced matrix of the apparatus system so, even if such reduced state is a density 
operator defined over pointer states, as a Von Neumann type I evolution requires, it is 
not a proper mixture and cannot be interpreted as a classical probability distribution 
over possible observed final pointer states.
1.1. O bjectification, Ignorance In te rp re ta tio n s  and  th e  Eigenvalue-Ei- 
g en sta te  L ink. It is worth examining in some more detail why a pine object-apparatus 
final state is unsatisfactory. The problem lies with the acceptance amongst a number 
of quantum theorists of the assumption Arthur Fine [37] has termed the eigenvalue- 
eigenstate link. Von Neumann [82, pp. 200-201, p. 215fi] is once more an obvious 
reference for the early use of this assumption. Again Fine [38] remarks how this as­
sumption is easily derivable from Von Neumann’s more fundamental principle P.
The eigenvalue-eigenstate link is the assumption that a system can be assigned a 
definite value for a certain quantity if and only if that system is described by a state in 
a Hilbert space which is an eigenstate of the self-adjoint operator which represents the 
quantity. That is, if a state is an eigenstate of a certain quantity, then it has a value 
for that quantity given by the eigenvalue associated to the eigenstate, and conversely
1For a proof, see the next chapter.
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if it has a value, it must correspond to an eigenvalue of the operator, and the system 
must be in the respective eigenstate.
A measurement leads to a pointer pointing to a precise and definite value, so the 
pointer system must be in an eigenstate of the appropriate pointer observable. In order 
for this to be the case, the final state for the pointer must at least be decomposable 
into a mixture of pointer observable eigenstates, with the appropriate weights. This, 
however, is not sufficient if we wish to claim that, for the individual pointer eigenstates 
in the final, mixed apparatus state, the eigenvalue-eigenstate link can be upheld. We 
need to be able to say that, for this mixture, only one of the states is actual; in other 
words we want to impose an ignorance interpretation on the mixture. This is formally 
interpreted as the requirement that the probability weights of the mixture be classical.
This is carefully explained for example by Busch, Lahti and Mittelstaedt2 [14]: 
they show how, for a single isolated system to possess one of a number of properties, 
it is necessary that the state of such system be a density operator defined over the 
projections representing these properties.
There are two ways in which a system may come to possess a mixed state. The first 
is that the system is prepared to be a mixture, for example by constructing an ensemble 
of individuals with different pure states. The second is by considering separately a 
system which is part of a composite system that has an entangled state. For a system 
which is a subsystem of a composite system, the condition that the state of this system 
be a density operator resolved by orthogonal projectors characterising an observable A  
is not a sufficient condition for the system having a property defined by one of these 
projectors: one also needs the composite system to be a density operator having a 
spectral resolution in terms of eigenstates of the property, represented by the operator 
A  <g> I.
More formally, for any state T  € T *  ('Hg <g> 'Hm), where 7[+ (Hg denotes the
set of trace class one operators on Hg ® H  m> representing the set of physical states of 
the system, the reduced state in 7]+(Hm) admits of an ignorance interpretation for a 
mixture over pointer states P ^]  G m) decomposing the reduced state if and only
2 Interesting and more detailed investigations on this issue can be found in Busch and Mittelstaedt 
[16]. The discussion is not unrelated to the distinction between proper and improper mixtures, as 
introduced by D’Espagnat [27]; a recent good discussion of this can be found in Ghirardi [46].
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if
(1.2) T  =  ^ 2 1 0  T 1 0  Jfy.].
t
Achieving all the conditions for an ignorance interpretation for the mixture over pointer 
states Ptyj] € 7^ + ( Hm) will ensure that the assumption of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link 
will yield the correct pointer values at the end of the interaction.
The question becomes the following: is it possible to find a unitary operator which 
evolves an initial object-apparatus state to a final state such that the final state will 
be a density operator decomposable into eigenstates of a pointer observable and which 
satisfies the appropriate probabilistic constraints?
1.2. Som e N o ta tio n  an d  D efinitions. The first step is to spell out some nota­
tion and list the conditions assumed in the following analysis.
T{H)  is the set of trace class operators on a Hilbert space. This is a Banach space,
i.e. a complete vector space with a norm defined on it, the trace operation. The set of 
states of a quantum system is represented by 7[+ (‘H), the set of trace class operators 
with trace equal to one. Observables are usually represented by Hermitean operators 
on the Hilbert space H 3 When such observables have a discrete spectrum, they admit 
of a spectral resolution in terms of a complete orthonormal system of eigenvectors. The 
dynamics of the system is normally given by a unitary operator on the Hilbert space 
'H\ we will consider also operations on the space 7[+ ('H) and represent them with bold 
characters.
The conditions for answering the above question are then as follows. Consider an 
initial state T =  T§ 0  Tm in the object-apparatus system 0  H m ); an object
observable H , a self-adjoint operator on H§, and a discrete apparatus observable A, 
a self-adjoint operator on the space % m with spectral resolution {&}.  If H  is itself 
discrete, and therefore with spectral resolution given by the orthonormal basis 
then for any given i we take observation of the pointer position symbolised by the state 
to mean that the state (pi was measured. In the case when H  is a self-adjoint, but not 
discrete, observable, the apparatus observable, which is always taken to be a discrete 
observable, will induce a partition on the spectrum of the observable H  via a pointer 
function f  : V(Qm ) -»• where P(Hm) and V(Q§) are cr-algebras of subsets
3Later on we will consider a generalisation of this, in the context of the discussion of unsharp 
pointer observables
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of the pointer and object observable spectra Qm and fig, under the assumption that 
/ ({ /} )U/({,7'}) =  0 and Yli / ( W )  =  ^S- This defines a coarse-grained, discrete version 
of the initial object observable, which has a spectral resolution in terms of eigenstates, 
through a procedure originally described by Von Neumann [82, Ch. III.3, pp. 220- 
221]. Discreteness of the operator describing the pointer observable is required to make 
sense of the objectification condition. Discreteness of the operator describing the object 
observable is not important, except insofar as we can note that, given a pointer function, 
the pointer observable can be taken to measure a discrete, coarse-grained observable 
defined via the pointer function. Suppose then that H  is the discretised observable 
with a spectral set {<#}, we again take recording of the pointer value tpi to mean that 
(Pi has been observed.
Is there an operator U : Kg Kg ® K m for which the following conditions
are satisfied?
1. Unitarity: The operator U is unitary
2. Quantum condition: The two spaces “Hg and K m  are proper quantum systems, 
in the sense that no superselection rules are present
3. Objectification: The final state U T U ~ l after the measurement interaction has 
taken place is a density operator over eigenstates of the operator I <8> Am repre­
senting the pointer observable and acting on H§ <8> K  m
4. The probability reproducibility condition:
(!-3) PrsP 0  1(-^))-
It is important to make three points about the probability reproducibility condition. 
The first is that the condition just stated applies in general. For a  sharp, discrete 
measured observable on the object system, on the other hand, it can be put in the 
following way:
(1.4) Tr[P[vi] TS] =  Tr[I ® ffo j U T U ~ l]
In (1.3) Pt (X)  is the probability measure over the set of possible values of the observable 
E,  relative to the state T  G Ti~{Kg), and /  is the pointer function described above. 
The state 71a(U{T§<8>Tm)U~1) is the reduced state of the apparatus system (obtained 
via the partial tracing operation 71 a )  after the measurement evolution has taken place. 
That is, for each set of possible values in the set X , pj. (X) is the probability that the
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system %§, when in state T, has value for the observable E  in such a set X .  One way 
to see the difference between the two formalisations of the probability reproducibility 
condition can be seen by the following example. Consider a continuous observable E  
on an infinite dimensional Hilbert space H.  For each interval [a, 6], b > a > 0, in the set 
of continuous possible values for E , there is a distinct probability measure associated 
with this interval, call it P[a,b]i which maps states to probabilities. Consider now a 
discretised version of E ,  denoted by E d - Suppose that it is discretised over, amongst 
countably many others, two intervals [<a—x , (a+b)/2] and [(a+6)/2,6+rc], to which the 
discretised observable associates projection operators P[a-x,(a+b)/2] ajid P[(a+b)/2 ,b+x]' 
Then the probability that E  has value in the interval [a, 6] when in state T  is given by 
P[a,b](T )> while such probability for E d  is given by Tr[T ( P [a_ Xt{a+ b)/2] +  % +& )/2,6+*])L  
which will be different from P[a,b]{T)-
In the present context, given that the objectification requirement forces a mea­
surement of a discretised observable, the simpler and more intuitive condition (1.4) is 
almost sufficient for the results we will discuss: the important proviso is that the fol­
lowing proofs apply also to the case when the measured object observable is an unsharp 
discrete observable (a POV measure as outlined in the introduction). More will be said 
about unsharp observables later on in the chapter, in section 5. For the time being it 
suffices to note that for this, more general case the probability reproducibility condition 
would assume the form
(1.5) T t[Fx  7s] =  7V[I ® U T U ~ l]
where F  is an effect associated by the POV measure to the set of possible values X .
The second point to note about the probability reproducibility condition is that, in 
cases such as that of unsharp or continuous object observables, it is best thought of as 
a two-part condition. The first condition captures the intuitive idea that if the initial 
state of the system to be measured yields non-zero probability for some eigenstate of 
the observable to be measured, the final state should yield non-zero probability for the 
corresponding pointer eigenstate in the object -I- apparatus space and viceversa. The 
second condition will determine the probabilistic relations between initial object state 
and final object +  apparatus state. Formally the two conditions can be spelt out as 
follows:
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5. Let T§ be an initial state of the object system, Tm an initial state of the apparatus 
system. Then
(1.6a) p g ( X )  0
if and only if
(1.6b) pt u (u(ts®Tm) u- 1) ^  l ( X ) ) ¥ 1Q-
6- ^ ^  then.
(1-7) PTS( X )  ~  PK A (U{Ts®TM)U-')(f XW )
It then becomes possible to hold condition 5, but change 6. Namely we can ask that 
‘pointers point’ to the appropriate measurement results (so that all the appropriate 
measurement results appear), but relax the probabilistic condition so that the proba­
bilities for the results in the final state might not be equal to those given in the initial 
state by the Born rule. It is worth noting that it is the probability reproducibility 
condition that does this work. In fact the objectification condition requires the final 
density operator to be decomposable in terms of pointer eigenstates, but gives no speci­
fication about which pointer eigenstates should be part of the decomposition: an initial 
object state which is an eigenstate of the measured observable might be evolved into 
a final density operator over several pointer eigenstates, and still it will satisfy the 
objectification condition, as it is by definition a density operator decomposable into 
pointer eigenstates, and that is all that objectification requires. In the case of a sharp 
and discrete observable, condition 5 implies condition 6 and they are equivalent to the 
probability reproducibility condition.
The third point is that the probability reproducibility condition is equivalent, in 
the case of a sharp and discrete observable, to the calibration condition (see Busch et 
al. [14, p. 34]):
• Calibration: for each initial state of the form ipi <S> Tm, W  maps this state to a 
final state T§® ipi, where ipi is the pointer state for the ith value of H  and the 
<Pi are arbitrary, and thus neither necessarily distinct nor orthogonal.
An initial state ipi of the object system has probability 1 with respect to P ^ j  and prob­
ability 0 with respect to P[Vj\ with j  ^  i, so that the final state must yield probability 
1 for the pointer observable eigenstate I <8> P^,.] and zero for other pointer observable
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eigenstates not measuring the value i. Therefore the final state must be of the form 
T§ ® ipi. Linearity then easily implies the probability reproducibility condition. Note 
that the calibration condition plays no direct role in the following proofs, save for a 
brief remark made in the context of the discussion of unsharp pointer observables; in 
fact most of the traditional results analyse the compatibility of 3 and 4.
In what follows we will sometimes make the distinction between these conditions 
explicit, and work with condition 5, which is a more general condition for the general 
case of POV measures. It will hardly be required to discuss POV measures explicitly 
for the object system. Nevertheless, proving insolubility results for 5 gives a genuinely 
more general proof.
Given the splitting of the probability reproducibility condition, there are at least two 
options open for generalising it in the context of trying to deal with the objectification 
condition. We can maintain 5, which guarantees that object observable eigenstates are 
correlated to pointer observable eigenstates, but relax the requirement that probabilities 
be exactly matched up in cases when the initial object state is a  superposition of 
eigenstates of the measured observable. Alternatively we can follow Fine [35] and 
substitute a more general probabilistic condition than 4 which allows for violation of 
both 5 and 6. He asked whether, given an observable H  to be measured on the object 
system, there existed a unitary measurement W  which, rather than ‘reproducing’ the 
probabilities, might simply discriminate between two initial states T§ and T§ so that if, 
for some i ,
pfs ( X ) ? P % ( X )
then
P' ^ ( U( Ts ®Tm) U~1) l (X )) ^ P & A(U(TZ®Tu )U -l ) ( f  1(-X’))*
In such a case we say that the respective initial states of the combined system, T  and T', 
are H-distinguishable. This does not help in trying to answer the highlighted question 
on page 44; the answer is simply ‘no’.
In the present framework a measurement has taken place when the apparatus system 
is in an eigenstate of a pointer observable defined over the apparatus system. In the 
next section, for the sake of simplicity, the pointer observable is taken to have no 
multiple eigenstates, and only one eigenstate indicates measurement of an eigenstate
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of a (discretised) object observable. A remark at the end of the section will emphasise 
how this restriction is not essential to the argument.
The analysis of the next section will also make use of the following definitions:
D e f in i t io n  2 .1 . An induced notion of linearity for 7 +^ ('H) is defined by considering 
a linear mapping U  : T(H)  —>• T(W)  on the Banach space of trace class operators T(H)\  
its restriction U  : T f  {%) —> T *  (%) (when well-defined as a mapping from 7^+ (H) to 
Ti'i'H)) satisfies the corresponding convex-preserving property, i.e. for all ai, . . .  , 
on 6 K + , a i  +  . . . + a n =  l  and Pi, . . .  , Pn one-dimensional projections on W
U (a\Pi +  . . .  + anPn) =  aiU(Pi ) . . .  + anU(Pn).
Such U  is by definition called convex4.
D e f in i t io n  2 .2 . The rank of a density operator T  defined for a Hilbert space 
7i (written Rk(T)) is the minimal number of one-dimensional projections of which it 
is a convex combination. This is an invariant for the density operator under convex 
transformations of the form U*TU, with U unitary. The more formal definition of rank 
considers, for a given density operator T, the projection operator E T on the range of 
T, such range being a subspace V! C %. Then the rank of T  is equal to Tr[PT], the 
trace of the projection operator on the range of T5.
2. A ‘proof’
Geometric arguments can take us a long way towards answering the question de­
fined in the previous section. By this I mean that most of the negative results in the 
measurement problem follow from simple considerations about the structure of the state
4For the case of dim(H) =  oo we have that, for {01, . . .an, . . . }  a (possibly infinite) sequence of 
positive real numbers such that limn_K» $3?=ia* =  1» {P i, * • • , Pn, ■ • •} a (possibly infinite) family 
of one-dimensional projections on H
n n
lim U ( y t aip i )=  lim J 2 aiU (Pi)’71—^ O O  ■ ^  71—f O O  ■ ^<=i ,=i
5This is an immediate consequence of the discrete spectral representation of density operators as 
proved already in Von Neumann[82, Ch. 2, Sec. 11]. The rank is basis independent, as it is defined 
through a trace operation, and can be infinite in the case when E T is a projection on an infinite 
dimensional subspace of H. For a detailed analysis of the geometry of stratified convex sets of states, 
see [7]; Rockafellar [73] gives a detailed account of convex analysis .
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space and the possible transformations on this structure given by unitary dynamics. 
This section does not give a general proof, but rather considers a number of (succes­
sively more general) options for answering the question positively and shows why these 
options cannot work. In the end this will lead to a result as general as any of the ones 
present in the literature, but it is hoped, in the first instance, that the problems en­
countered when trying to solve the quantum measurement problem by trying to find a 
mapping that will yield an appropriate final density operator will become clearer. It will 
successively become clear also that strategies employed in this section can be applied 
to other questions about insolubility proofs of the quantum measurement problem.
The approach taken involves assuming the objectification condition 3 and the first 
part of the probability reproducibility condition 5, then seeing whether the second part 
of the probability reproducibility condition 6 is satisfied.
The strategy of the argument used in this section is essentially a generalisation of an 
argument that Von Neumann has given in his book [82, pp. 437-439]; the mathematical 
structure is the same. It is also discussed by Scheibe [75, pp. 151-155]. Its generality 
is comparable to that of Busch and Shimony [17], in the sense that it can be shown to 
include the case of an unsharp object observable.
2.1. A  T heorem  by Davies and  Some In itia l R esu lts . The following theorem 
by Davies [25, Theorem 3.1, p.21] is a good starting point:
THEOREM 2 .1 . Consider a Hilbert space 71. Every pure positive linear map T  : 
T(7i)  -* T(7l) is of one of the following three forms:
(1) T  (T) =  BTB*, 
where B  \7 t —>7i is bounded and linear;
(2) T(T) =  BT*B*, 
where B  : 7t —> 71 is bounded and conjugate linear;
(3) T(T)  = T r [ TB ] ( \ ^ ) ( ^ \ ) ,  
where B  : 7L —» 7i is bounded, linear and positive and i}> G 7LG.
6Note that xj) is constant.
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Pure positive linear maps on T{H)  are such that every element in the set of positive 
trace class operators is mapped into the same set, and furthermore every pure state 
is mapped to a pure state. Type 3 maps as characterised by the theorem are called 
degenerate: they map all states to a unique pure state, multiplied by a weight Tr[TB]. 
Therefore all such maps are pure. As for maps of Type 1 and 2, it is easy to see that 
all such maps are pure. In fact pure density operators are characterised by being one­
dimensional projection operators, and therefore have rank 1. But it is a well-known 
result of linear algebra that Rk(AB), with A  and B  two operators on is equal to 
min[Rk(A), Rk(£)]. It follows that whenever Rk(A) =  1, then Rk(AB) =  1. This 
shows that maps of Type 1 and 2 are always pure, so that with the Davies theorem it 
is possible to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a map to be pure.
The standard dynamics for a state, given by a unitary operator W  on T(H),  can be 
represented as the conjugation action W P ^W * . It is well known and worth repeating 
that this is equivalent to the evolution given by P[w(<p)]7> therefore establishing in a 
different way that this mapping is pure. The remark of the previous paragraph clearly 
establishes that the conjugation action of a unitary operator on the set of positive trace 
class one operators must be pure, that is it maps pure states to pure states. This imme­
diately eliminates the possibility that any such conjugation might map an initial state 
of the form <g> P[^0] =  P[<p®i>0\ t0 a final state satisfying the objectification condition 
and condition 5: P ^^o ]  is a pine state, and therefore of rank one, while generally 
speaking the rank of the final state will have to be greater than one if objectification 
and 5 are to be satisfied.
Furthermore, Davies’s Theorem states that all pure positive mappings have this 
form, so if any invertible mapping is to provide a solution to the measurement problem, 
given a pure initial object -f apparatus state, it will not itself be a pure mapping. 
However the following result rules out this possibility.
T h e o r e m  2 .2 . A convex mapping U  : -*  T i’i'H) is bijective if and only if
it is rank preserving for all T  € 7^ + (%).
Any convex-preserving mapping can be a bijection (and therefore an invertible 
mapping) on the space of density operators if and only if the rank of the density matrices 
is a ‘constant of the motion’. In particular any conjugation action of a unitary operator
7Von Neumann again shows this [82, Sec. V.l].
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on 7^ + ('Hs ® ^  m) will be rank preserving and it can be shown that such mappings are 
the only ones that are rank preserving, and thus bijective on T*(H§  ® H m )- The proof 
of this result and the discussion of its other implications in the context of the quantum 
theory of measurement is left to the next chapter; for the time being it will be applied 
in a fairly basic way in the context of providing an insolubility proof.
This leads to the heart of the classical technical results on the measurement problem. 
We assume that, ‘physically’ speaking, there might be a degree of uncertainty as to what 
the initial state of the apparatus might be; as Wigner put it “the state vector of the 
apparatus, which is under the conditions now considered usually a macroscopic object, 
is hardly ever known”8 [87, p. 333]. This might be modelled by assuming that the 
initial state of the apparatus is a non-pure density operator; then the initial state of 
the combined system will not be a pure state, and perhaps it is possible to satisfy 
the objectification condition this way. The first consideration must be to decide what 
density operator is appropriate, and for which types of measurement.
Theorem (2.2) immediately rules out that a perfect correlation measurement might 
satisfy the objectification condition. A perfect correlation measurement is a measure­
ment where the objectification requirement and condition 5 are satisfied and, moreover, 
the final state of the system is such that each final pointer state is correlated with a 
unique object state. In other words in a perfect correlation measurement, for a pointer 
state P[^.], the component T  ® Py,.j is such that T  =  where again note that (pi is 
an arbitrary vector in H§. Given that the final object +  apparatus state admits of an 
ignorance interpretation, observing a specific pointer state allows inference of a pure 
final state for the system. The final state for the object +  apparatus system would 
then be
n
w  (PM®T)W- 1 =
i=1
with T  a mixed state for the apparatus system and ^2 W{ =  1. Perfect correlation mea­
surements such as the one just described are just a generalisation of so-called strong
8Wigner in fact makes this remark in one of his papers on measurement immediately after making 
the point of the previous paragraph. Ignore for the sake of argument the apparent contradiction in 
Wigner’s argument in that we are supposed to hardly ever know what the state of a macroscopic 
apparatus is, yet are supposed to learn about the value of an observable for a system precisely by 
discerning such a state.
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state-correlation measurements. The latter measurements have been studied, for in­
stance, by Busch and Lahti [15]. The former are defined by the property of the final 
object states associated with a given pointer state being pure states, with in addition 
the property of these final object states being pairwise orthogonal. While it is the case 
that strong state-correlation measurements have much more interesting informational 
properties than perfect correlation measurements, for the purpose of the present work 
the specifics of correlation properties are not important. The case of perfect correlation 
measurements is mainly illustrative of the kind of argument that will be presented in 
the rest of this section, as well as providing an insolubility result for a wide class of 
measurements which includes Busch and Lahti’s strong state-correlation measurements.
The following condition is also normally assumed when characterising quantum 
measurements; as for instance Araki and Yanase have put it,
According to von Neumann, the measurement of the operator M  in a state 
ip is accomplished by choosing an apparatus in a state £ (fixed normalised 
state independent oiip) in 71 m • • • (my italics) [2, p. 622]
meaning that such an initial state (which might of course be a density operator), must 
be chosen so as to not depend on what state we are trying to measure, as presumably 
we do not know what we are trying to measure before we have measured it.
In a perfect correlation measurement (again assuming objectification and 5) if the 
initial state of the object system is a (p superposition of two eigenstates of the observable 
A which is being measured, the final state will be a density operator over two eigenstates 
of the pointer observable M, each representing the pointer recording one of the two 
eigenvalues corresponding to the two eigenstates of A  which resolve (p. This is because 
such a measurement should avoid interference between different pointer states in the 
final object +  apparatus state after the evolution, while at the same time each pointer 
state should appear just once in the resolution of the final state. The final density 
operator will then have rank 2.
REMARK 2 .1 . Note that the observable Is <8> Am has eigenvalues with de­
generacies of the order of the dimension of the space 'Hs- For example, if 
dim(%s) = dim(%M) = 2, suppose Am has eigenstates {rpi, fa}- Then Is<8> Am 
has eigenvalues <p (8) ifti for i = 1,2, where ip is any state in 7is- Therefore it is
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quite possible, for instance, that an eigenstate of the apparatus observable Am 
might appear several times in the final state’s resolution, coupled to different (p’s.
Similar reasoning though tells us that, if (p is a superposition of three such eigen­
states, we should expect a final state with rank 3 for a perfect correlation measurement. 
But in both cases the rank of the final state is determined by the rank of the initial 
state, which is equivalent to the rank of the apparatus state chosen initially and inde­
pendently of (p. If the initial state is chosen independently of any cp its rank is therefore 
constant. It follows that any measurement satisfying the objectification condition will 
not be a perfect correlation measurement, which requires the rank of the final state 
to vary with the number of eigenstates of the measured observable which resolve the 
initial state (p.
The argument excluding perfect correlation measurements is a simple, but instruc­
tive case. It can be generalised to the conclusion that the initial apparatus state should 
be a density operator of rank at least as high as the dimension of the Hilbert space Mg 
characterising the object to be measured, at least if we want a proof that will cover all 
possible initial object states.
It may of course be the case, as Stein has claimed in his recent paper [79], that we 
don’t want to prove insolubility just for the whole of a possible Hilbert space associated 
with a system on which a measurement is made, but also for certain given subspaces 
of it. The idea is that what doesn’t work for the whole space might after all work if 
certain conditions are imposed on only a smaller part of it. That is, according to Stein, 
an insolubility proof for evolutions given by a certain unitary operator U , mapping all 
possible initial states of the object system H§, coupled to an apparatus initial state 
Tm, will show how certain conditions will fail given all these possible evolutions for all 
these different states. But we also need to show explicitly that the evolutions given by 
U for initial object states (p € "Hg coupled to Tm, with Hg a  proper subspace of Hg, 
fail. Stein’s idea seems to be that there might be some unitary C/’s which run foul of 
insolubility proofs when applied to a whole Hilbert space, but might work if we only 
consider their action on a restricted part of the Hilbert space.
Here is a good physical example: suppose you want to measure the position of a 
particle which you know is somewhere along a line. In practice it is confined to a seg­
ment in front of you in the laboratory, and not outside. We can break up this segment,
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within which we know the particle to be confined, into finitely many ‘subsegments’, 
and measure which one of them the particle is in. We would t hink it necessary to prove 
or disprove theorems about measurement for all of the (discrete) position observables 
on which represent the particle position along a fine. According to Stein, we should 
make sure that, in proving such theorems, we don’t rule out unitary evolutions which 
fall foul of an insolubility proof when we argue at the level of the observable on the 
whole space, but which might model perfectly good measurements when the measured 
observables are restricted to the ones corresponding to positions in my lab. Consider 
a finite set of eigenstates, which span a proper subspace %§' C %§, corresponding to 
the particle being somewhere in the laboratory. If we have a unitary operator that 
can model a measurement (in the sense of satisfying objectification and the probability 
reproducibility condition) for this finite set of eigenstates of a position observable, but 
fails when we consider all the eigenstates of the observable, then we should not rule this 
unitary operator out as a good model for measurements. It would account for one way 
of usually looking at measurements, namely that measurements are made in the strict 
confines of a laboratory. So insolubility proofs should hold not only for measurements 
on the whole space, but also for measurements on proper subspaces of these spaces.
The argument given in this chapter fulfils Stein’s desideratum all the way: if one 
wants to provide a proof for a finite dimensional subspace of the Hilbert space associated 
with a particle whose position we want to measure, we can just think of the Hilbert sub­
space representing the particle’s position as, nevertheless, a finite dimensional Hilbert 
space of possible position states, and make the same arguments, beginning from the 
claim that the initial density operator for the apparatus will need to have rank equal 
to the number of position eigenstates which we think it is realistic to measure.
In the case in which the measured observable has degeneracies, the rank of the 
initial density matrix for the apparatus space must be bounded from below by the 
cardinality of the set of eigenvalues; without loss of generality in the argument it is 
possible to make the assumption that there are no such multiplicities. In this case an 
equivalent claim is that the mixed state should have range of dimension at least equal 
to dim('Hs)9*
9More appropriately in the case of an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space the mixed state should have 
infinite-dimensional range. Note also that again results in the next chapter establish that if the rank of 
the density operator representing the initial apparatus state is greater than the dimension of the Hilbert
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If the mixture has rank m  strictly less than dim('Hg) =  n, then a measurement of 
an initial state (p, a superposition of all the eigenstates of the measured operator, will 
yield a final state mixture of rank less than the number of eigenstates in the initial state 
(p. This cannot possibly be a final state of a measurement satisfying the objectification 
requirement and condition 5. Objectification and 5 would require that the final state 
be a density operator defined over at least n projectors, so that the pointer states in 
the final state do not display any interference between them: the pointer states must 
point to n  different values, and if the final state is a density operator of rank m  some 
of these different pointer states will necessarily have to be superposed.
The elimination of these possibilities leaves the case of an imperfect correlation 
measurement of an observable defined on an object system %§, with the initial state 
of the measuring apparatus system being a mixed state (over projectors on states 
forming a complete orthonormal system for the apparatus system H  m of rank equal to 
dim(^s))-
Before moving on to the general argument it is worth summarising what has been 
established in this section. We assume that the initial density operator for the apparatus 
state is given independently of the initial object state when measuring an observable 
H , also independent of the initial states. This initial apparatus density operator must, 
when coupled with initial object states, in all cases lead to a final state which satisfies 
the objectification requirement and condition 5 (at least). But this assumption is 
enough to rule out that there exist any perfect correlation measurements that do the 
trick: for example when the initial object state is a pure state the final rank is constant, 
while objectification, 5 and perfect correlation would demand a ‘variable’ rank for the 
final state.
This achieves two things. First, it rules out perfect correlation measurements as 
possible candidates for measurements satisfying objectification and 5 (because they 
would require the rank of the final density operator to ‘vary’ when it is in fact constant). 
Second, it requires the initial density matrix to have rank greater than or equal to the
space U s for the object system some very peculiar problems can arise, given the procedures we adopt 
for defining actual unitary premeasurements: it is possible to show that under certain circumstances 
no unitary premeasurement at all (that is, independently of whether objectification is satisfied) cam be 
defined for an initial object-apparatus state where the apparatus density operator is of rank greater 
than the dimension of the Hilbert space for the measured system.
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cardinality of the spectrum of the (discretised) measured object observable, so that 
measurements on all initial object states (including for example initial object pure 
states which axe superpositions of all eigenstates associated with distinct eigenvalues 
of the measured observable) might have a chance of satisfying objectification and 5 .
2.2. A first version of the general argument. We begin by considering first 
the case of dim('Hg) =  dim(^M) =  n < oo. Again without loss of generality assume 
that , <pn} pick out an observable with a non-degenerate spectrum. We have
that, for an initial pure state =  P[ai<pi+...+an<pn] an initial apparatus state 
Tm = S iL i where the P[^']’s form a set of arbitrary orthogonal projections, the
dynamics of a measurement process represented by a unitary operator U would yield
n n
t f (E ,0*iW g )irI = Y ,w‘UIU w u~l
t= l i= l
n
(2 *1) = Y l WiPM ^ ) ]
i=1
As the states axe pairwise orthonormal, {p  ® is an orthonormal set in 
'Hs <8 > Hm- Therefore {U(<p ® V’i))* *s 311 orthonormal set, too, under the assumption 
of unitaxity of U.
Suppose that, for i j ,  Wi  ^  Wj .  If S?= i satisfies the objectification
requirement of being a sum over eigenstates of the pointer operator I  ® Am, then the 
states must be such eigenstates, that is U(<£>®^) = Pi® with (pi arbitrary
states. Recall from remark 2.1 that all states in W§ ® [tpi], for all eigenstates of a 
pointer observable Am, axe eigenstates of I®  Am- Furthermore the eigenstates must be 
eigenstates of different pointer values (as we are measuring an initial superposition (p of 
n states) and therefore pairwise orthogonal. Under the assumption that the weights of 
the mixed state axe different, such mixtures will admit of only one resolution in terms 
of orthogonal projections.
It then follows that, calculating the probabilities for I ® P[^f], we obtain always 
and only w^s as a result. Therefore the probabilistic information is determined solely 
through the weights of the initial apparatus mixture and completely independent of 
initial states such as </>, which axe superpositions of n distinct eigenvalues of the ob­
servable to be measured. The probabilistic part 6  of the probability reproducibility 
condition will then be violated and we already have a proof of insolubility.
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It is not difficult to see that a similar calculation will work for superpositions of less 
than n  eigenstates. Discussion of an example will be helpful here.
Exam ple 2.1. Consider an initial state for the measured system ip =  oc\ip\-srct2ip2 , 
|o i |2 +  |o!2 12  =  1, P^\ 5 <P2 eigenstates of the measured observable. Also again consider 
an initial state for the apparatus system given by Tm =  ]C?=i wip W^i where we assume 
the ip^s form an orthonormal set.
The initial state of the system is then
n n
T = pw)0 53 WiPm = 53 wip[v®ViY
i= l  i= l
A unitary evolution U will then yield the final state
n
53 WiP[U((P®tp,i)] 1 
i = 1
where the P[u(<p®^ i)],s 3 X 6  orthogonal 1-dimensional projections. For objectification and 
condition 5 to be satisfied, this state must be equal to a state of the form
k n
^Final =  5 3  Wi P [<fii®ipi\ 5 3  Wi P [Vi®'l>i]'> 
t= l i = k + 1
with 1 < k < n.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the states (pi <S> tpj, for fixed j ,  form
an orthonormal set. This is because
k (  k
53 wiP[<f>i®^j] ~ I 53
*=i \t= i
=Tfc <g> P[^]
and Tjt must have a decomposition in terms of orthogonal projections. Furthermore, 
states <Pi<S>ipi are orthogonal to states (pj^rj) 2  for all i, j .  Therefore Tpinai can be written 
in terms of an orthonormal decomposition of factorised states of the form Cpi <S> ipj- 
Under the assumption that Wi 7  ^Wj in the initial apparatus state, wip [U{v<2nl)li)\ 
is the unique decomposition of the final state in terms of orthogonal projections. It 
follows that UfaQipl) =  (pk <8> fpj for one of k, j  and that, more importantly, w[ is equal 
to some Wi of the initial mixture.
L #
Then calculating, for example, the probability for I <8 P ^]  will yield X)t=i w*i again 
dependent only on the probabihty weights of the initial mixture and not equal to |a i |2. 
Again therefore the probabilistic condition 6  is violated.
wip m
2. A ‘PROOF’ 58
The argument clearly generalises to all cases where the number of eigenvalues mak­
ing up the superposition of the measured state is less than the rank of the initial density 
matrix for the apparatus system. It then follows that, given an initial pure state of 
the measured system, the probabilities of the final apparatus state depend only on the 
weights of the initial apparatus state.
A similar result holds for the case when the initial measured system state is a 
density operator. Again an example will clarify what happens.
E x a m p le  2.2. Consider the case of a measurement on a 2-dimensional Hilbert 
space of an observable whose eigenstates are ip\ and v?2 - Let the initial state of the 
measured system be
Ts =  ViP^ij +  t>2-P[p2]
where (pl = anpi +  ct2<P2 and <p2 =  <*2 ^ 1  — &\y>2 , a* G C (where, for a  € C, a  is the 
complex conjugate of a). In other words we write the initial state of the measured 
system in its resolution in terms of orthogonal projections. We then have that the 
probability for tpi, given that the initial state is Ts, will be v i |a i | 2  +  ^2 1<^2 12- 
Now we consider an initial state
Tm =  wi P[^01] +  w2P[,j,02]
for the apparatus, and an observable A  on the apparatus space with eigenstates ipi and
ij) 2 representing pointer positions for (p\ and (p2 respectively.
The initial object +  apparatus state will then be
2
i j = 1
where the are pairwise orthogonal projections on the composite system.
The final state
2
^Final =  5 3  ViWj^[U(<pi<S>rl>oj)\ 
i j - l
is then resolved in terms of a set of pairwise orthogonal projections Exactly
the same argument employed from the previous example will show that these must be 
factorised states of the form Then the probability for H ® ‘tpj will be equal to a
combination of weights V{Wj. At this point more could be said about how the weights 
combine. For the purpose of this example, however, it suffices to note that, in any case, 
such probabilities are independent of |a i |2  and [or212, the coefficients which appear in
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the probabilistic calculations for the initial state T§. This again contradicts condition 
6  and yields an insolubility proof.
2.3. T h e  a rgum en t for in itia l a p p a ra tu s  s ta te s  w ith  m ultip licities in  th e ir  
w eights. The situation is not much different if multiplicities in the weights of the 
initial apparatus density operator are allowed for. It is important, nevertheless, to 
show explicitly why this is the case.
Consider again the case of an initial pure object state <p E %§, where dim(H§) =  n 
and ip is a superposition of all eigenstates of the measured observable. Suppose that 
the initial apparatus state Tm has a set of equal weights it;*, with multiplicity m. When 
some WiS are equal, the set {U(p  <8 > ^ ) }  may well contain elements which are not 
eigenvalues of the operator E <g> A. The reason is that neither the initial state, nor 
the final state, have a unique resolution in terms of pairwise orthogonal projections. 
Therefore, even if the initial state is resolved in terms of such projections, there is no 
guarantee that the final state will be resolved in terms of the orthogonal projections 
corresponding to the apparatus eigenstates. This then raises the possibility that the 
probabilities will not depend on the weights of the initial density matrix, whereas they 
do in the case when no multiplicities are present.
The final state is itself a positive, self-adjoint operator on Hg ® "Hm- As is well 
known, it must contain the appropriate apparatus observable eigenvectors in its range 
in order to be expressible as a convex combination of them 10 and thus satisfy objecti­
fication. Furthermore the apparatus observable eigenvectors will form an orthonormal 
basis for the range of the final state. Then the objectification requirement and condition 
5 can be satisfied. Two possibilities have to be considered here.
Any pure states in a resolution of the final state in terms of orthogonal projections 
whose weights do not occur more than once in the final state are fixed by the objectifi­
cation condition, which demands that the final density operator admit of an orthogonal 
representation in terms of eigenstates of a pointer observable I <8 > Am- The orthogonal 
representation of the density operator is given by a set of eigenstates of the operator, 
the weights being its eigenvalues. For eigenvalues (weights) with multiplicity 1 there is 
no possibility of eliminating their corresponding eigenvectors from the orthogonal rep­
resentation. These eigenvectors appearing in the final state of the object -1- apparatus
10It is a general feature of density operators that any projection onto a state in the range of these 
operators can appear in a decomposition of the density operators.
2. A ‘PROOF’ 60
system must then be eigenvectors of the pointer observable, as we assume that the final 
state satisfies objectification and 5.
The problem case therefore remains when eigenvalues (weights) of the final (and 
initial) density operator have multiplicity greater than 1. Denote by ip" the states of 
the initial apparatus density operator for which the weights of the representation are 
repeated m  times. The final states {U((p<8>ip")} for 1 <  i < m  must span m  eigenstates 
of I ® A  in order for the final state to have a representation in terms of eigenstates of the 
pointer observable, satisfying in this way the objectification requirement and condition 
5. Rewriting the final state in this way will not, however, affect the weights associated 
with the projections. In this case again calculation of the probabilities will yield always 
and only the weights W{. The convex-preserving property implies that the weights, as 
determined by the initial density operator for the apparatus system, will themselves be 
‘constants of the motion’ under any possible action of the conjugation operation as can 
be seen in (2.1). This is true regardless of whether the weights exhibit multiplicities or 
not, and the result previously established still holds.
REMARK 2 .2 . Assuming that the pointer observable has multiple eigen­
states associated with a given eigenvalue will not affect the argument given in 
this section. Suppose that the apparatus eigenspace H m is such that dim(?{M) > 
dim('Hs), and suppose that for some eigenvalue a of the pointer observable Am, in­
dicating measurement of an eigenvalue of the object observable being measured, 
the pointer eigenvalue is degenerate. Assume that the eigenvalues associated 
with a are spanned by an orthonormal set {ipia, • • • , ipna}- Then the appropriate 
projector to test for the probability associated with the pointer value a of the 
observable I® A will be I® P[{^lai... ,^no}]> where P[{^1oi. . . i s  the projection 
on the subspace of 'Hm spanned by the orthonormal system {ipia, • ■ • ,ipna}- 
It is easy to check that the probability condition will fail in exactly the same 
way if this is the case. Objectification requires that, if the initial state yields 
probability |a 0 |2 for the eigenstate ipa of the measured observable which is asso­
ciated with the pointers ipa, then the final density operator U(T) of the object 
-h apparatus space must admit of a decomposition into one or more of the pro­
jections P  ® Ptya]. The pure final states I ® P ^o] will be orthonormal to the 
projections associated to all other pointer eigenvalues. They will, therefore, have
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been unitarily evolved from pure states spanned by a subset of the initial appara­
tus states ortbonormal to the other pure states decomposing the initial apparatus 
mixture. Suppose the weights associated with such initial orthonormal states are 
Wia; their sum W{a will then clearly be equal to Tr[?7(T)I ® 
irrespective of the initial object state.
2.4. Som e conclusions. This section establishes that one cannot construct an 
operator satisfying conditions 3 and 4, by deriving a contradiction for assumptions 3 
and 4, given the further assumption of unitarity of the measurement operator.
While the proof is carried out for the finite dimensional case only, it is clear that 
much the same reasoning can be applied to the infinite dimensional case and the same 
result (independence of probabilities) applies. This is because of the form of the con­
vexity assumption for infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces, namely
n \  n
u ~ l =  T j v i V  ( ^ W '] )  u ~ l
i= l /  *=1
n
i= l
Again the states P[u{ip®^] must be pointer states (or a group of them must span 
pointer states in the case of multiplicities in the weights, even infinite multiplicities) for 
objectification to be satisfied. Thus the probabilities will again be equal to (possibly 
infinite) sums of weights itfj. 11
The argument of this section seeks to give an intuitive idea of what can happen 
when we assume that objectification of the pointer observable holds. It can also easily 
be made rigourous for cases where multiplicities and degeneracies are present, following
11 Note in particular that unitary transformations on infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces must map 
the whole space onto itself as well as being isometric. This means that transformations which for 
instance map an orthonormal basis of the Hilbert space to a countably infinite subset of that basis, 
even though they preserve the inner product and are thus isometric, are not unitary. The argument 
however works both for unitary and isometric transformations. In fact the condition that the projection 
operators P[^], the set of all relevant pointer observables, span the whole of the infinite dimensional 
Hilbert space “H u  is not a necessary condition for the argument just given. Therefore the eigenspaces 
Tis ® [tpi] of the pointer observable need not add up, for all non-zero pointer values indexed by i, to the 
whole space Tis <S> ‘Hm, but will add up to Tis ® a proper subspace of Us ® Hm- In such case the 
measurement operator might well be an isometry from 'Hs '&'Hm to Hs ®
U \  lim
\ n—»oo
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the points made, for example, in subsection 2.3 and in Remark 2.2. I avoid this, though, 
for the discussion of this section will be generalised by the result given in section 4.
The present discussion also makes use of condition 5, which is independent of ob­
jectification and enables a more intuitive discussion of what is happening in terms of 
the dynamics: it requires not just that pointers point, but that they point to the right 
values. This is not, however, necessary for the results of this section to work. Assuming 
just objectification means that the final state (2 .1 ), that is
n
i= l
must be decomposed into eigenstates of I ® Am- Such eigenstates, however, need not 
point to the right result. Nevertheless, calculating probabilities for E®P^.] for a pointer 
state P[^], the same line of reasoning used in this section will yield a value of 0  or a 
sum of weights Wi yet again, once more independent of the probability distribution 
associated with the initial object state Pyy  Therefore the present strategy also yields 
a contradiction with Fine’s distinguishability condition.
The difference will be that, without assuming condition 5, the rank of the initial 
density operator for the apparatus space will not be constrained. This difference, 
however, straightforwardly leads to insolubility results if the rank is too small, with 
arguments similar to the one given for the case of perfect correlation measurements.
This section presents a result which is close to those of a recent paper by Stein [79]. 
Both reach the same conclusion, namely that the probabilistic information yielded by a 
measurement satisfying objectification will in the end depend on the initial apparatus 
state only: no transfer of probabilistic information can happen between systems %§ and 
%M- The probability reproducibility condition asks that the probabilistic information 
of an initial state <p s with respect to a measured observable on H§ be transferred to 
information of the final state of the apparatus with respect to a pointer observable: this 
cannot be done. Stein assumes that the measurement operator U be unitary and satisfy 
objectification. This latter condition is expressed by the requirement that, given an 
initial state T§®Tm, the final state of the measurement evolution, U(Ts<S>Tm )U~1 should 
commute with the pointer observable operator on ® Hmi namely I <8 > A. Rather 
than explicitly calculating the probabilities as is done in this chapter, he proves, using 
the commutativity condition, a general result which entails the conclusion about the 
probabilities. Both the present proof and Stein’s effectively show that the probabilistic
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requirement 6  is violated. Busch and Shimony [17, p. 401] explicitly construct an 
operator which is unitary and satisfies objectification, but for which the probability 
reproducibility condition fails in exactly the way shown by Stein and in this paper. 
This example will be discussed at some length in section 4.
Stein also motivates his proof by reference to a debate with Fine and Brown, which 
will be further discussed in the next section. Fine and Brown’s proof considers the 
possible evolutions of particular, preferred decompositions of the initial object +  ap­
paratus state; this actually leads to an obvious impossibility proof for the quantum 
measurement problem according to Stein. I think Stein has in mind something like the 
proof presented in subsection 2 .2 ; the ‘obvious’ is due to the fact that such a proof 
would simply consider unitary evolutions of the initial object +  apparatus pure states 
in the preferred decomposition.
On the other hand, this does not rule out the possibility that for some decomposition 
other than the preferred one the problem might be solved. In particular, if we have 
a density operator which is not a proper mixture, or if we reject the possibility of 
drawing the distinction between proper and improper mixtures (as, for example, Krips 
[53] does) we are not in any position to select a preferred decomposition. One way 
to read the results of this section is that they establish that such possibilities are not 
really present: objectification and unitarity constrain them, as is shown by considering 
the evolution of the initial orthogonal decomposition of the object +  apparatus state, 
and showing that multiplicities in this state do not make a difference.
3. Insolubility proofs and Real Unitary Evolution
This section discusses the insolubility proof given by Fine [36] and Brown [11]. 
The previous section has shown how, assuming objectification and condition 5 (indeed 
assuming objectification alone) makes it impossible for the probabilistic condition 6  
to be satisfied. Fine’s proof relied implicitly on a further assumption, Real Unitary 
Evolution (RUE), in order to derive the impossibility result. Brown’s paper makes this 
assumption explicit and defends it as a reasonable assumption for quantum measure­
ments.
Stein (in the paper [79] mentioned at the end of the previous section) and Shimony 
[77] have criticised this assumption as untenable on two different grounds. By relying 
on the analysis given in the previous section it is possible to show that the technical
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claim that RUE makes is in fact not independent of the assumption of objectification, 
but follows from it under the interpretation of mixtures that Stein in particular thinks 
is appropriate.
This result relies on an apparently stronger version of the condition of objectifica­
tion. In showing that the condition is not really stronger, I will prove another result 
which establishes that, for unitary evolutions of the object +  apparatus system, the 
requirement of objectification and condition 5 are incompatible. The result is of partic­
ular interest as it involves no consideration whatsoever of conditions such as 6 , Fine’s 
distinguishability condition, or indeed any other probabilistic condition that connects 
probabilities for objects to probabilities for apparata. It is therefore more general than 
any of the proofs given before, which assume such detailed probabilistic conditions for 
quantum measurement. This will be discussed in the next section.
3.1. R eal U n ita ry  Evolution and  its  critics. The principle of Real Unitary 
Evolution (RUE) assumes that the initial state of the object 4 - apparatus system, call 
it T  =  Yh wiP[<t>i]‘> &i — <P ® “0Oz € 'H.s ®'Hm is a (proper) mixture of the pure states 
and asserts that the final state is actually a mixture over the states -P[u($i)]’ 
where U is a  candidate measurement operator. This implies that, if the final object +  
apparatus state Y i  wiP[u($i)] is to satisfy objectification, the states P[u(<i>i)] must be 
the eigenstates of the pointer observable I <8 > Am, for they are the only states which can 
appear in the decomposition of the final mixture, given that it is a proper mixture.
Recall that a mixture is defined as a density operator which is a genuine mixed 
state, i.e. a density operator which either represents an ensemble of distinct systems 
truly in pure states, or represents a system which admits of an ignorance interpretation, 
so that the weights of the density operator are in fact classical probabilities, and the 
system is really in a pure state, we just don’t know which one.
Unpacking the definition, we can see that it entails a number of things. The first is 
that the initial apparatus state is equally a proper mixture: this is because if the initial 
object state is pure, the combined state will be a proper mixture only if the apparatus 
state is a proper mixture, too. As the apparatus state is selected independently of the 
initial object state, it must always be a proper mixture. So, secondly, both for the 
combined state and for the apparatus state RUE selects a preferred decomposition,
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whatever decomposition is forced upon the states by the fact that they are proper mix­
tures. The final apparatus eigenstates, if they emerge, must be the result of evolutions 
of the pure states appearing in the preferred decomposition of the initial combined 
state. These evolutions are called Real Unitary Evolutions because they are evolutions 
of clearly defined pure states making up a mixture.
The assumption that the initial state is a proper mixture is needed, according to 
Brown, because if the final density operator of the combined object-apparatus system 
is to allow for an ignorance interpretation we must be able to rule out all other possible 
resolutions of it (orthogonal or not, presumably), and this is straightforward if the 
initial state is a mixture, for then the final state will be one, too. Fine’s result relies 
on considerations of states precisely of the form P[u(<pn)]i original weakness of the 
result was in the lack of justification for why we should think of states like P[u(<pn)] ^  
the only plausible candidates for being eigenstates of the pointer observable. Brown’s 
own justification of the reliance on states such as P[u(<pn)]i by assuming RUE, rescues 
the proof.
There are several problems with the RUE principle. First of all, why should we 
assume that the initial state must be a mixture in order to have a genuine measurement? 
There is no particularly good reason for this. A problematic aspect of this assumption 
concerns for example how we are to read the evolution: if the system is a proper mixture, 
it might be argued that it is as if it evolves as an ensemble of pure states, ‘sectioned 
off’ from one another according to whether they have the same pure state or not. Then 
there is a problem, because perhaps in this case we should characterise the measurement 
evolution as many different measurement evolutions for different individual pure states 
and treat the measurement problem on this basis. But it is by now well understood, 
for instance as a result of the discussion on page 50, that no satisfactory solution to 
the measurement problem in the present framework can be found if the evolution is 
defined over initial pure states.
There are two other reasons for dropping RUE, one to do with the generality of 
proofs that one wants to achieve and one concerning the interpretation of density op­
erators in general. It seems unreasonable to disallow density operators which are not 
proper mixtures from being initial apparatus states, particularly if this might solve 
the measurement problem. This requires only objectification for the final apparatus 
system, which in turn requires only that the final object +  apparatus system be an
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appropriate density operator, and not that such density operator be a proper mix­
ture. Initial apparatus density operators which are not proper mixtures might arise, 
for instance, by a decoupling of an apparatus from an environment if the apparatus 
+  environment system happens to be in an entangled state. Several reasons suggest 
that this will in general be the case: the Coulomb interaction is sufficient to guarantee 
that everything will become entangled, even when it is effectively shielded. Shimony’s 
own statement is that “ . . .  the energy levels of macroscopic systems are so densely 
spaced that no shielding can prevent the entanglement of [the apparatus system] with 
the environment” [77].
Stein’s argument against assuming a principle such as RUE is based upon rejecting 
the possibility of interpreting the density operator as an assignment of probabilities to 
possible pure states. As he puts it, “ the full content of the statistical operator lies 
in its assignment of probabilities to the possible values of observables, and [ . . .  ] it has 
nothing whatever to do with probabilities that the system is in a given pure state” [79]. 
This is, in several different senses, a point well made; many recent approaches to quan­
tum mechanics stress the fact that states are derived from the demand that they define 
a probability measure for the sets of observables (this is how Gleason, for example, 
characterises states). From this point of view pure and mixed states have the same 
status: they both define probability measures, albeit different ones. But also we assign 
states of incoherent polarisation (non pure density operators) to photons without nec­
essarily intending to interpret this assignment as stating that the photons are in one as 
opposed to another state of coherent polarisation. The algebraic approach to quantum 
mechanics also defines states in this way.
Stein’s position seems to me to be the correct one on the issue of interpreting den­
sity operators, at least for the present discussion. If we assume that a decomposition 
of a density operator is to be privileged at all, this is in a sense equivalent to saying 
that quantum mechanics is incomplete. This is because nowhere does quantum me­
chanics tell us how to distinguish such a decomposition from any other (Van Fraassen 
makes a similar point when discussing the ignorance interpretation [80, p. 206]). In 
particular there are no observables which can draw this distinction, in the sense that 
no observables lead to different expectation values for different decompositions of a 
density operator. Therefore no physical setup according to the quantum theory on its 
own, no experiment, can draw the distinction: this is the essence, from a theoretical
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point of view, of what differentiates quantum mechanics from ‘classical’ theories. Van 
Fraassen in fact explicitly speaks of quantum mechanics being incomplete insofar as we 
think we can tell which decomposition of a density operator is the correct one.
Henry Krips similarly rejects the idea that we can interpret density operators epis- 
temically, as he puts it. He flatly rejects that it makes sense to talk about proper 
mixtures from a different point of view, both for technical and mainly philosophical 
reasons: if it makes sense to talk about proper mixtures in quantum mechanics, then in 
tru th  this so-called mixture is really a pure state, and Krips gives a number of technical 
and philosophical reasons for treating it as such [53, Ch. 4].
Nevertheless I think that Fine and Brown’s proof works without assuming RUE, and 
I will try to show this in what follows. What is it that Fine and Brown actually do? The 
proof works by considering three initial states (pi and <P2 , eigenstates of an observable 
H , and <p =  a\(p\ + ot2<P2 for the object system, as well as an initial density operator for 
the apparatus system, 2 * wi^\n] ( ^ e 7 *’s n°t necessarily eigenstates of the apparatus 
observable). The proof then examines the three end states after the evolution, namely 
wiP[U(<pi®'Yi)\ and the similar states for <p2 and (p. These must all be weighted sums 
of eigenstates of I 0  A  if they are to satisfy the objectification condition. Now let 
=  (pi 0  7 n for some fixed n, $ 2  =  ¥>2 ® 7 n and $  =  (a\cpi 4- a 2<P2 ) ® 7 n- Then we 
have that U($) =  a iU ($ i) -ha^UX^)- But U($), U ($i) and U(<&2) are all supposed 
to be eigenstates of 2 0  A and for this to be true it must be that these eigenstates have 
the same eigenvalue. If this is so then Fine’s distinguishability criterion (as well as 
the probability reproducibility condition) will fail: (pi, (p2 and (p are if-distinguishable, 
while the final states are not 1 0  ^-distinguishable.
A natural question arises here: can this proof work without explicitly assuming, as 
RUE does, that, for an initial density operator ^  wiP[tp<s>Tp0i] for the object +  apparatus 
system, the final state, which by objectification must be a decomposition in terms of 
projections on eigenstates of pointer observables, will actually be so decomposed by 
projections of the form P[u(<p®ii>0i)]'! Can the proof work without assuming that the 
ignorance interpretation of mixtures selects a preferred decomposition of the initial 
state of the combined system, as RUE suggests? The aim is to attempt a different 
‘rescue’ operation of the proof just outlined in the previous paragraph from the one 
that Brown suggests. The motivations are also different from Brown’s. He sees a virtue 
in the RUE condition itself, as well as in saving the proof in view of its simplicity: the
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addition of the RUE condition, while philosophically debatable, certainly does not add 
to the difficulty of the mathematical argument we have just seen. My rescue of this 
argument has a somewhat different motive. I want to show that it is on a par as a 
result with other insolubility proofs, so that it is not necessary to invoke any additional 
conditions in order to show that Fine and Brown’s proof is valid. This will hardly keep 
matters simple; on the other hand it shows that the insolubility result that Fine and 
Brown propose is in no way less general than other results, irrespective of the attitudes 
one has towards interpreting quantum density operators.
3.2. Saving F ine and  B row n’s p roof?  In order to answer the question on 
which the previous section has closed, I have to show that we can dispense with RUE, 
assuming only the standard conditions invoked when proving insolubility results, while 
keeping the proof just outlined as a valid one. The crucial step in doing this is to 
show that the technical part of the RUE assumption is in fact derivable from the other 
conditions usually assumed when trying to solve the measurement problem.
This technical content amounts to the claim that there exists a preferred resolution 
of the initial apparatus state, independent of the object state. This resolution must in 
addition have the following property: the pure states decomposing the initial appara­
tus state, when coupled to the initial object state, are necessarily mapped to pointer 
eigenstates. This will establish that there is a way of writing down the initial object -f 
apparatus state, independent of the initial object state, for example as wiP[<p®ip0i]i 
such that the final state 2 *  a^ er th® evolution U has taken place, is
decomposed in terms of pointer eigenstates of precisely the form P[u(<p®ip0i)]' The in­
dependence of the ipoi's from the initial object state <p is again needed for the proof on 
page 67 to go through, as can be seen by inspecting the role of the 7 n’s in that proof.
If I can show that this technical content follows from the usual conditions in the 
quantum measurement problem, RUE will then become redundant. If this is established 
it will it be possible to appeal to that resolution and give as a proof the argument of Fine 
and Brown presented on page 67, independently of the philosophical reasonableness of 
RUE and regardless of the approach we want to take in the interpretation of quantum 
density operators.
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It is worth stressing that what I am considering here is the objection to the validity 
of the proof given on page 67 per se, and not the objections to RUE. If it were pos­
sible to show that the result of Brown and Fine follows without assuming RUE, then 
debates over the status of RUE and debates over the status of the proof will become 
separate issues: it might be thought that RUE is a tenable interpretation for quantum 
measurement evolutions, or it might not, but this would not affect the status of Fine 
and Brown’s proof.
The final state of the object +  apparatus system should be a density operator 
which admits of a decomposition over eigenstates of a pointer observable I <g> A for 
the composite system in order for objectification to be satisfied. A subset of these 
eigenstates (bearing in mind remark 2 .1 ) forms an orthonormal basis for the composite 
system. The initial density operator can also be decomposed over a set of orthonormal 
states, P[$.] say. As any unitary operator maps orthonormal systems to orthonormal 
systems, and a density operator has a unique resolution in terms of orthonormal states, 
assuming there are no multiplicities in its weights, then the final state must have its 
orthonormal resolution given by P[t/($i)]j given the are orthonormal states. If the 
decomposition of the final state in terms of pointer eigenstates is orthonormal, then 
the pointer eigenstates must be of the form C7($*).
Suppose the unitary operator measures an observable with eigenstates <£>i, v?2 , • • • 
and that the initial object state is a pure state which is a superposition of m  such 
eigenstates. Then the final state must be a density operator decomposable into pointer 
observable eigenstates having m different pointer eigenstates of the observable Am 
defined on the apparatus space H m - If two pointer eigenstates have different eigenstates 
of Am for their H  m component, they are orthogonal. Some, on the other hand, will 
have the same % m component. Consider now two different ones, Pi == P^®^*] and 
P2 =  P[^/®^], i fixed. Suppose they are not orthogonal, therefore not of the form 
U($i)] they do span a subspace of dimension 2 , however, and any density operator 
which is decomposable into Pi and P2 is decomposable into any two projections on the 
image space of Pi +  P2 . In particular, given the assumption of no multiplicities in the 
initial density operator, there must be exactly one orthogonal decomposition of the 
subspace; this will, as is easily seen by looking at Pi and P2 , necessarily contain as 
its % m component.
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It follows that the projections which decompose the final object +  apparatus state 
after a unitary measurement, in accordance with the objectification condition, are such 
that
e ither: only one contains a particular ij>j as its Tig component, in which case it 
will be a projection orthogonal to all other projections and therefore necessarily 
of the form
or: more than one contains tpj, in which case there exists a decomposition of the 
particular ‘subpart’ of the density operator in terms of orthogonal projections, 
both containing ipi, and both orthogonal to all other projections in the final 
state, in which case they will also be of the form P[u($i)]12-
12 It is easy to show that this is the case. First of all, note that the decomposition of a (multiplicity 
free) density operator T  in terms of pointer eigenstates might not be made up of pairwise orthogonal 
pure states of a density operator, but will consist at the very least of a set of states, grouped into subsets 
which span orthogonal subspaces of the Hilbert space “Hs ® M m, where the subsets are characterised by 
the fact that the eigenstates belonging to them share an eigenvalue. Clearly the elements of the subsets 
need not be pairwise orthogonal, but they are orthogonal to all other eigenstates in the decomposition.
Given one such subset S  and its complement S ' in the set of eigenstates of the given decomposition 
of the density operator T , the latter can be written as Ts + Ts>, where Ts  is the operator obtained 
by summing together the elements of the subset S, with the appropriate weights, and T$> is simply 
T  — Ts. Ts maps all vectors in a Hilbert space such as "Hs ® "H m to vectors spanned by S , and is null on
vectors spanned by S '. T$> clearly does just the opposite. The claim just made is that the orthogonal
decomposition of the density operator will then of necessity be given by vectors spanned by S  and S' 
separately, and cannot belong to the span of the union of these two sets.
The orthogonal decomposition of T  is given by its eigenvectors multiplied by its eigenvalues. 
Namely, for any <p such that Pv appears in the orthogonal decomposition of T, we have that T(ip) =  ap . 
Now suppose that <p is in the span of T, and that ip =  aiy?i +  02^2, where p \  is in the span of Ts  and 
<P2 is in the span of Ts> ■ Then, if ip is an eigenstate of T, we must have that
T(p) =  Ts +  Ts> (ai<pi + oc2<Pi) =  ociTs{<pi) + ol2Ts> (<pi)
For this to be equal to atp both <pi and <p2 must be eigenstates of Ts and Ts> respectively, and therefore 
also of T, and both must have eigenvalue a. But this would imply that T  has a multiple eigenvalue, 
which gives a contradiction. Therefore the eigenstates must belong to S  and S '. The argument 
can clearly be repeated for each of the subsets which partition the decomposing pointer eigenstates, 
therefore making sure that all elements in the orthogonal decomposition of a multiplicity-free final 
density operator T must be pointer eigenstates. Note that this applies regardless of whether the pointer 
observable has multiplicities or not: if the pointer observable has multiple eigenstates associated with 
a pointer eigenvalue, it might be the case that in the final density operator after measurement there
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So, regardless of whether we assume a condition such as RUE, it is a result that, in 
the absence of multiplicities in the initial apparatus state, the technical requirement of 
RUE (that the final state has the form P[u(&)] with U(3>) an eigenstate of the pointer 
observable signifying that a measurement has unearthed a certain value) holds. The 
technical content of Shimony and Stein’s objection to the proof is not so easily defeated, 
though: the U ($n) need not be eigenstates of the apparatus observable if there are 
multiplicities in the initial apparatus state, until otherwise proved.
As the possibility of writing the final states as £/(4>n), where these states are pointer 
eigenstates, is crucial for Brown’s proof to work, the disagreement voiced by Stein and 
Shimony still looks strong. Is it tenable? No, because, as I will show next, it is always 
possible to find a unique way of writing the initial density matrix, independently of 
what the initial object state is and independently of whether the initial state contains 
multiple weights, so that the final object +  apparatus state is a sum of eigenstates of 
the apparatus pointer observable.
It looks as though, in the argument leading to proposition 2.3, it is not possible 
to get the eigenstates right: the procedure for finding the preferred way for writing 
the initial density operator will make use of a  violation of condition 5. It is useful 
to explain this in some detail, as it will also lead to a very simple insolubility proof 
involving a contradiction between the objectification requirement 3 and condition 5, 
given unitarity of the measurement, rather than between 3 and 4, and eventually to a 
characterisation of unitary operators satisfying objectification. This makes it doubly 
worthwhile to study the question.
The following argument is close in structure to the one given in the previous section, 
specifically in subsection 2.3, when dealing with the question of how the result in section 
2  is affected by the case when the initial apparatus state contains multiplicities. Suppose 
1 <  i < m  <  n, where n  is the rank of the density operator for the initial object +  
apparatus system and m  is an index which tracks the multiplicity of one of the weights of 
the initial density operator. The states E Us ® 1 < i <  tti, which appear
in the decomposition of the initial density operator, all have equal weight w ^  0 , so 
that the density operator (which is just a standard self-adjoint operator on the Hilbert
axe many eigenstate associated with such eigenvalue. In this case they could well have different tpi's 
in them, but again this is not a problem; the same argument just given applies, as if two eigenstates 
share the same eigenvalue, then so do all its linear combinations.
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space Hs ® %m) has an eigenspace of dimension m, with eigenvalue w. -P[u($i)] neec* 
not be an eigenstate of H <S> A, but if the final state is to have a spectral resolution in 
terms of such eigenstates, the states U($*) for 1  <  i < m  must span m  of them.
More specifically, given an initial state of the object p, and an initial apparatus 
state that is a density operator resolved by arbitrary states of the apparatus system 
ipoi, suppose the density operator has, for 1 < i < m, weight w. Suppose also that for 
(p <g> V>o», U(p<2> V’oi) are not eigenstates of I <8 > A. Still these eigenstates must be in the 
range of the operator 2 * P[U(<p®ip0i)]- U is unitary, and therefore invertible, so there 
must be an orthonormal system of states $ j  in the subspace spanned by the p  <g> Vtoi’s, 
each of which will be mapped onto an eigenstate of the apparatus observable. But this 
subspace spanned by the states p  ® V’oi consists of states of the form p  <8 > aiipoi, so 
that =  p  <g> Xli Let V’oj  =  then it follows that U(p ® if)J.) is an
eigenstate of I ® A.
This establishes that, given an initial object state p  there is a way to write the 
initial object-apparatus state as a sum of the projectors such that these will be
mapped onto eigenstates of the apparatus observable. This is not enough for Brown’s 
proof to work: the density operator must be the same for all initial object states, it 
cannot be dependent on the initial state of the object system. The reason for this is that 
RUE asserts that the evolution U maps an initial state with a specific decomposition in 
terms of states p  ® V^-, which results from the state being a proper mixture, to a final 
state where the pointer eigenstates are assumed to be the evolutes of the initial states 
in the decomposition, namely U(p <8 > ipQj)- The proof works with such final states, and 
the tpQj are selected independently of the initial object state by arguing that there is a 
preferred decomposition of the initial apparatus state. In order to show that Fine and 
Brown’s proof can do without assuming RUE it is necessary then to show that there 
is a unique initial decomposition of the initial apparatus state so that the final state 
is a density operator resolved by pointer eigenstates. In other words, there must be a 
set of states ip'Qj  which we can point to, independently of the initial object states, as 
the ones which, when coupled to initial object states, are mapped by the measurement 
evolution to a final pointer eigenstate. Then it is not necessary to assume that the 
initial state is a mixture in order to claim that the final state consists of eigenstates of 
the form U( p ®
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To show that there can be a unique decomposition of the initial apparatus state 
when there are multiplicities in the density operator representing this state, we need 
to focus on the parts of the density operators which contain these multiplicities. These 
are, so to speak, the problem areas. Consider any two parts of final states which 
have multiple weights of order m, and denote them by T  =  w [^U((p®ip0i)\ and
T ' =  wP[U(<p'®‘ifi,0j)] f°r different initial states (p and <p' of the object system. T
and T ' are sums of projections over eigenstates of the observable I 0  A.
Assume that they are such that, for i ^  j ,  (U(<p<2> tpoi)\ U(ip' 0  V’oj) ^ — 013- 
Then (p 0  ifioi and <p' 0  must be sets of vectors in 9{§ 0  H m satisfying
(3.1) (<£®^0 i| = 0  for i ^ j .
I want to show that from this there follows that V’oi and ipr0j  axe the same set of 
orthonormal states. Two cases can arise:
• <p jLip': In this case (3.1) reduces to
(V’oil^oi) =  0 f o r i ^ j . ,
which implies that ^oi and V'oj are the same set of orthonormal states, considering 
that they must span the same (sub)space of W m-
• <p _L <p': Choose a vector <p" such that it is perpendicular neither to (p nor to cp'. 
Then apply the argument of the above case for the pairs <p, <pu and (pu, ip’ to 
obtain that the density operators must have the same spectral resolution in this 
case, too.
The following result has been established:
P r o p o sit io n  2 .3 . Consider any initial state P^j £  T *  C%§) of the measured sys­
tem, an initial apparatus state ]T”= 1  a unitary operator U acting on 0  'Hm
and a pointer observable for the apparatus system Am (and corresponding pointer 
observable I 0  Am for the object + apparatus system). Assume further that objec­
tification is satisfied in such a way that, for a final state T  = WiP[u(ip®ipoi)]? 
U((p 0  ipoi) =  <pi 0  fa with ipi ^  for i ±  j .
13This is the problematic assumption, apparently a stronger assumption than objectification. It 
will be analysed in the next section, where I will show how it in fact follows from the objectification 
assumption together with the assumption of unitarity of the measurement operator. Only then will it 
be possible to claim that Fine and Brown’s proof is entirely equivalent to all other insolubility results.
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Then there must be a resolution of the initial density operator in the object + appa­
ratus system, independent of <p € H§, in terms of orthogonal projections on 
of the form
*
such that, for the final density operator
wiP[U(tpi®rp'oi)]i
i
the U fa  ® ip'0i) must be eigenstates of the pointer observable I ® .Am*
Clearly such a resolution will apply also in the case of an initial mixed state, as it 
applies for all the individual states of the decomposition of such a state.
The result says that, for any initial apparatus state of rank n there is a  unique 
resolution of this state in terms of orthogonal projections such that the state of the 
apparatus after the measurement interaction will be a sum of n  distinct and orthogonal 
projections on pointer eigenstates. Note that no assumption is made here about the 
specific value of n, nor indeed about degeneracies in the pointer observable.
We can then, without loss of generality, rewrite any initial state of an object- 
apparatus system in such a way that the final state will be a density operator over 
eigenstates of the apparatus observable, given the additional assumption about objecti­
fication made on page 73. In this case it is possible to say that, even if it is not possible 
to interpret the initial object +  apparatus state as a proper mixture, as Brown wishes 
to, the argument of the proof that Fine and Brown give can be applied to yield an 
insolubility proof.
There remains the question of whether this apparent restriction of the objectifi­
cation condition is actually a restriction, or whether it itself follows from the other 
assumptions used in the proof. We examine this in the next section, for it will be 
of interest in its own right to do so, as it will yield two further results, one a very 
simple insolubility proof, the other informative as to what the structure of the unitary 
evolution must be if objectification is assumed.
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4. Insolubility without probability
This section, by farther analysing the arguments of the previous section, will make 
clear in what sense insolubility proofs are independent of specific conditions tying prob­
abilities of objects to probabilities of apparata in quantum measurement. In Section 2 
of this chapter the argument has been that it is impossible to satisfy objectification and 
unitarity (with or without condition 5) on the one hand, and the probabilistic condition 
6  on the other. Section 3 has analysed Fine’s and Brown’s proof, which establishes that 
objectification implies a violation of Fine’s distinguishability condition, hence a fortiori 
of the probability reproducibility condition.
Stein, however, makes a stronger claim in his recent paper. He claims that, given the 
assumptions of unitarity and objectification, “the observation [the measurement pro­
cess] conveys no information whatever about the antecedent condition of the object” 
[79], and he is right, of course. The implication of this is that there is no meaningful 
sense of measurement that can be attached to these processes, if we assume both uni­
tarity and objectification. The first result of this section shows how, independently of 
which probabilistic condition is imposed, there is, given the unitarity of the measure­
ment operator, a contradiction between objectification and condition 5. The second 
result is more general, and the closest to Stein’s: it provides an explicit character­
isation of any unitary operator U on a composite system Hs ® H  m which satisfies 
objectification. Through yet another different route this establishes Stein’s claim.
The crucial assumption in the discussion of Fine and Brown in the previous section 
is made on page 73, as I’ve already remarked several times. The requirement is that, 
for i 7  ^ j ,  ( U(tp <S> ipoi)\ U(<p' ® ipQj) ^ =  0. This can hold only if the final state is a 
sum of eigenstates of the pointer observable I ® Am with distinct eigenvalues, and this 
is immediately in contradiction with 5, the first part of the probability reproducibil­
ity condition. Consider an initial state P[Qm+Q2V?2] € 7i+ ('Hs), the <p*’s eigenstates 
of observables to be measured on the object system, and an initial apparatus state 
]Ci= 1  w*P(^ o»]* Why should the final state be a sum of projections over three pointer 
eigenstates with distinct eigenvalues? If this were true, by condition 5 the initial state 
would be a superposition of three different observable eigenstates, which is clearly not 
the case. This remark suggests the following result, which demonstrates the contradic­
tion between 3  and 5, independently of which probabilistic condition we adopt.
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P r o po sit io n  2 .4 . Suppose an operation U  acting on 7 ^ (%§ 0  “Hm) satisfies the 
objectification requirement 3 and also condition 5. Then U  cannot be a unitary mea­
surement action U*TU.
PROOF. Consider two initial states of the object, P ^  and P\^y  Suppose they 
are such that P^] has non-zero probability with respect to two eigenstates of the dis­
crete measured object observable (effects, if the observable is unsharp) and P^/j has
non-zero probability with respect to three eigenstates (or effects) of the same object 
observable, two of which are the same as for Pyy  Consider also an initial apparatus 
state S?=i wiP[*Poib n Possibly infinite. Assuming objectification the final state 
for <p will be of the form
n n
* = 1  i=l
and for iff
n
i=i
5 implies that, in the case of (p, we will have that ipi =  ip\ or ip2 , these being pointer 
observable eigenstates associated with different eigenvalues (not necessarily unique if 
the eigenvalues are multiple), indicating that ipi or ip2 respectively have been measured. 
For y/, on the other hand, ipi = ipi, ip2 or ip$, again eigenstates associated with distinct 
eigenvalues. Consider in the second case a final pointer eigenstate (jpfa <g> ip$. This is 
necessarily orthogonal to all the final eigenstates of the pointer observable appearing 
in the decomposition of the first final state, corresponding to the initial state <p, be­
cause it is a pointer eigenstate recording a value that is different from the eigenvalues 
corresponding to both eigenvalues associated with pointer eigenstates containing ip\ or
1p2'
If the operation U  is generated by the conjugation action of a unitary operator 17, 
then for some i = a, ipf 0  ipoa is orthogonal to all the states in the decomposition of the 
initial state for <p. This gives a contradiction: in order for (<// 0  ipoa\ ip <g> ipoi) =  0 it is 
necessary that either (<p\ <p') = §, clearly not the case, or else that ( ipoa\ ipoi) =  0  for 
all i. This is impossible, for there is no decomposition for the initial state wi^ bPoi] 
such that ipQa will be orthogonal to all the states in the decomposition. Such states 
must span the range of the self-adjoint operator X3£=i therefore they must
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span ipoa, so that the inner product of ipoa with them must yield at least one non-zero 
number. □
The previous result is in itself an insolubility proof; it says that unitarity of the oper­
ator and objectification yield a contradiction with 5. It is worth exploring a bit further 
what restrictions on the form of the unitary operators axe imposed by objectification 
alone.
The following corollaries follow straightforwardly from the arguments in the proof 
of Proposition 2.4.
COROLLARY 2 .5 . Suppose the unitary operator U satisfies objectification. For any 
two states P^ j, P^/j G 'Hg, and given an initial state for the apparatus system  Tm, the 
final states after the evolution of the object + apparatus system will be decomposable 
into a sum of projections over eigenstates of the pointer observable I <S> Am- I f  one 
such pointer eigenstate in the resolution of the final state, evolved from the initial state 
f\<p] ® has eigenvalue qm, then there must be a pointer eigenstate in the final state 
evolved from P ^ j  <g> Tm with the same eigenvalue om-
P r o o f . See Appendix A. □
C orollary  2 .6 . For any initial state P^] of the object system T i ’i'Hs), and an 
initial state for the apparatus T  =  YliLi where the projections P[tp0i] are mu­
tually orthogonal, if  the final state after the unitary evolution satisfies objectification, 
then it must be decomposable into projections of the form P ^ ® ^ ], with the ipi’s distinct 
eigenstates of the pointer observable Am- Furthermore there must exist an orthonormal 
set of such ipi’s.
P r o o f . See Appendix A. □
The previous corollaries need some comment. Suppose we have a final state of 
the form Y jiwiP[$i) ® P[A]i measuring an initial pure state <p G where the ipi axe 
eigenstates of the pointer observable Am- The first corollary tells us that the span of 
the reduced apparatus state Yli wiP[ipi] must be the same for all initial object states (p.
If not there must exist two object states <p and <pr for which the final apparatus states
will have different span. In this case we can find, as in the proof of Proposition 2.4, a 
projection operator appearing in the decomposition of the final state associated to one 
of the two initial states which is orthogonal to all possible projections decomposing the
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final state associated with the other state. This violates the assumed unitarity of the 
evolution.
The second corollary establishes that the rank of an initial apparatus state Tm 
must be equal to that of the final reduced apparatus state. Then the span of any final 
apparatus state is not only fixed, but also maximal relative to the rank of the initial 
apparatus state. Furthermore, there always exists an orthogonal decomposition of 
the final object +  apparatus state in terms of eigenvectors of the apparatus observable 
1 0  Am. Note that this does not mean that all vectors appearing in such a decomposition 
will be of the form Cp <g> ipi, with ipi an eigenstate of Am- It is quite possible that 
projections over vectors such as Y%=i ® V’t might appear in the decomposition if 
ipi and ip2 axe eigenstates of Am corresponding to the same eigenvalue, for then such 
an entangled vector will nevertheless be an eigenstate of I <8 > Am-
REMARK 2 .3 . Note that in the previous proofs (see Appendix A) no as­
sumption is made that the resolution of the final state in terms of pointer eigen­
states must correspond to the evolutions of initial projections of the form >
with the ipoi’s an orthogonal decomposition of the initial apparatus state. How­
ever at this point it is possible to invoke Proposition 2.3. Suppose we have a 
unitary evolution satisfying the objectification criterion, which we now know to 
entail, by Corollary 2.6, the extra assumption in proposition 2.3. This propo­
sition then shows that there must exist an orthogonal resolution of the initial 
apparatus density operator, independent of the initial object state, such that 
projections in the resolution of the initial composite density operator, induced 
by the resolution of the initial apparatus density operator, will be mapped to 
projections which are eigenstates of the composite pointer observable.
This finally and somewhat laboriously establishes, amongst other things, that 
Fine and Brown’s proof outlined on page 67 can be used to provide an insolubility 
proof of the quantum measurement problem independently of the interpretation 
we impose on quantum mixtures.
This result also leads to the further theorem which characterises unitary measure­
ment mappings with sharp pointer observables satisfying objectification of the pointer 
observable.
Consider a complete orthonormal set in Hs 0  suc^ as {<£i, . . .  , <pn}, used in the 
proof of the previous Corollary, and the resolution in terms of orthonormal projections
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onto ipoi of the initial apparatus state selected by Proposition 2.3. The states U (ipj<Siipoi) 
must be equal to Yhk=1 ® w^ere Vfy'fc is 311 eigenstate of Am, with possible
multiplicities in the eigenvalues of Am- When k > 1 , the eigenstate of the pointer 
observable I®  Am for the composite system is entangled. A vector (state) in a  composite 
system such as Tig ® H m is called entangled if it is not of the form ip® ipi under any 
basis for Tig ® 'hLm\ if it has this latter form it is called factorisable. An entangled state 
is always the sum of factorised vectors in Hg ® ^ m -  In the present case an eigenstate 
can be entangled if and only if the set {ipijk}k all share the same eigenvalue of Am- 
If there are ipifis which are not orthogonal for different values of j  (either because 
they are equal, or simply non-orthogonal eigenstates corresponding to the same eigen­
value), then in order to preserve the orthogonality of the initial states ipj ® ipoi and 
(fji ® ipoi it will be necessary that
(<Pij\<Pij') = 0-
Note also the following definitions:
D e f in it io n  2 .3 . A linear partial isometry (from now on simply partial isometry) 
on a Hilbert space W. is an operator W  which is isometric on a subspace V f of H  and 
null on the conjugate subspace 'H1- of vectors orthogonal to vectors in V !.
DEFINITION 2.4. [ipi\ denotes the subspace spanned by the vector ipi. Similarly 
[<pi\i denotes the subspace spanned by the vectors ipi in the range of the index i.
We then have the following
T h eo r em  2 .7 . 1. Consider a complete orthonormal set {<£i , . . .  ,<Pj,... ,^ m } in Hg 
and an initial pointer state Every operator U : Hg® [ipoi\i -> H g® [ipij]ij
is unitary and satisfies objectification of the pointer observable I ® Am if  and only if
li
(4.1) U := Y .
»=1.....» fc=lj —1,... ,TO
where WSyfc( •) : Hg ->■ Tig is a partial isometry of the form
<<Pj\ (*))(<Pijk)
on the subspace [<pj] and W Mijk{ •) : [V’oi]* [tpijklijk is a, partial isometry of the form
(tpoi\ (*))WyJfc)
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that maps the (sub)space spanned by the initial states ipoi (which are fixed for any U 
through Proposition 2.3) to the (sub)space spanned by final pointer eigenstates ipijk, in 
such a way that ipijk, ipijk' ipij'k are eigenstates of the pointer observable with the same 
pointer eigenvalue.
2. The following equation also holds:
h k
(4 .2) y  w sijk ® w Mijk =  y  < &  ® t /^  i (•)> (& ;*
jfc=i fc=i
3. For any two different such partial isometries, W  and W ', and any vector $  G 
n § ® H M, {W ($)\ W '( $ ) ) = 0 .
In particular, if the partial isometries W Mijk are equal for all j  }s and k }s then
n
(4.3) U = Y ,U f ® W Mi,
*=1
and if all U f are equal
(4.4) U = US ® U M
P r o o f . See Appendix A □
The result establishes the following facts. The main representation of unitary oper­
ators, given by equation (4.1), looks quite complicated, and indeed allows for entangle­
ment between the object and apparatus system: the measurement can map an initial 
factorised object +  apparatus state to a final entangled state. The entanglement in 
question, however, is possible only on the assumption that the pointer observable Am 
has multiple eigenvalues. In this case the observable I 0  Am has entangled eigenstates: 
to see this note first that if ipi is an eigenstate of Am then, for any ip G Hs, (p®ipi is 
an eigenstate of I 0  Am; then, if ip\ and ip2 are both eigenstates of Am with the same 
eigenvalue, it clearly follows that, for any two ip and </?', a\ip® ip\ +  ct2<p' 0 1P2 is also an 
eigenstate of 10  Am- It is precisely these kinds of eigenstates which might emerge as a 
result of a unitary interaction satisfying objectification. The indexed U which appear 
in the characterisation of U ‘track’ the extent to which such an eigenstate is entangled, 
by determining how many factorised states make up the entangled eigenstate that can 
appear as a result of the unitary evolution.
It is only to this extent that objectification allows entanglement. When, however, 
the observable Am has no multiple eigenstates (which is the case described by equation
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(4.3)) then objectification allows for no interaction whatsoever between the object sys­
tem on the one hand, and the apparatus system when this is in the states decomposing 
the initial apparatus density operator. That is, for such an observable Am, initial fac­
torised states of the composite system, where the apparatus state is one of the states 
*0 0 1 , do not get entangled by the unitary operator satisfying objectification.
The ‘no-information’ result for quantum measurements, stated on page 75 as be­
ing Stein’s claim, then follows easily: an operator which satisfies objectification yields 
probabilities for pointer observable eigenstates which depend solely on the initial appa­
ratus density operator: in particular the weights in the appropriate decomposition of 
the initial object -I- apparatus state, fixed by proposition 2.3 and by Corollaries 2.5 and 
2 .6 , determine the final probabilities for eigenstates of the pointer observable H <g> Am.
In the context of this result it is worth reviewing Busch and Shimony’s example, 
mentioned at the end of Section 2.
E x a m p l e  2 .3 . This exam ple is supposed to be an exam ple o f how objectification  
can be satisfied through the conjugation action o f a  unitary operator, while illustrating  
the failure o f the probability reproducibility condition in  such a case.
Here is how Busch and Shimony present the example:
Let U be of the form V  ® Va, where F , Va are unitary operators and 
Va commutes with all Fn [Fn is a finite or countable family of mutually 
orthogonal projections of the apparatus system, characterising pointer 
observables]. Furthermore let Ta be a mixture of Fn-eigenstates. Then 
U (P<p <g> Ta)U~l =  VP,pV- 1  <2> VaTaV ~l is a mixture of I  ® Fn-eigenstates, 
in fulfilment of [the objectification condition]. But the probabilities Tr[I <g> 
FnU(Py<8Ta)U~l] =  TrlFnVaTaVa1] =  Tr[FnTa] are independent of ip so 
that [the probability reproducibility condition] is violated. [17, p. 401]
Theorem 2.7 characterises all operators U that satisfy objectification. Busch and 
Shimony’s is a special case of such an operator (explained in the third claim of Theorem 
2 .7 ) where furthermore the initial state of the apparatus also happens to be a mixture 
over pointer states. If Ta is a mixture of Fn-eigenstates, let F{ be the projection on 
any one such eigenstate. If F{ commutes with an operator Va, then it is a fixed point 
under the action VaFiV~l , i.e. it is left unchanged by this action. Then, independently 
of <£>, the unitary operator in question is of the form F  <8 > Im and the final state under
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the action given in Busch and Shimony’s example will be V P ^V -1 <g> Ta. This shows 
in an evident way what it means to say that unitary operators satisfying objectifica­
tion cannot transmit any information from the object to the apparatus system: this 
unitary operator has no effect whatsoever on the apparatus system! In particular, the 
probabilities of the pointer observable with respect to the final state clearly depend 
solely on the weights of the initial apparatus density operator. Theorem 2.7 shows how 
all unitary operators satisfying objectification in a sense do this same thing, and what 
their general form is.
5. Inso lub ility  proofs in  th e  case of u n sh arp  p o in te r observables
This section investigates the extent to which the insolubility results discussed in 
previous sections have counterparts in cases in which the pointer observable is unsharp, 
and under which conditions. To even begin to address this question, however, we have 
to reformulate some of the conditions imposed in the previous sections of the chapter. 
Despite doing this it will be apparent that none of the content of these conditions is 
substantially changed. Rather the conditions are suitably modified to deal with the 
conceptual differences which arise once we work with unsharp observables.
Before we address the problem, a brief introduction to unsharp observables in quan­
tum mechanics is required (for more comprehensive treatments, see the classic texts by 
Ludwig [63] and Davies [25], or more recently Busch, Grabowski and Lahti [13]).
5.1. U n sh a rp  O bservables and  U nsharp  O bjectification . Traditionally ob­
servables are identified with self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space 7-L. A more recent 
approach identifies observables with mappings from a subset of the power set of the 
set of possible values of an observable (usually the Borel sets) to projection operators 
on a Hilbert space (including O  and I ,  the null and identity operators on 7i). Thus, if 
the set of values is the real line, one associates a projection operator with every (Borel) 
subset of the real line. For example, consider the observable ‘spin in the z  direction’. 
This has values 1 and -1 . To the set (0,2) (having a value between 0 and 2) such a 
mapping will associate the projection operator Pi onto the eigenstate corresponding 
to the eigenvalue 1; to the set [—1,1] the identity I; to [2, oo] the null map O. Such 
mappings axe known as projection valued measures, PV measures for short, and they
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characterise so-called sharp observables. These are the standard quantum mechani­
cal observables, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between p v  measures and 
bounded self-adjoint operators on the Hilbert space.
p v  measures can be used to define the probability measures which provide quantum 
mechanical information. However the condition that sets be mapped to projection 
operators is stricter than is needed to obtain a probability measure. It suffices that the 
operator that sets are mapped to be a normalised positive operator. We then encounter 
the generalisation to positive operator valued measures, or POV measures.
Those observables characterised by POV measures which aren’t PV measures are 
called unsharp. Consider the generalisation of the above spin example by means of the 
observable E. E  maps {1} C E to the normalised positive self-adjoint operator
Fu = (1 — e)Pi + eP_i,
e 5 , { —1} C E  to  the operator
F-u = ePi + (1 -  e)P-i,
and all subsets of E \  {—1,1} to the null operator Q. It is easy to see how this additively 
generalises to a mapping for all subsets X  of E. F  is not a sharp observable; never­
theless, for any state T  6  7^ + (H) the quantity Tr[TP(X)] is a well-defined probability, 
for F ( X )  a normalised positive self-adjoint operator associated with the subset X  of E. 
For instance if T  =  P^] with ip =  anp\ -1- and <pi, y>-i eigenstates of the sharp
spin observable, then it is easy to see that Tr[TPie] =  (1 — e ) |a i |2  +  e |a_ i | 2 which is 
positive and less than one. This number represents the probability that a certain spin 
direction is unsharply realisable (in a sense that will be defined shortly) if the object 
is subjected to a measurement of the unsharp spin observable E. To the generalisation 
from PV to POV measures there corresponds a generalisation from projections such as 
Pi to normalised positive self-adjoint operator such as F ie, which are known as effects.
The precise definition is as follows14. Let Q be a non empty set and T  a  <r-algebra 
of subsets of Q so that (fl, T )  is a measurable space. A POV measure E  : T  -» C(7t) 
{C(H) the set of bounded linear operators on H) on (ft,P ) is defined through the
14This particular one is taken from Busch, Lahti and Grabowski [13].
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properties:
(5.1a) E { X )  > 0  for all X  G T
(5.1b) E ( Q )  =  I
(5.1c) E ( U X i )  =  'y^  E ( X j )  for all disjoint sequences (X{) c  T
where the series in (5.1c) must converge in the weak operator topology of C(H). For 
a PV measure the positivity condition (5.1a) becomes the more familiar idempotency 
condition. Note that the set of effects E ( X )  associated with a system is in fact nothing 
but the convex combination of the projection operators of any dimension associated 
with the system (for a proof, see Davies [25, p. 19]). Note also that it is still possible 
to associate a positive, self-adjoint operator to any POV measure. Intuitively, we can do 
this simply by adding all the effects which are mapped from the spectral set of the POV 
measure, multiplied by the spectral values associated with them, together. As effects 
axe bounded and self-adjoint, their sum will also be a bounded, self-adjoint operator. 
However, the uniqueness of the observables associated with the self-adjoint operator is 
lost: many different POV measures will be associated with the same operator.
The standard definition of when a property is realised in a quantum state is just 
a generalisation of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link: if, for a state T  and a projection 
.P, Tr[TP] =  1, then the property P  is realised in state T. This can be generalised 
to a notion of unsharp realisability for so called regular effects, namely effects whose 
spectrum extends both above and below For two such effects F  and its complement 
F 1- (note that the map F  -» F 1- is an orthocomplementation) there exist states T  and 
T' for which Tr[TP] >  J and TrfT'P-1-] > We can say that F  is unsharply realised 
in T  and F 1- is unsharply realised in T'.
Now suppose we allow for an unsharp pointer observable. It is essential to refor­
mulate the objectification condition. Pointer objectification reflects sharp realisation 
by requiring the final state of a measurement interaction to be a mixture of pointer 
eigenstates of a self-adjoint operator representing the observable: these are states for 
which the property “having the pointer point to the value x” is sharply realised. If 
the pointer observable is unsharp this condition must be modified. Busch suggests the 
following condition: we require the components of the final state to be quasi-eigenstates 
of the effects making up the pointer observable, in the sense of giving probabilities close 
to 1 for the properties that these effects denote. In other words, given regular effects
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F  we look for (pure) states T  for which Tr[TF] > 1 — e for some arbitrary selected e 
close to zero. Such effects will form a smaller set than the one of regular effects defined 
above.
These states should form a density operator for which it is possible to apply the 
ignorance interpretation to the reduced state of the apparatus: the quasi-eigenstates 
of the pointer observable on the composite system should decompose the final density 
matrix, much as the pointer eigenstates should do for the sharp pointer observable 
case. The reduced apparatus state should also be a mixture over quasi-eigenstates of 
the pointer observable.
In order to make clear this condition, some points must be clarified and some 
assumptions must be made explicit. The first assumption is that, again, the pointer 
observable Em is discrete. This now is taken to mean that, for a set of possible values 
Q, there exists a countable subset S  such that Em {Q \  E) is equal to the null projector. 
The elements of E will correspond to measured values. This will induce, much as for 
the sharp case, a discretised version of the measured observable.
Secondly, what should really count as a quasi-eigenstate? Suppose the pointer 
observable has the formal properties of the ‘smeared’ spin observable E. If the only 
condition for a quasi-eigenstate were that its probability with respect to one of the two 
effects be greater than 1/2, this would make every state of C2 a quasi-eigenstate. For 
the time being it is assumed that the quasi-eigenstate corresponding to each effect is 
the state for which the effect yields maximal probability. This will be discussed after 
the next point.
There are two ways to interpret such an unsharp objectification condition, depend­
ing on the distinction between commutative and non-commutative unsharp observables.
Recall that here we consider observables as mappings from a value set to effects. If 
such effects turn out to form a complete 15 set of pairwise orthogonal projections, then 
the observable is sharp. Consider the case of a mapping from a set of values to a set 
of effects which are not projections. These effects are themselves representable as self- 
adjoint operators on a Hilbert space and therefore admit of a spectral representation.
In particular, we can associate orthogonal projections with these effects, correspond­
ing to projections on the effects’ eigenstates, their spectral se t  If effects characterising
15In the sense that their sum is the identity operator on the Hilbert space under consideration.
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an unsharp observable have spectral sets whose union form a complete pairwise orthog­
onal set of projections, the unsharp observable is said to be commutative16. Consider 
the example above of the unsharp generalisation of a spin observable on C2. The spec­
tral set of the effect E \e is {Pi, P_i}, equal to the spectral set of E -u ,  and obviously 
to their union. This set is a complete set of orthogonal projections for C2 and so 
the observable is commutative. This is no coincidence: the observable in question is 
constructed from a sharp one, essentially through a smearing procedure17.
On the other hand not all unsharp observables are commutative, as the following 
example shows.
E x a m p l e  2.4. Consider the mapping F  : {1,2,3} =*► F(€?) (where PfC 2) is the 
set of effects on the space C2) defined by
0
\ °  °>
F  is an unsharp observable, but
[ w e ) ] - ! ! 0 o K * * * 0 ’
F{2 ) := - F(2) := ^
so the observable is not commutative18.
Returning to the question about quasi-eigenstates, the choice of quasi-eigenstates 
above makes trivial the consideration of commutative unsharp observables as possible 
pointer quasi-eigenstates. This is because it is easy to see that the state which will yield 
the maximal probability for a given effect (that is, a bounded self-adjoint operator which 
is a convex combination of projections) will be a projection over an eigenstate of the
16The usual definition of commutativity here is that, for all values x, y  in the set of possible values
of an observables, the effects associated with these values commute, i.e. [Ex, E v) — ©. We use this
other definition because it will be useful to think in terms of the complete pairwise orthogonal set of
projections defined above when selecting quasi-eigenstates.
17It is well known, at least for the finite-dimensional case, both that an unsharp commutative
observable can be constructed, by a standard procedure, from a realisation of a sharp observable and
from a suitable finite family of functions (see [20]), and that a commutative unsharp observable can
be understood as an unsharp realisation of an essentially unique sharp observable (see [21]).
18This example is taken from Cattaneo, Nistico and Bacciagaluppi [21].
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effect, namely the eigenstate corresponding to the greatest eigenvalue19. If the quasi­
eigenstate is a projection over an eigenstate of effects, clearly the case of commutative 
observables would lead to a set of pairwise orthogonal pointer quasi-eigenstates, which 
clearly would pick out a sharp observable as pointer observable, and be subject to 
insolubility results such as the ones discussed in the previous sections. In order not 
to make the question trivial it is necessary, therefore, to assume that quasi-eigenstates 
will not be pairwise orthogonal.
At this point the assumption made is that there is a unique quasi-eigenstate asso­
ciated with each effect that makes up the object observable to be measured, and such 
quasi eigenstates are not pairwise orthogonal.
For interpretative reasons it might be appropriate to also assume that such quasi­
eigenstates are not linearly dependent, even though this is not a necessary assumption 
for the proof to be given in the next subsection. Two reasons can be given for this, 
a technical one and a less strong conceptual one. Such an assumption follows if it is 
assumed that quasi-eigenstates must yield probability close to one, 1 — e with e very 
small, for their associated effects. More specifically, suppose, without loss of generality, 
that there are three quasi-eigenstates,
13i<p\ +  faibi<pu 0 1  =  a m  + <*2 0 . and Xlp - _ ^ - ^  =  ^
with |o:i| 2 +  \oc2 \2 =  lApxl2 +  \M 2 — 1 a^d <pi X associated to the effects
Ti =  ai P[(pi] + a2P[{pi)
T2 =  biPM  +  6 2 ^ 2]
T  =  ci p[xi] +  c2p[x2]>
where, without loss of generality, ip2, fa  and X2 are taken to be orthogonal to the span 
of the set {(pi, fa }  and a\ > bi > c\ > 1 / 2 .
It follows that
/  a i+ f c i l a ip + c i l / ^ l 2  &i(aTa2) +  c i ( /W ^ )
S  =  ai PM  +  6 1 PM  +  ciP[xi] =  2
\ h(aia2) + c i t i f y )  h\a2\2 4- ci|/fy|2
which has trace a\ +  6 1  +  c\. Now the sum of effects making up an observable must be 
the identity matrix, so the sum of (parts of) effects over a two-dimensional subspace of
19It is a well-known theorem of functional analysis that the spectrum of a self-adjoint operator has 
a maximum which is finite, as proved for instance in Riesz and Nagy [72, pp. 231-235].
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the space over which the observable is defined must be a  projection operator over that 
subspace, and in particular it must have trace 2. So if the effects Ti, T2 and T  are to 
be possible effects of the one observable, it must be that, as a minimum requirement, 
ai + b i+ c i < 2. But if ipi, ipi and x i  are to be quasi-eigenstates than they must yield 
probability close to one with respect to their associated effects, so that, for example,
T rP i- fW  ® 1 -  «•
Yet even the choice of a\ =  b\ =  ci =  3/4 results in ai+bi+ci =  9/4 >  2. The argument 
clearly generalises to effects which have associated quasi-eigenstates linearly dependent 
on a finite number of quasi-eigenstates. However the argument will not work in the 
case of a quasi-eigenstate which is a sum of infinitely many other quasi-eigenstates.
The assumption does seem to be reasonable, though, simply because it would be 
strange to think that a measurement would result in pointer states which are superposi­
tions of one another. The quantum theory of measurement emerges to account precisely 
for the fact that superpositions of properties that are measured aren’t observed, so coun­
tenancing final pointer states which are linearly dependent on one another might seem 
an odd way to go about resolving the issues with measurement, for it’s unclear how it 
is that such pointer states could be said to be observed.
5.2. A  re su lt for unsharp  p o in te r observables. The previous subsection has 
clarified the following assumptions:
1. The pointer observable is a discrete unsharp observable: that is the observable 
is of the form Am : R £  := X  -> Am(-Y) and there is a countable subset C  of 
R such that Am(R \  C) =  O, the null operator. Elements of C  are the readings 
associated with the pointer observable.
2. Unsharp objectification stands for the condition that the final object -I- appara­
tus system be represented by a density operator which has a decomposition in 
terms of a set of quasi-eigenstates of an observable. Quasi-eigenstates are one­
dimensional projection operators whose probabilities with respect to the effect 
they are associated with (the effect corresponding to the number in C that the 
quasi-eigenstate indicates is measured) are approximately 1.
3. Objectification implies that the measurement process measures discrete observ­
ables, which might be coarse-grained versions of observables with a continuous 
spectrum in the case of an infinite dimensional system.
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4. It is assumed, for the purpose of the present discussion, that, for each effect 
associated with a single value in the countable set C, there is exactly one quasi­
eigenstate corresponding to this effect, the quasi-eigenstate which has maximum 
probability with respect to this effect. This is equivalent to saying that each 
such effect is represented as a convex sum a\P\ +  . . .  of projectors where a\ is 
the greatest weight in the convex sum, and its associated projection P i is one­
dimensional. Then the state Pi will be the unique quasi-eigenstate associated 
with the effect according to the above definition. For the moment, all quasi­
eigenstates are assumed to be pairwise non-orthogonal.
5. Finally, the condition 5 is assumed; this condition is here interpreted as saying 
that the final density operator for the apparatus should be decomposable into 
the quasi-eigenstates which correspond to the effects of the measured object 
observable having non-zero probability with respect to the initial state.
Consider now an orthonormal basis <pj of the object system H§ which has the 
property that all the f i j’s yield non-zero probability with respect to all the effects of 
the object observable to be measured.
Consider also the set xpi of quasi-eigenstates; by (5) the final state of the object +  
apparatus system must be, for all initial object states <pj% a density operator with a 
decomposition xv{<pij 0  ipi.
Now suppose the initial state of the apparatus to be Tm- All initial object +  
apparatus states of the form <Pj<8>xpij, where ipij is in the range of Tm, must be orthogonal 
for different j ’s. Then, assuming the measurement evolution to be given by a unitary 
operator 17, all <pij 0  xp^s must be orthogonal for different j ’s, which implies that 
(pij — <fj and that all such (pf s axe pairwise orthogonal.
So the unitary measurement evolution U maps initial states <pj 0  xpij to final states 
<Pj 0  xpi. As, by unitarity, ( <pj 0  xpij\ fij 0  xpvj ) =  ( Cpj 0  xp{\ ipj 0  xp#) for different i 
and z', it follows that ( xpij\ xpi'j ) =  (xpi\ ip#). Should all xpij’s be equal for different 
f s  the result would be immediate: it would be easy to show that the only unitary 
operator that could have such properties would be of the form Us 0  17m- It would then 
follow, just as it does in section 4, that there could be no transmission of information 
between the object and apparatus system. But the xpij’s are not orthogonal, and it is 
quite possible that there are different sets of them, with inner products fixed, which 
might all be mapped to the appropriate final states.
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We now need to work with the sets of initial pointer states decomposing
Tm, one for each j  denoting a different initial object state tpj. How can they differ 
for different j ’s, while preserving the inner product relations captured by ( ipij\ tpi/j ) =
( H  # ) ?
The first thing to notice is that, given a state Tm and the inner product property, the 
way that the ifrij can change in the decomposition is via a unitary transformation of the 
range of Tm which leaves Tm invariant. That is, the states ipij must be transformed by a 
unitary evolution which has as its eigenstates the states projected on by the orthogonal 
projections decomposing Tm- Consider such a transformation V. It is unitary, and 
will then act on the state Tm =  WiP^..^ in the ifaj decomposition, by means of the
action V(TM)V ~l =  V{'Ei wiP[ll,ij]) V - 1 =  'Ei™ip [V(ti>ij)\-
Crucially, any such transformation leaves invariant the weights W{20. Then a unitary 
measurement operator U will lead, for an initial state <pj in the set considered above, 
to the evolution
i i t
for which it is easy to check that the final reduced state for the apparatus is
i
independently of the specific form of (p. U will fail to convey, therefore, the probabilistic 
information contained in <p, and this establishes an insolubility result.
6. Conclusions
In the first instance this chapter has added to the already considerable literature 
on quantum measurements and insolubility proofs three new results, and has rehabili­
tated somewhat Fine and Brown’s proof strategy by analysing the idea of real unitary 
evolution: by giving up an unnecessary part of RUE related to the interpretation of 
density operators in quantum mechanics and showing that the technical part of RUE 
is not independent of other assumptions, but rather follows from them, a proof can be 
given.
20Note how the argument here is just a generalisation of what happens in the case of a density 
operator with multiplicities in the initial weights given earlier in subsection 2.3, when one asks for dif­
ferent decompositions of the operator which preserve orthogonality relations between the decomposing 
states, again such different decompositions having no effect on the weights of the density operator.
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There axe then several different ways of proving the insolubility of the quantum 
measurement problem. The proofs of Fine, Shimony, Brown and Stein cover the tradi­
tional cases as do the proofs in Section 2 and Proposition 2.4. More restricted results 
can be obtained by explicit characterisation of operators of a different kind. By the 
latter I mean that, by providing a full characterisation of the unitary operators gov­
erning measurement evolutions and satisfying the probability reproducibility condition 
4, as is done, for example, in Beltrametti, Cassinelli and Lahti [6], it is easy to see 
almost by inspection that objectification cannot be satisfied for the cases covered by 
the characterisation result. We can do this just by checking the form of the projectors 
on ® "H m that make up the final state of a measurement evolution. It helps if the
characterisation is general, and in particular if it specifies the form of the unitary op­
erator exactly, rather than as an (unspecified) completion of non-unitary operators, as 
is generally done in the literature; this and related questions are discussed in the next 
chapter.
More importantly this chapter provides a characterisation of all unitary operators 
which satisfy objectification, given an initial apparatus state. This enables a clearer 
understanding of how Stein’s result about no possible information transfer in measure­
ments satisfying objectification comes about. By relying on arguments which use the 
orthogonality of decompositions less explicitly, it also suggests techniques that might 
be applied to giving a similar result in the case of unsharp pointer observables. A first 
result along these lines is developed in Section 5 for unsharp noncommutative pointer 
observables. Generalisation of this result is left for a later stage.
The discussion of this chapter also allows some comments on the relevance of insol­
ubility proofs. Shimony remarks that if RUE were true, the philosophical consequences 
of the insolubility results would become almost trivial, as such result would follow sim­
ply from the dynamics. By this he means that, if given an initial object +  apparatus 
state Yli wiP[v®ii>oi\-> the pointer eigenstates of the final state must necessarily be of the 
form U(ip <8> ipoi), then by linearity of the dynamics the final state for the composite 
system must necessarily be wiP[U(<p®ip0i)] trivially the probabilities with respect 
to the pointer observable for the combined system will be given by w^s or sums of 
them. In a sense all proofs presented in this chapter aim to establish that insolubility
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of the quantum measurement problem is simply a consequence of the dynamics. How­
ever I don’t share Shimony pessimism about the philosophical, or physical, weight of 
the conclusion.
There is one sense in which Shimony’s remark is important. The more conditions 
we impose in the search for a certain result, the more likely it is that such result will not 
be achieved. Adding RUE as a condition for a (yet unknown) measurement evolution 
makes it less likely that such evolution will exist. If furthermore it can be envisaged 
that such a condition might not be met in a reasonable measurement (and this seems 
possible) then Brown’s proof, by accepting this condition, does fall short of the required 
result.
But that such a proof might be essentially a consequence of quantum mechani­
cal unitary dynamics seems neither trivial nor philosophically unimportant, for several 
reasons. It is technically no less trivial a proof to give; it requires more than just point­
ing to a mock evolution and showing that it goes wrong, in the manner just outlined. 
Careful consideration must be given, for example, to the cases when multiplicities arise.
The conceptual importance of such proofs is also unaffected by the methods by 
which they are achieved. It is helpful to look at what importance these proofs had for 
their first proponents. Why did Wigner set his mind to proving these results?
Wigner’s concern was to definitively establish, in Von Neumann’s words, that “the 
non-causal nature of the process 1. is not produced by any incomplete knowledge of 
the state of the observer”. [82, page 439]
Both Von Neumann and Wigner believed in the fundamental difference between 
the unitary and non-unitary evolutions seemingly required by quantum mechanics. 
Von Neumann premises the above quotation with an argument formally very similar to 
the result of Section 2, as was mentioned before. Both want to put forward a cogent 
defence of non-unitary evolutions and the proofs, complicated or otherwise, are aimed 
at establishing this. It is arguable that such an explicit aim would have led to little 
concern with the techniques used and would have made an easier and more intuitive 
proof of such fundamental difference quite welcome.
Yet the outcome of establishing an incompatibility between unitarity, objectifica­
tion and probabilistic conditions is no longer taken to mean that we must give up 
unitarity of certain quantum evolutions. Superficially at least these proofs assume four 
conditions for measurements and really work with three: objectification, probability
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reproducibility and unitarity of the measurement operator. This clarifies the stakes 
somewhat: the incompatibility of these conditions must mean that one of them has to 
be rejected, but is not necessarily an argument against the unitarity of the measurement 
evolution in the manner that Von Neumann and Wigner had envisaged it.
The probability reproducibility condition is often treated as being pretty much 
safe. It is not only that it embodies, more than any of the other conditions, what is 
thought to be important about quantum mechanics, namely its status as an essentially 
probabilistic theory. It is clear from the above proofs that unitarity and objectification 
imply a probability distribution over pointer states that is independent of the initial 
state of the apparatus; in fact a proof can be given which abstracts from the probabilistic 
content 6 of the probability reproducibility condition, which links probabilities for the 
object system to probabilities of the apparatus system. So no relaxation of probabilistic 
conditions alone can achieve much, unless we are prepared to consider the possibility 
that measurement of an eigenstate of an object observable will not necessarily yield a 
given value with certainty.
One obvious way to get around the insolubility results is to give up the idea that 
measurement is a unitary, closed-system interaction, and hence best captured by a bijec- 
tive, invertible mapping. The next chapter will show a way to construct measurement 
mappings which satisfy objectification and the probability reproducibility condition, 
relying on Davies’ work on open quantum systems. The idea is simply to constructs a 
mapping on the set of density operators of a composite which is a sum of Davies’ pure 
mappings of type 3. These kinds of mappings are effectively generalisations of Von 
Neumann type 1. evolutions on composite systems. The problems with this approach 
are philosophical, more than physical: taking this proposal seriously seems to involve 
the belief that at some point the evolution is fundamentally non-unitary, rather than 
a projection on a subspace of a unitary evolution on a larger space. Otherwise the 
problem just resurfaces.
Another option is to look more closely at objectification. As remarked above, this 
condition allows the applicability of what Fine calls the eigenvalue-eigenstate link. A 
number of problems have emerged with this condition specifically, though. One is 
that it effectively underwrites the possibility of giving an ignorance interpretation of 
the final apparatus mixture. But if such an interpretation is mistaken, as has been 
discussed in the chapter, if it indeed amounts to assuming that quantum mechanics
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is incomplete, then it is less obvious why we should assume objectification. The final 
apparatus state certainly can tell us what the probability of a system having a certain 
property is regardless of how it is generated from a composite state. If the apparatus 
density operator does not, on the other hand, allow us to claim that the system is in 
one particular pure state, then the motivation for having the right composite state to 
make this claim seems considerably weakened.
There has indeed been over the past 40 years a long tradition of formulating inter­
pretations of quantum mechanics that renounce this criterion for states in a composite 
system, starting with Everett’s work, and including, for instance, modal interpreta­
tions, although these approaches also have many problems, which won’t be discussed 
here.
W hat insolubility results teach us, from a foundational and philosophical point of 
view, is the importance of these lines of research, given that the most intuitive approach 
fails: this for me has been and still is their most important role.
CHAPTER 3
Describing M easurement Interactions in Quantum  
M easurement Theory
This chapter investigates one of the standard assumptions of the quantum mechanical 
account of measurement, that premeasurement interactions between a system and a 
measuring apparatus are mathematically described by a unitary operator.
A premeasurement is a transition which takes an initial object +  apparatus state 
to a final state in such a way that the transition satisfies the probability reproducibility 
condition. It is called a premeasurement since it is not automatically implied that such 
a transition will satisfy the objectification condition. Indeed, assuming the eigenvalue- 
eigenstate link and that the object and apparatus systems are both proper quantum 
systems, the premeasurement cannot be a full measurement in the sense of satisfying 
objectification, as was shown in the previous chapter. The study of the properties of 
premeasurement operators goes back at least to Von Neumann [82, pp. 440-445], who 
gave the first characterisation result for a class of such operators.
It is important to study premeasurements carefully for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
in those interpretations which drop the eigenvalue-eigenstate link these premeasure­
ments (or perhaps a subset of them, as argued by Van Fraassen [80, pp. 211-2]) yield 
the complete description of measurement processes; such interpretations include Ev­
erett’s relative state interpretation of quantum mechanics [33, 34] and its derivative 
interpretations, such as many worlds and many minds interpretations (on the latter see 
for example Albert [1]), as well as modal interpretations of all varieties, (see Kochen 
[52], Healey [48], Vermaas and Dieks [81] and Bacciagaluppi [3]).
Secondly, it has been argued (for instance by Kronz [54], as seen in Chapter 1) 
that Von Neumann’s process of state reduction is best applied to a composite object 
+  apparatus system which has undergone the appropriate unitary premeasurement 
evolution: this can help in giving a description, at the level of theory, of apparently 
problematic measurement situations, such as destructive photon measurements. For
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the rest of this chapter the transitions will be referred to simply as measurements, 
except in cases where this might create confusion.
The chapter begins by showing that in the Hilbert space representation such mea­
surement interactions are fully described by a unique and ‘minimal’ partially isometric 
and contractive operator; usual unitary operators are non-unique completions of this 
operator. It then studies what possible transformations on the space of density oper­
ators of a system mirror the properties of the partial isometry characterised for the 
Hilbert space representation. Several different options are explored and compared, and 
I prove a new result, showing how the only operations which can satisfy both proba­
bility reproducibility and a generalised version of unitarity, which retains its essential 
content, are those generated by conjugation of the unitary completions just mentioned.
This analysis then enables the detailed investigation of such measurements where 
the initial apparatus state is a non-pure density operator. The basic informational 
properties of Von Neumann-Liiders, repeatable and first-kind measurements (to be 
defined later on) are affected under these circumstances: it will be shown that, when the 
initial apparatus state is a density operator which is not pure, the measurements under 
consideration cannot satisfy these informational properties. Furthermore, for a certain 
class of initial density operators, it is impossible to define any ‘unitary’ measurement at 
all which satisfies the probability reproducibility condition. It is easy to characterise the 
basic properties of this class of density operators. This in turn suggests the theoretical 
possibility of direct tests for the quantum theory of measurement: these cases could well 
appear in measurements in practice, while the theory rules them out. I will conclude 
by discussing some of the consequences of this analysis for the quantum measurement 
problem. In particular the problems raised for the case of an initial apparatus state 
which is not a pure density operator are linked to the problem of interpreting quantum 
mixtures, and raise some issues which connect to the discussion in Chapter 1. Both of 
these merit some comment.
1. Some introductory remarks and definitions
In the standard approach to measurement theory, a measurement interaction be­
tween a system S and a measurement apparatus M is thought to be described, in 
the first instance, by a unitary operator acting on the Hilbert space Hs <8> % m> tensor
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product of the Hilbert spaces 7i§ and TLm describing the system and the apparatus 
respectively (see for instance Beltrametti et al. [6] and Busch et al. [14]).
The setup described is such that information about an observable, fixed for a phys­
ical system under observation, must be obtained on the basis of the results given by an 
observable for a measuring apparatus, prepared in an initial state, after a coupling of 
system +  apparatus and a dynamical evolution of this pair.
The standard quantum mechanical (QM) description of this situation on Hilbert 
spaces is based on the following assumptions:
1. both system and apparatus observables are described by projection valued (PV) 
measures (or equivalently, in accordance with von Neumann’s spectral theory, 
by self-adjoint operators);
2. the dynamical evolution of the coupled pair ‘system 4- apparatus’ is unitary.
Some attempts to generalise quantum measurements have concentrated on the first 
assumption, as I have briefly touched upon in the previous chapter:
1\ in the mathematical description of observables, generalise from PV-measures 
(sharp QM) to POV-measures (unsharp QM).
POV-measures, or positive operator measures, are based on the class o f so-called effect 
operators (operators which are linear, positive, and bounded by the identity); they con­
tain  as sub-class the fam ily o f all projectors, and in this sense the unsharp formulation  
of QM is an enlargement o f the standard sharp one.
It is also possible to discuss a weakening of (2),
2'. in the mathematical description of evolution, generalise from unitary dynamics 
to a non-unitary one.
These generalisations, as was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, are limited 
by the following well-known result of Naimark (see [72, Appendix]):
•  for any POV-measure on the Hilbert space 71, there exists a  larger Hilbert space 
i i  (7i turns out to be a subspace of 7L) in which the POV-measure is represented 
by a  PV-measure;
•  for any contraction operator (one parameter semi-group of contractions) on the 
Hilbert space 7i, there exists a larger Hilbert space 7i (71 turns out to be a 
subspace of ti)  in which the contraction(s) is (are) unitary operator(s).
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This theorem raises the question as to whether the generalisation of the unitary evolu­
tions to non-unitary evolutions should be understood in the context of larger systems 
whose evolutions are unitary; in other words, we might ask whether the apparent non- 
unitary evolutions are a result of % becoming entangled with 'HQ'H,  where H Q ' H  
models an environment, or whether the interaction is just irreducibly non-unitary. Sim­
ilar questions can be asked about POV-measures. The present chapter, however, is not 
concerned with whether the physics of measurement interactions is best described by 
unitary operators or by other operators. Assuming that interactions are described by 
unitary operators, given a specific quantum measurement I show that there are many 
unitary operators satisfying the standard conditions for an interaction operator for 
such measurement: they are the ones that share the common mathematical “core” W , 
a partial isometric contraction which I will shortly define. I also show that, in some 
more general circumstances, no such unitary operators can be defined. I do not discuss 
here whether this implies that it is appropriate to abandon the idea of unitary evolu­
tion. The physical arguments on this are unclear (for more on this in the context of 
quantum mechanics see, for instance, Davies [25]; for a discussion of this in the context 
of the quantum measurement problem, see for example Cartwright [18, Essay 9]); on 
the other hand the question is surely underdetermined: there are many more options 
than just rejecting unitarity.
Note that, when the question of objectification is discussed, the previous chapter has 
shown that POV-measures cannot, in most cases, help to overcome insolubility results. 
Whether assuming 2' can help with the problem of satisfying objectification will be 
briefly considered later on. The chapter, in any case, does consider weaker versions of 
(2) in a context sufficiently general so as to not impede unsharp generalisations of (1).
A measurement interaction for an initial vector apparatus state will be shown to be 
minimally described by a unique linear contraction W  : Hs ® H m H§ ® with 
\\W\\ <  1, which is also a partial isometry on a subspace M  of Hs ® H m - As a conse­
quence we have that for any partial “conjugate” isometry W 1- : Hs ® H m Hs 
on the subspace i.e., such that W ( M )  X and W ( M )  ® =
Hs  ® H m , the operator W  +  W 1- : Hs  ® 'Hm -> Hs  0  H m is unitary and realises the 
same measurement interaction. W’*L, in a sense, ‘completes’ the partial isometry to 
a unitary operator. In what follows, the question of how minimal operators realising
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the measurement process might be so completed will be analysed in several different 
contexts: this is because, while the minimal requirement of satisfying the probability 
reproducibility condition is achieved by ‘smaller’ operators, unitarity of the measure­
ment remains an important condition in the debates on the quantum measurement 
problem.
For the case when dim(%M) > 2 there is an infinite class of conjugate, contractive, 
partial isometries W^-, W^ , . . .  such that each of them behaves as the null operator on 
the vectors describing the prepared initial object +  apparatus combination, namely on
0  [*,] (note that [tp] denotes the closed linear subspace spanned by the vector ip, 
while [{ipii ip2 , • • • , VVi}] denotes the closed linear subspace spanned by the set of vectors 
{ipi, ip2 , • • • , ipn})' It is then possible to construct the operators U\ =  W  © W ^, U\ =  
W  ® W<2~,. . .  which are all unitary. Theorem 3.2 will show how to do this.
There are some important physical ideas here, which are not fully investigated 
in the present chapter, nor in the standard literature. We are used to thinking of the 
physical content of a quantum mechanical process as being described by the interaction 
Hamiltonian. This Hamiltonian is not normally calculated explicitly for measurement 
interactions. The present account of quantum measurement shows that there are going 
to be many physical processes, all described by different Hamiltonians, which will yield 
a measurement and suggests that the physically interesting information about mea­
surement may be found in the common core to all these processes, that is our partial 
isometry W.
Furthermore, it will emerge from the discussion that the partial isometry W  depends 
critically on the initial state of the apparatus. This is a well-known fact, it is for 
example certainly clear in the analysis that Beltrametti et al. give [6]. It implies that 
the interaction Hamiltonian itself depends on such a state: for different initial apparatus 
states, the interactions are different. This is a peculiarity of the measurement process 
as it is standardly characterised, and one whose significance for interpretive questions 
of quantum measurement has been little explored. It is nevertheless a consequence of 
assuming the probability reproducibility condition, as will be clear in the next section. 
I will not attempt to criticise this feature of measurements here, for it would involve an 
analysis of the exact structure of Hamiltonians generating the unitary measurements 
discussed here, and a discussion of the physical relevance of such Hamiltonians. However 
it is at least important to note that this is unusual with respect to how quantum
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mechanics usually works. The Hamiltonian for the particle in a box does not depend 
on the initial state of the system it describes in any way; this feature of the system is 
not relevant in determining its energy. In the case of a quantum measurement, on the 
other hand, a different initial apparatus state, though not a  different initial object state, 
implies that the energy of the combined measurement interaction is different: change 
the initial apparatus states, and the combined system energy eigenstates change. This 
means that, if we were to observe the process of measuring a given object observable 
in cases of different initial apparatus states, we would be observing something totally 
different.
What we can say is that the project of characterising unitary measurement opera­
tors satisfying certain further assumptions is not in and of itself a project which aims 
to characterise how measurements really work, as has been argued in chapter 1. The 
latter is a different, and further question, one which explicitly addresses the way in 
which theory connects with what happens in real experiments. I would claim that the 
physical and philosophical justification for this property of measurement interactions 
has not been explored, as far as I know, but does not invalidate the first project. On 
the other hand, any solution of the measurement problem which claims to mirror and 
rely on what happens in all real measurements would require some account of it.
The next step is to consider possible extensions of the linear contraction W  to op­
erations on the space 7^ + ('Hs ® m) of positive trace class one operators on Hs <8> "H m, 
the density operators.
The possibility of bijective mappings having certain properties will be investigated. 
The requirement of bijectivity of operations defined on density operators is an obvious 
one if we wish to generalise the idea of a unitary operator on a Hilbert space. A map 
/  : A  —> B, with A  and B  any two sets, is bijective if and only if it is one-to-one and onto. 
/  is one-to-one if and only if, given any two x, y € A, x  ^  y, it follows that f ( x )  ^  f (y).  
It is onto if for any y  G B  there exists an x  in A  such that y = f (x) .  All unitary maps 
on a Hilbert space are bijections, and bijectivity of a mapping f  : A  -¥ B  captures 
the possibility of constructing an inverse mapping f ~ l : B - * A  which is well defined 
on all of B.  This property is important, in the context of quantum mechanics, for 
distinguishing the dynamical properties of unitary operators U as opposed to projection 
operators P : the former describe reversible interactions in the sense that, given £/, it 
is possible to construct an operator U~l which will enable us to tell, in a sense, from
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where any state has originated, while this is not possible in the case of a  projection 
operator like P. Bijectivity is a minimal condition for mirroring unitarity, on the other 
hand, because it doesn’t make any allowances for the other important property of 
unitary operators, preservation of inner product of states. An additional condition for 
operations might be that they preserve the trace. Nevertheless, any result which we 
prove for a bijective operation will be valid for a bijective, trace-preserving one, too.
As well as more usual extensions, it is interesting to investigate a mapping W 1 
which preserves the trace of the density operators it acts on in a particular subset of 
the set namely T * (?{§) ® P[ip0y In general the trace of the operator
produced by the action of W 1 will be less than or equal to 1. It is possible to extend 
W 1 to a trace preserving, but not bijective, mapping on 7^f ('H§ <g> 'Hm ), unlike for the 
operator W.  On the other hand, it is easy to see that W 1 satisfies objectification of the 
pointer observable. Comparison of W 1 with standard extensions of premeasurements 
to the density operator framework will offer yet another view of insolubility of the 
quantum measurement problem.
Before moving on to address these questions, it is important to review the reasons 
for assuming the probability reproducibility condition as a condition for measurements. 
There are two, at least. First of all, intuitively this condition ensures that the prob­
abilities associated with the individual object states axe recovered in the apparatus. 
In particular, measurement of an eigenstate of an object observable will lead to the 
pointer observable being in an eigenstate. While this is certainly sufficient to ensure 
the relevance of this condition, should it be necessary to give it such a central place in 
the analysis of unitary measurements?
At the very least, we might expect a measurement transferring information from 
the object to the pointer system to misfire occasionally. Perhaps we shouldn’t ask for 
the probabilities associated with an object system to be reproduced exactly, but only 
approximately. On the other hand, if the measurement is to count as measurement of 
an object observable O, it should distinguish initial object states which yield different 
probabilities with respect to O. This is a possible rationale behind Fine’s probabilistic 
condition, briefly discussed in the previous Chapter. Fine’s condition is an interesting 
one in the context of insolubility proofs, because of its generality: it is implied by 
all other probabilistic conditions on measurements, so a no-go theorem holding for this 
condition covers all reasonable cases of measurement. For the discussion in this chapter,
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however, it is easily seen to be defective as a condition for the measurement of an object 
observable. Consider an object observable 0§, a pointer observable Am, an operation 
U  : Ti'i'H s <S» ^ m ) ->• 7^ +(%§ a pair of initial object states T, T ' E T *  (Hs)
and an initial apparatus state Tm € Fine [35] proposes two conditions to
impose on U:
(L la ) pTS ^ P t > => PnL{U{T^Tu)) ^  pn^(U(T>®TM))
or, in addition to 1.1a,
(L l b ) Pt s ~ P t  PnL{U{T®Tu )) = -P^m(C/(T'®Tm))’
where P °  is the probability of observable O in state T  and TZm : T \r{7~Ls ®Hm ) —► 
Ti~ ( H m ) is the operation of partial trace, ‘taking out’ the object space. A measurement 
is called an O-discrimination if it satisfies 1.1a, it is called an O-filter if it satisfies 1.1a 
and 1.1b.
The problem with these conditions, as Busch et al. show [14, p. 30], is that they 
allow a U  which satisfies these conditions and is a measurement of many observables, 
including non-commuting ones. In the extreme case, a discrimination of any informa­
tionally complete observable1 will be a discrimination of all observables. As for filters, 
clearly an O-filter is a Q-filter for any observable Q which is informationally equivalent 
to O, i.e. any observable for which, if p% = p®>, then pj, = pj,, for any pair of states T  
and T '. Fine himself [35, pp. 116-117] makes a number of criticisms: while he is trying 
to establish what could be the most general probabilistic conditions for a measurement 
he is aware of several potential difficulties for discriminations and filters. As a conse­
quence of this, it seems reasonable to concentrate the analysis in this chapter on the 
probability reproducibility condition. Given, however, that I will be highlighting some 
of the problems that can arise with it, perhaps at some point it would be reasonable 
to reassess the role of Fine’s more general conditions.
xAn informationally complete observable O is an observable which separates all states, i.e. for 
any T  and T ' y px  ^  p°<- No sharp observable is informationally complete, but there exist unsharp 
informationally complete observables.
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2. T h e  c o n tra c tiv e  p a r tia lly  iso m e tric  ev o lu tio n  a n d  i ts  co m p le tio n  in  
sy s te m -a p p a ra tu s  m e a su re m e n t in te ra c tio n s
Consider a measurement interaction of standard measurement theory involving a 
system § and a measurement device M. The quantum mechanical description is math­
ematically realised by two complex Hilbert spaces with dimensions equal to n and m, 
Tig and Tim respectively with dim(%s) = n <  dim (Hm) =  rn. Let {(pi, . . .  , <pn} be an 
orthonormal basis of vectors in Tig (which picks out an object observable to be mea­
sured) such that (pi describes a state of the system. The measurement apparatus M is 
initialised in a fixed starting state described by the vector ipo € %m5 normalised so that 
M  =  1- Having chosen the basis {(pi, . . .  , tpn} and the starting state ipo, select an or­
thonormal basis {ipi, . . .  , ipm} of vectors in TLm (which picks out an apparatus pointer 
observable) and a set of vectors (p\ , . . .  ,<pn G Tig, with ||<£i ||^s =  . . .  =  ||y>n lifts =
The question is now whether there exists a (not necessarily unitary) linear operator
W,s-M
which mathematically realises the measurement interaction described by the “proba­
bility reproducibility condition” [6, Eq. 1]: for any vector (p € Tig, and any eigenstate 
of the measured observable (pi, measured by the pointer eigenstate ipi,
(2.1) {<p\ P y iYfi)  =  ( ^ • M(V ®V'o)| ( /s ® P W )(WrS'M(¥>®V’o)))-
As a consequence, such an operator will satisfy the “interaction conditions” (cali­
bration conditions in the terminology of Busch et al. [14])
(2 .2 ) i =  1 , . . .  , n  W'S,M ( ® ^ 0) =  (pi 0  ,
(pi any vector in Tig. In fact, suppose (p =  (pj, so th a t ( <p\ P[<p{](p ) =  0, or 1 when i  =  j ;  
then it m ust be tha t ( W's,M(y>® ^>o)| (/§ ® P[^i])(W's,M(<£> <g> ipo) ) ) =  0, or 1 when 
ij>i =  i\)j. This implies the interaction conditions fo r j  =  1, . . .  , n. By linearity and (2.2) 
it follows immediately tha t G Tig, PTs,M(y?(8)^o) =  E£=i ( W  ® ^ol <P <8> tpo )((pi <8> ipi), 
and more generally
n
(2.3) = y^ ((pi<8)‘ipo\ ')(<Pi® j>i).
»=i
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The mapping is clearly dependent, in a crucial way, on the initial apparatus
state -0 0 , and in a way that is entirely a consequence of the probability reproducibility 
condition.
2.1. B e ltra m e tti, Cassinelli and  L ah ti’s C harac te risa tio n  T heorem . Bel- 
trametti, Cassinelli and Lahti [6] have proved a well-known characterisation theorem 
for unitary measurements of discrete quantities. There are several similarities between 
their paper and this section, so it is worth reviewing their work and explaining in what 
way the present material differs and is more general.
Beltrametti et al. essentially show that a mapping like (2.3) exists and can be 
extended to a unitary mapping (possibly in a non-unique way), and then discuss infor­
mational properties of these mappings (conditions under which these mappings are of 
the first kind, repeatable, Von Neumann-Luders) and problems with the objectification 
condition and the Wigner-Araki-Yanase result.
The following work begins by restating the result about unitary mappings, with 
some differences. The first is that it is shown that the mapping (2.3) is a partial 
isometry, a result not previously established; also much more detail is given of the ways 
in which completions are constructed, and there is no restriction on representations 
of the measurement apparatus to spaces of dimension equal to the cardinality of the 
discrete spectrum of the measured observable.
The latter difference merits some comments. Beltrametti et al. make the assump­
tion that if the discrete spectrum of a self-adjoint operator has cardinality n, then, 
for V. m the apparatus space, dim(7{M) =  n. This seems harmless enough, yet the 
construction of the unitary extension leads to many different problems for the case in 
which dim('HM) >  dim('H§). Given that the latter relation is what we would usually 
expect to be the case when we speak of apparatuses as macroscopic objects (indeed it 
would often be the case that dimf^M) ^  dim('Hs)), this case merits further attention. 
It also plays a  crucial role in the further generalisation that is considered here, where 
the initial state of the apparatus is taken to be a nonpure density operator. Several 
problems emerge here for the quantum theory of measurement, and the impossibility of 
constructing an operation satisfying the probability reproducibility condition is related 
to some instances of the case when dim('HM) > dim('Hs).
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The definitions and the notation introduced at the beginning of the section differ 
from those put forward by Beltrametti et al.: they work with orthogonal projectors 
, P[(pn] which are spectral resolutions of the identity, so that Y liP^.j =  /§. 
Further, they index the values for the observables with two indices, the second tracking 
the multiplicity of the first index.
Given our framework, it is certainly possible to construct, from the basis {y?i,. . .  , 
ipn} of the Hilbert space describing the object system and a corresponding value set 
{ a i,. . .  ,a n} of a- measured system observable A§, the self-adjoint object operator As 
as
As =  a iP ^ ]  +  . . .  +  O nP^] ,
so that in the notation of spectral representations one has PAs(a*) =  P ^ ] ,  the event 
testing if “a measurement of the observable As yields the result a*”. Furthermore, 
to the basis { ^ l , . . .  , ipm} of the Hilbert space describing the apparatus system one 
can associate an observable Am, with a set of values { m i,... , mm} for the pointer 
observable, such that ipi mathematically describes the state in which a test of the 
observable M  yields the value m* with certainty.
The “pointer function” /  which correlates the value sets of the system observable 
and the pointer observable is
(2.4) /  : { a i , . . .  ,a n} — > { m i,... ,m n},ai — ► /(a*) =  m*.
The pointer function does not usually play a major role in the discussion of quantum 
measurements: it doesn’t play a role in the dynamics of measurements, and is in a 
sense defined externally of quantum mechanics. In particular, no measurement scheme 
such as those discussed in this chapter enables recovery of this function. On the other 
hand it is clear that only through such a pointer function can we actually say which 
specific observable is being measured
2.2. A Characterisation Result for the Case of an Initial Vector State.
The general mathematical requirements needed in order to establish the main result of 
this section can be spelt out as follows:
1. The dimension of the Hilbert space 'Hs describing the system and of the Hilbert 
space H u  describing the apparatus are in the relation:
dim(H§) < dim(%M)
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In w hat follows I will assume I  =  { 1 , 2 , ,  dim('Hs) =  n} and J  =  { 1 ,2 ,... ,  
dim('HM) =  m}, so that clearly I  C J;
2. {<Pi}izi is an orthonormal basis of Us',
3. is an orthonormal basis of U u \
4. (a) {fpi}iei is an orthonormal family in U m
(b) V7 £ I  and V / £ J  — I  there exists a such that ^ | Vy ^ =  0 and
is an orthonormal basis in U m -
5. (a) Vy 6  / ,  are normalised (not necessarily orthogonal) families from
U s
(b) ' i i £ l , V h , k £ l , h j ^ k ,
Under the notation just specified the interaction conditions assume the form, for 
all j e  / ,
(2.5)
Also assume for the moment that, Vi G I  and j  £ J  — I. Given any orthonormal family 
{v*} in U§,  let
W j ((pi <g> iJPq) =  Vi 0
Informally, these requirements fix a number of points concerned mainly with the 
case where dim(Hs) < dim('HM)* (2) and (3) fix two observables, one on Us  which 
is the observable to be subjected to measurement, and one (of the generally infinitely 
possible ones) on Um,  which has as one of its eigenstates the ‘ready-to-measure’ state. 
In characterising a unitary operator I make use of the fact that it maps an orthonormal 
basis for the space U s ® U m  to another orthonormal basis. (2) and (3) fix an ‘initial’ 
orthonormal basis for the composite space Us <8> Um\ hence the indexation of the initial 
‘ready-to-measure’ apparatus state: we still need a basis for "Hm in order to characterise 
a basis for Us  ® %m5 in order to characterise a unitary operator U : Us <8>Um —► 
Us <8>Um- The fact that, for dim(?{ m) >  2 , the possible basis in (3) is fixed only 
by such an initial apparatus state implies that many unitary operators will realise a 
measurement of the observable selected through (2), one for each different basis for 
Um  that can be chosen in (3). The further fact that as implied by the probability 
reproducibility condition, requires only specification of an initial apparatus state should
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already be a clue to the fact that this condition is not sufficient to characterise a  unitary 
operator.
Conditions (4a) and (4b) select a set of orthonormal pointer states in the apparatus 
space H m , which in the first instance, barring pointer degeneracies, will have cardinality 
bounded by the dimension of the space Hs- In the case in which dim(%§) <  dim(‘HM) 5 
this orthogonal set must be completed to an orthonormal basis, as is done in (4 b).
(5a) makes it clear that, in principle, we can’t rule out, given an initial ‘ready-to- 
measure’ apparatus state ip\, the possibility of the final object states resulting from 
the measurement interaction not being mutually orthogonal (as in the by now familiar 
case of destructive measurements discussed in Chapter 1 ). However, (5b) states that, 
given two mutually orthogonal states in the set described in (3), the final object states 
resulting from the measurement interactions must be orthogonal. This is because, if 
we couple such states ip] and ipfi with an element of the set in (2 ) (an eigenstate of the 
measured observable), the probability reproducibility condition forces the final pointer 
state to be the same for both initial states obtained in this way. Then, in order to 
preserve the orthogonality of the two initial states that is demanded by the unitarity 
of the interaction, the final object states must themselves be orthogonal.
In the next theorem (which is work carried out jointly with G. Cattaneo [19]) I will 
refer to the following
L e m m a  3 .1 .  Under the above conditions, both
(2.6a) {ipi <g> ipo,. . .  , <pn ® ipo}
(2.6b) {<p\ ® ‘tpi , . . .  , <p\ ® Tpn}
and
(2.7a) {(pi <2> > • • • y<Pn ®
(2.7b) {<p\ 0  ^1,. • • ,<Pn ® tpn} fc€J
(2.7c) {ui <g> i>j,. . .  , vn <g> ipj}jej-i
are orthonormal (not complete) families of vectors in /H§<8'H m- The union of sets 
(2.6a) and (2.7a), and of (2.6b), (2.7b) and (2.7c) form an orthonormal basis.
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The proof is trivial, following from the points under condition 4 above. Complete­
ness for the first union follows from conditions 2 and 3, while for the second they follow 
from 5, which establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the two union sets.
T h e o r e m  3 .2 . For an apparatus in the starting state
(i) the operator
(2.8) W l =  ]>^(<Pi<8 >V,o| (•)>($
i € l
satisfies the probability reproducibility condition (2 .1 ) (and therefore the interaction 
conditions (2.5)); it is contractive and partially isometric on the subspace Hg ® [V’o] 
and null on the subspace W.g ® fa/,o]'L-
(ii) The conjugate premeasurement operator for W 1, fixed by the base selection in 
condition (3 ), is
(2.9) =  o ( * ) ) ( £ ? $ $ « ) )
*€/ *€/ \ t e /  /
*5*1 *5*1
and is itself a partial isometry on the space Tig ® [{V,o}fc€/I-
*5*1
(Hi) Given an orthonormal set {vi},gj and the operator
W 1' :=  (-))(v i  ®  & ) ,
i£ l,k£J—I
itse lf a partia l isom etry  on Tig ® [{^J } k e J - i \ t  the operator
(2.10) W' =  W 1 +  R '1-L +  W'1' = £ ( W ®t(’o (•)>(£* ® & )
*€/
* € /
+  (•)>(«»$& )
*€/ kej-i
is unitary.
P r o o f . See Appendix A. □
REMARK 3 .1 . As noted on page 103, the probability reproducibility condi­
tion implies that operators satisfying it have the form (2.3) when restricted to the 
subspace of Us selected by the initial ready-to-measure state. The previ­
ous Theorem shows the converse, that all operators of the form (2.3) satisfy the 
probability reproducibility condition and are in fact contractive partial isometries
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on the subspace. Their unitary extensions characterise measurement operators 
precisely because they also satisfy the probability reproducibility condition.
(2 .11)
REMARK 3.2 . It is important to appreciate that, for any (arbitrary) com­
pletion
{ t i n  =  (fii <g> . . .  t i n i  =  ipn ®  V # > • • • • • • u n m }  < € / - { i>
{Wll =  <£l ®  i ’l l  • • • W21 =<f>2®  • • • U nm }  <€/-{!}i€J—{1}
the linear operator 
defined by tbe Jaw
E  <“« ! •> %  = " ”'(•) + 2  <“«!■>“ «
i€J
is unitary and satisfies the interaction rules (2.5) and the probability repro­
ducibility condition (2.1). There are, obviously, as many of these unitary oper­
ators realising a unitary measurement for a given initial state rpQ as there are 
completions. The particular construction of the unitary operator W  discussed in 
Theorem 3.2 is motivated in section 5, when the possibihty of measurements with 
initial states given by density operators is considered: it is a construction where 
the components in W 1,J- are themselves partial isometries which are premeasure­
ments of the object observable. Then the probability reproducibility condition 
implies generalised interaction conditions: more initial ready-to-measure vector 
states are fixed through the initial density operator, and this fixes more than one 
of the partial isometries which make up the unitary measurements.
It is worth noting that this construction does not exhaust all the possible 
extensions. For example, suppose W1,J- := Yhiei,kei,k^i ('))(v* ®
ipk). This is clearly not a premeasurement, as it does not satisfy the probability 
reproducibility condition. This can be easily seen by its failure to satisfy the 
interaction conditions 2.5.
REMARK 3 .3 . The completion discussed in part (iii) of the Theorem details 
a W i, part o fW 1’, which is not a premeasurement when j  € J. Again this need 
not be the case in general. The specific situations where there exists a which 
will necessarily fail to be a premeasurement will be outlined in section 5, together 
with the problems which arise as a consequence of this.
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2.3. Some Examples.
E x a m p l e  3.1. —  The (2,3)-dimensional case. I give a simple example of the 
above operator in order to illustrate its construction for the case in which dim('Hs) =  2  
and dim(^M) =  3. We have the explicit formula:
(2.12) W 1 =  \ (•))(<£ i ® ^ i )  +  (¥?2 ®i/,o| ( O X ^ ® ^ )
describing the perfect measurement interaction:
(2.13a) W l ((pi 0  V>o) =  <Pi ® i ’l
(2.13b) W 1 (cp2 ® ^o) =  ^ 2  ® ^ 2
The unitary operator W  : TLg 0  % m Ms 0  m is th e  sum
E  w '
h=2,3
=  (v > i® ^ o |  (*)X0 1 ® & )  
+  (v>i®V>o| (-)X<£i®<W 
+  ( V?1 ® V’O | (•)>(«! ®^3)
+(v?2®^o| ( 0 X ^ 2 ® ^ )  
+(<^2 ®^0 | (0)(^2 ®^2) 
+ ( ^ 2 ®^o| (-)>(U2®^3)
The unitarity follows immediately from the fact that the two families
{ <pi 0  <P2 ® i ’o, <Pl ® Ipo, V>2 ® 0O» ^1 ® $)> ^2 ® $)}
{<p\ 0  0  ^2, ®  $ 1 , <^ 2 0  ^2 , «1 0  V>3, U2 0  ^ 3 }
are orthonormal bases of 7i§ 0  H  m, the latter following in a crucial way from condition 
(5b) on page 106.
E x a m p l e  3.2. The special case of von Neumann-Luders measurements is charac­
terised by the fact that Wi((pi 0 >^J) =  Vi ® ^  we assume that dim('Hg) =  n < m =
2. THE CONTRACTIVE PARTIALLY ISOMETRIC EVOLUTION 
dim(‘HM)» W l can be obtained by considering for example
WL(<pi ®i>l) =  <pi 0 ^ 1  . . .  WL((Pn ®^o) =  T>n
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W L (<Pl ® i> o )  =  <Pn®'<l> 1
W Lfo ® V,0+1) =  V7! ® ^n+1
W ' i t a  ®  V’o ) =  ¥>1 ®  V'n 
Wl(<Pti ® ^o+1) =  ® VVi+1
W L (ipn <g> C )  =  <Pn ® A
corresponding to a unitary operator like the one in Theorem 3.2 under the assumptions 
<Pi = <PirJ-i(i) Vi, j  G I , $  = (pi Vj E J — I where 7rJ - 1 (i) is the product of applying 
to the index i the (j — l ) th power of the permutation 7r =  (1,2 , . . .  ,n). Again it is 
worth stressing that the completion here is arbitrary and the only relevant part for the 
measurement interaction is tpQ in the present case, but again the completions will play 
crucial roles when discussing the case of an initial apparatus state which is a nonpure 
density operator.
The following Lemma will be needed later.
L e m m a  3 .3 . The adjoint of the operator W  is the operator
(2.14) W* = (<p\ <2> (•)>(y?i®V,o) +  *-' +  ( ^ ® ^ n  ( 0 ) t e n ® ^ o )
+ . . .
+  (#L*®$1 (')>(v?l ® ^ 0 l) +  --- +  ( ^ n  (OXVn®^?)-
»€/ fcgj—/
P r o o f .  Consider the first component of W, i.e. ( (pi ® (") X v’i ®  V>i)*
We have that
($| {(pi ^)(^i ®^i)) = (<Pi ®^ o| ^)($l £i ®^i)
=  ^  ( $1 01 ® $1 )(<^1 ® V>o)
=  ( ( < £ l  ® $ l |  $ ) ( ¥ > !  ® ^ o )
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repeating the process for each component of W , by linearity we have the result. □
In particular we have that, for the partial isometry W 1 which captures the measurement 
interaction for a given initial state ip\, the adjoint is
n
(2.15) =  (•)}(<# ®V>o)
i= l
3. Partially isometric contractive mappings in the density operator
formalism
In the next two sections the earlier discussion will be generalised to the density 
operator formalism, something not previously done in the literature. In particular I 
examine what sort of operations on the set of states, now taken to be density operators, 
are compatible with the probability reproducibility condition. First some notation is 
introduced. Let W§®'Hm he the space of the coupled object-apparatus system as 
defined in the previous section. Then define {7i§ ® Ti m) as the set of all positive 
trace one operators on TL§®71m - T{¥('Hs <S> TIm) is the standard choice for the space 
of physical states; however it is easy to verify that most of the results that follow hold 
for the general case of action on the set T{7i§ ® %m) of trace class operators.
Clearly all the one-dimensional projection operators
P [<p®1>\ = ( • ) ) (<£ ® VO = -P[y>] ® ify ]
(where ||y?|| =  ||V>|| =  1 ) axe positive operators of trace one. In general, for any 
arbitrary Hilbert space 71, one dimensional projectors are the extremal elements of the 
set T i ’i'H). This set is cr-convex with respect to its linear structure, so that an element 
T  G T *  {Ti) is extremal if the condition T  =  wT\ + . .  .+ w nTn, with Ti, . . .  Tn G {71) 
and 0 < Wi <  1, wi — 1 always implies that T  =  T\ =  . . .  =  T2 . The set of extremal 
elements exhausts the whole set 7^ + (7L) in the sense that any T  G T[+ C%) can be 
expressed as a convex combinations of some elements of this set. These elements are 
the set of states of the system in consideration, the projections being called pure states, 
and their (non-trivial) convex combinations mixed states.
An induced notion of linearity for 7^ + {Ti) is defined by considering a linear mapping 
U  : T{7L) —» T{TL) on the Banach space of trace class operators T{7t). Its restriction 
U  : Ti {Ti) -¥ Ti~{Ti), when well-defined, satisfies the corresponding convex-preserving
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property, i.e. for all a i, . . .  an E K+, a\ +  . . .  +  an =  1, P i, . . .  Pn one-dimensional 
projectors
U{a\Pi +  . . .  +  anPn) =  aiZ7(Pi) + . . .  +  anU(Pn).
Coming back to the space 7^ + (H§ ® H m)> note the following result for the trace 
operation:
(3-1) TtwsSWmPs ® Tm] =  T r ^ p s ]  • T r^ M[TM],
where T§ E 7 [+ (Hs), Tm £ T f  (Hm) and T§ ® Tm € T *  (H§ ® ^m )-
The natural way to extend the partially isometric operator W l over H§ <8 > Hm 
defined by (2 .8 ) is through the standard conjugation action, formally characterised 
amongst others by Davies [25] for operations on T ^iH g  ®Hm)- Consider first, how­
ever, the mapping W 1 : 7 j*(H§ ® Hm) T *(Hs ® Hm)i for all T  E 7^ (Hs ® Hm)> 
and P[^Q] the initial apparatus state:
n
(3.2) W \ T )  = £  Tr«saWM [(f[*,.Wo])(r)]
* = 1
The mapping W 1 is clearly convex-preserving. It satisfies the interaction condi­
tions, i.e., for 2 =  1 , . . .  , n, W l (P[<Pi^ 1p0^ ) =  P[^®^], corresponding to (2.5). Moreover, 
for T  =  P[$], $  E H§ ® H m , ||$ || =  1>
n
(3-3) W l (Pw ) =  £  |< w  ® * , | $ )|2 P [#jWj],
i=l
which is analogous to (2 .8 ).
Suppose now that the observable selected by the orthonormal basis {(p\,. . .  , <pn} is 
being measured by an apparatus which is in the state P[^0] and that {ipi, . . .  ,ipn} is an 
orthonormal set in Hm selecting a pointer observable for the measurement. Suppose 
the object being measured is in the state P^], where tp = ct\<p\ + . . .+ a n</?n, |a i |2+ . . .+  
|« n |2 = I- Hence the combined object system +  measuring apparatus in 7^ + (H§ <8 > Hm) 
is T  =  P[(p^Q\ • The result of applying W 1 to T  is, by (3.3)
n
(3.4) W  {P\(p®t[f0]) — lQ!il2 (T>f<p1®^])
Z= 1
This is again in accordance with the probability reproducibility condition. This example 
usefully illustrates part (1) of the next theorem. The following lemma will be used in 
the proof.
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Lemma 3.4. Suppose {<p\ , . . .  , } is a complete orthonormal system in C 1. Then
,^ r[^>[V’i]'^ [Q:iV?l+'”+anV’n]] =  la *l >
a i ,  . . .  a n E C, | a i | 2 +  . . .  +  |a n |2 =  1.
The proof is straightforward and will not be given here.
T heorem  3.5. The mapping W 1 has the following properties:
1. it satisfies the probability reproducibility condition in the sense that, for a state 
T  E T f  (Hs) and for j  =  1 , . . .  , n,
(3.5) TrWs[T P[^.]] =  T r^s^M  [ w ^ T  <8 > P ^ 0]) (I§ <8 > P[^])] >
where Is is the identity map on T(Hs) and P ^ 0] is, as usual, the initial state of the 
measuring apparatus.
2. it is a partial isometry, in the sense that it preserves the trace of the density 
operators in the subset of (Hs 0  H m) defined as (Hs) ® P[^Q], i-e. for all T§ 0  
P[M € (Us) ® P[xp0]
<S> P[iPo))] =  Trws®ftMP s  <S> P[^0]] =  1
and it is null on the subset of Ti~(Hs ® ^ m ) denoted by 7^ + ('H§) 0  (•f>['0 o])‘L» *-e- f or 
all states T§ 0  P^j_j E {'Hs) <S> P[$±]> where ipQ is any vector in H m perpendicular 
to rfo
® P[1>±])] =  °-
3. it is contractive, i.e. for all T  E Ti ’(Hs ® H m),
T tks® * m ( ^ ( T ) )  <  T tW m(T ).
P roof. See Appendix A □
R em ark  3.4. For all T e  7[+(Hs 0  H m), setting 
Ai(T) = TrfP^g^] oT];
then clearly
Ai {T) =  (<Pi® tp0\ T((fii 0  V’o)) € [0,1]
so we have that
W l (T) = ' £ x i( T ) F \ ^ l]
i=1
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It follows that W 1 (T) is a quasi-convex combination with weights \ ( T )  (in the 
sense that 0  < Yli < 1 , while for a convex the sum must be equal to one).
Consider again Davies’s theorem [25, Theorem 3.1, p.21]:
THEOREM 3 .6 . Consider a Hilbert space %. Every pure positive linear map T  : 
TifH) —> T(fH) is of one of the following three forms:
(1) T(T) =  B T B \
where B  is bounded and linear;
(2) T(T)  =  BT*B*, 
where B  : H  —> % is bounded and conjugate linear;
(3) T(T)=Tr[TB](\i/>)(4>\),  
where B  :W —t H  is bounded, linear and positive and ip E H .
Pure positive linear maps on TifbL) are by definition such that every element in the
set of positive trace class operators is mapped into the same set, and furthermore every
pure state is mapped to a pure state. Type 3 maps as characterised by the theorem
axe called degenerate: they map all states to a pure state. Note that the map W 1 is a
sum of such degenerate mappings:
n
W*(T) =  53 (v* 0  ^°l ® XI f t  ® f t  X  f t  ® f t  I)
i= l
n
=53 ^ C^WiKI ft ® ft) (ft ® ft I)
1=1
At this point a comparison is useful between W 1 and the Davies map of type 1 induced 
by the partial isometry W 1, i.e.
W 1d {T) = W 1T W u .
Both are candidates for constructing a bijective, trace-preserving mapping yielding a 
measurement on T *  {Ws <g> 'Hm)- Like the partial isometry W 1 on W§ <8 > 'Hm they satisfy 
the probability reproducibility condition, and if they can be completed to a map which 
is one-to-one and onto and preserves the trace of the density operators it is applied 
to, we will have an equivalent for the space 7J+ ('H§ ®Hm) of a unitary mapping on
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H§ In what follows I show why this can be done for W lD, but not for W 1, and
connect this with the discussion of the previous chapter. On the other hand, I will also 
show how W 1, but not W p , retains, in the density operator description, important 
informational properties, normally associated with unitary measurements.
The explicit form of W lD is
P r o p o sit io n  3 .7 .
w d ( T )  =  5 ^  ( <p* 0  0o| T((pj 0 0O)XI& ®*Pi){<Pj 0  ipj |). 
i j
P r o o f .  Since W i =  ^  {y?* 0  ^o| (•) )(<Pi 00*) and W j * =  < <Pj ® 0;i (•) )(cPj ®
-0 0 ), we have, for any $  € Hs
=  1>j\ i ) ( Vj  ® ipo)
j
T ( w i ' m  =  s m v ’j ® * o)
j
W i T W i ' i ® )  =  £  < ¥>j ® V>o| £  ( ® tfil $  >r(»»i ® V>o) \  (W ® * )
t j  /
=  5 3  ( $3 ® 0jl  $  X W 0  001 ® 0o) )(0* 0  0i),
i,3
proving the result. □
In order to appreciate the difference between W 1 and W lD, consider their action on a 
pure state
T =  P[*], $ e % 0 % ,  ||* || =  l.
We have already seen in equation (3.3) that
w l (p m )  =  E  Kw ® *>l$  >l2
i
a quasi-convex combination of the pure states Pf^®^] with weights given by Aj($) =
|( <p* 0  0o| $  )|2, such that |( <# 0  0o| $  )|2 <  1- Now we have the following
P r o po sit io n  3 .8 .
W d {P[$]) =  P e ^ s ^ o I * ) ^ ® ^ ) ]
=  5 3 1^ *  ® ^°l ^  +  Int(• • •)»
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a pure state where Int( . . . )  represents interference terms between the projectors equal 
to
(3.6) ^  ( $ | ipj <g> rpo) { $ | &  <g> )| <Pi ® f a ) ( <pj ® ^  |.
v£j
P r o o f .
wd(p[*]) =  X ) < ® V'ol ( <^ | <Pj ® )$  )| <Pi 0  fa) {0j ® tpj I
$ > (0j ® ^ i )
But
( V7* ® W  $  )(<& ® ^i) =  ^  ( <Pj <S> ^o| $  ) f e  ® ^j)
* i
so
W d C ^ # ])  =  -^E< < ¥>*®^o| $  )(ft® ifc)l 
The proof of the second claim is similar. □
E x a m p le  3.3. For the case when $  =  (Ya =i <W z) ®  Vto €  H§ 0  'Hm  with dim(K§) 
=  dimf^M) — 2  and |a i |2  +  |qt2 | 2  =  1  we have that
i —^ E i= i
2
1 = 1
+  aitt2| <^ 2 ® V>2 ) ( <£l ® ^1 I +  «ia2| <£l ® V’l ) ( <P2 ® */>2 I
The difference between W 1 and W lD is a crucial one: W 1 maps away interference 
terms like (3.6), while W lD does not. As such it should be intuitively clear that W l 
cannot be extended to a bijective mapping on 7^ + (%s ® 'Km) generated by a unitary 
operator on Tig <8 > “Hm? in the manner of a Davies type 1 conjugation. Nevertheless 
we can’t exclude the possibility that W 1 or some such mapping can be extended to a 
bijective mapping in general. This question will be treated in detail in the next section.
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4. The problem of completion for mappings on 7^ +(%§
In this section I examine the problem of constructing bijective completions of the 
mappings W l and W XD on the whole of 7J*(H§ ® 'Hm). As explained at the beginning 
of the chapter, such completions are important because quantum mechanical evolu­
tions are assumed and, with respect to quantum measurement, hoped to be invertible. 
Again, therefore, after introducing mappings which satisfy the probability reproducibil­
ity condition, the next step is to see whether these mappings can be ‘embedded’ into 
invertible mappings. I will begin with some results which hold for any space T(H),  H 
some Hilbert space.
D e f in it io n  3.1. 1. The rank of a density operator is the minimal number of
one-dimensional projectors of which it is a convex combination. This is an in­
variant for the operator and it stratifies the convex set of density operators (for 
a geometric description of some low-dimensional examples see [7]).
2. A map is rank-preserving in 7J+ (%) if it preserves the rank of the density oper­
ators on which it acts.
Note that it follows trivially from the above definition that rank-preserving maps 
must be pure, as all pure states are 1 -dimensional projections, and so have rank 1 .
Positive, linear rank-preserving mappings on T{H)  are a subset of the pure map­
pings of Davies type 1 and 2: mappings of type 3 cannot be rank-preserving, as they 
map all T states, regardless of their rank, to final states of the form Tr[2T?] (| xp) ( xp |), 
which have rank one. The restrictions of such mappings to Ti'ifH.) is clearly well- 
defined and convex. I will prove a theorem linking bijections to rank-preserving maps 
in Ti'i'H). For this I will need the following
LEMMA 3.9. I f  U is a pure convex bijection on 7'I’i'H), then so is its inverse U~l .
P r o o f .  In order to prove this I must show that U maps no mixed states to a pure 
state, so that its inverse U~1 necessarily maps pure states into pure states. Consider 
a mixed state T — Y n = i such that U(T) =  P , P  a pure state. Without 
loss of generality suppose n =  2. Now let U(Pi) =  T*, a pure state. Then we have that, 
by convexity
U(T) =  a\U(P\) +  a2U(P2) =  aiTi +  a2T2.
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By the definition of a pure state this implies that T\ — T2 — P , so U(P{) =  U(T)  
which contradicts bijectivity. □
T h eo rem  3.10. A convex mapping U  : —y T i ’i'H) is bijective i f  and only
if it is rank-preserving for all T  6 7^ + (%).
PROOF. The first part of the proof is the claim that bijectivity implies rank- 
preservation. Note first that every bijection is pure. Suppose the linear mapping 
U  is not pure. Then there exists a pure state P^j for which
u (P[<p\ )  =  a i P \<Pi]' a* €  R + ,  a* =  1, p [<Pi] ^  P [<pj] w h e n  * ^  i -  
i i
Without loss of generality assume that i =  1, 2. Then there must exist two distinct 
states Ti, T2  such that 17(Ti) =  P ^ ] . Consider the state aiTi +  <2 2 ^ 2, clearly distinct 
from P yy  We have that
U (aiTi +  0 2 T2 ) =  aiU(Ti)  +  G2 *7 (T2 ) by linearity 
=  aiP[Vi j + a 2 f jOT]
=  U(PM ),
so U  cannot be a bijection. Hence every bijection must be pure.
The next step is to show that every pure bijection is rank-preserving. Consider 
T  =  X ^ C iP i  € Ti'i'H), with Pj one-dimensional projectors and hence Rk(T) =  n. 
Then U(T) = £ ?= i CiU(Pi). It follows that Rk[C7(T)] < n.
Suppose now that there exists a decomposition U(T) = YlijLi djPj, with m  < n. 
It follows that T  — jy jL i djU~1(Pj). By Lemma 3.9 U ~ l is also a pure bijection, 
hence we can write U ~ l {Pj) — P j and T  =  Y^jLi djPj> which implies Rk(T) <  m  < n, 
yielding a contradiction. We therefore have that Rk[U(T)] =  n =  Rk(T).
For the converse, assume that U  is a rank-preserving map. If it is not a bijection, 
then there must be at least two distinct states T\ — ]P”=i a-iPi and T2  =  S S u  ^ip l 
which map to the same final state T. Rank preservation implies that n  =  m. Convexity 
implies that
U(Ti) =  = Y i biU{Pi) =  U(T2)
i i
so the two sets {a*} and {&*} must be equal and each U(Pi) must be equal to some 
U(Pj).  From this it follows that there must be at least two distinct pure states, call 
them Pi and P 2 , which are mapped to the same final pure state P .
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Now consider the mixed state T' =  a\P\ 4 - 0 2 ^ 2  € 7 ^  (‘H). Again by convexity
U(T') =  a\U (P\) 4 - a2U{P2) =  axP  4 - a2P  =  P, 
which violates rank-preservation and hence yields a contradiction. □
W '1, analysed in Theorem 3.5, is clearly not a bijection. It yields a final state for 
the system 4 - apparatus which is a mixture over final states of the system perfectly 
correlated with the corresponding pointer states, while achieving the appropriate prob­
abilistic behaviour in order for it to satisfy the probability reproducibility condition. 
In order to do so it maps all initial states with the same probability distribution with 
respect to the system observable in question to the same final state, irrespective of the 
rank of the initial state. For instance, given an observable determined by . . .  , <pn}, 
the two states i^oivi+oaval E»=i,i once tensored with a ready-to-measure
pointer state Pty0], will both be mapped to the same final state
^  \a i\2 
*=1,2
Equally clearly it is not rank-preserving on T*[Hs ® H u ) \  for example P^® ^], which 
has rank 1  since it is a projection onto a one-dimensional subspace, is mapped to a 
state of rank 2. Any trace preserving extension W  on 7^ + C%s ® H m) of an operator 
like W 1 would retain such failure of rank preservation. It is possible to construct many 
such operators, for example
(4.1) W (T) = ^ T r „ s8WM £  W o l  I
t= l
But, by Theorem 3.10, no such extension can be a bijection, because of the continued 
failure of rank preservation.
The positive, linear, trace preserving, pure transformation W lD is equally clearly 
not a bijection; for instance, it maps all the operators P[$] with $  = ip<8> ipQ, V’o’ fixed 
and orthogonal to V>0 ) to the null operator. However, consider the map
W D : Ti'i'Hs T f { H s  ® H m),
(4.2) W d {T) = W * T W ;
it is not hard to see that this will be a linear bijection on 7^ + (‘Hs ® H m )' it is just 
the unitary operator W  “extended” to the set of density operators. Davies’s theorem,
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together with Theorem 3.10, makes it clear that mappings like (4.2), where W  are the 
unitary operators characterised in Theorem 3.2, are the only pure bijective premeasure­
ments of discrete observables. The Davies result characterises pure mappings; Theorem 
3.10 tells us that all bijections must be rank-preserving, therefore pure.
Bijections, therefore, must be of one of the Davies types. They cannot be of type 3, 
which axe essentially projection mappings and therefore not bijective. Given a unitary 
operator U , type 1  and type 2  characterise a mapping and its inverse as a conjugation 
action just like the one in (4.2); the pure bijections then will all be of the form W & 
for some unitary premeasurement W . Note that no other invertible map other than 
the ones characterised through Theorem 3.2 can yield a premeasurement through (4.2); 
straightforwardly, for a pure initial state i ^ j ,  the probability reproducibility condition 
would fail.
As an aside, we know that such mappings do not solve the general measurement 
problem as defined in the previous chapter. They clearly do not satisfy the objecti­
fication condition for the pointer observable, because they fail in all cases to excise 
the relevant interference terms. This is particularly clear from proposition (3.8) and is 
obviously independent of whether the initial combined state is a nonpure density op­
erator. Convexity will imply in this case that all individual states will be transformed 
in accordance with (3.8), thus retaining interference terms between pointer eigenstates 
in the final state after the premeasurement evolution. So in a sense Theorem 3.2 and 
Theorem 3.10 also make up an insolubility proof.
Concluding this section, we have seen how the probability reproducibility condition 
is satisfied by a varied class of operations on density operator spaces, not all of which 
admit of completions to invertible mappings, which is not the case for operators on a 
Hilbert space. We have explicitly examined this problem for two operations satisfying 
the probability reproducibility condition, W 1 and defined in the previous section: 
W', an extension of W 1, can never be an invertible completion, while W d is indeed 
an invertible completion of W lD.
5. Som e in form ational resu lts  for m ixed in itia l a p p a ra tu s  s ta te s
The analysis of this chapter has been considerably more detailed about the im­
plications of assuming the probability reproducibility condition than is the case, for 
instance, with the work of Beltrametti et al. [6 ]. I now draw some conclusions from
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this further analysis. A consequence of it is that in the density operator formalism, the 
possibility that the initial state of the apparatus might be of rank greater than 1  will 
make a difference to the kinds of bijective measurement mappings that are possible.
To begin with, note that the only possible rank-preserving maps on T *  (Hs ® H m) 
will be mappings such as W p, where the generating unitary evolution on Hs  ® 
must necessarily be given by an equation such as (2.10). Suppose in fact that dim('Hg) =  
n  <  dim('HM) and that we have an apparatus in an initial state given by the den­
sity operator To =  Y%=i wip [%]’ V’o -L measuring an observable determined by 
the orthonormal basis - with the final pointer observable determined by
{■0 1 , . . .  , ipn}- It is easy to see that, if the natural probability reproducibility condition
(3.5) is satisfied for an initial pointer state To, then it must be satisfied even if the 
initial pointer state were to be either one of the component states P ^ .j. This follows 
naturally when we consider that the probability reproducibility condition (3.5) in this 
case takes the form
(5.1) Trwstrfi*,,]] =  TVWs8« m [w ^ C T S T o M /s® /^ ])]  ,
for all T  E (Hs ® H m ) and for all cpj's eigenstates of the measured observable. But 
by linearity of W 1 and of the trace operation this becomes
2
p [<Pj]i = Y l Wi \ w l (T  <g> P^ij) (Is <8> P[^])] •
i=l
Letting H s 3  T  =  P[Vj\ it is easy to see that condition (5.1) can be satisfied only when 
it is satisfied for each of the pointer states PbPhY Therefore the only mappings that can 
satisfy (5.1) must satisfy probability reproducibility conditions for initial states which 
are pure states, so must be captured by mappings W d  generated by unitary operators 
as characterised by Theorem 3.2.
In particular, 0 j will fix one partial isometry W 1, but its completion will not be 
totally arbitrary now. The idea is for W d to satisfy the natural interaction conditions
P[<pi] <£> P[^i] -3 P[^i] ® P[y>i]
p tv ii®Fy s i ~ * Fi9 8 ® FbM
which follow from (5.1). These can be put more generally as
(5.2)
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Now, however, the partial isometry W 2, corresponding to the initial apparatus state 
p \h \' will be fixed, just as W 1 is, in the way shown by Theorem 3.2. The more 
pure states appear in the initial apparatus state, the less freedom we have in 
specifying unitary completions of partial isometries if we want to satisfy the interaction 
conditions, until we reach the point where the initial state is To =  XIILi P[-0 *] for 
n =  dim('Hs), when the above reasoning shows that the unitary operator characterising 
the measurement will be fully specified and unique given the system observable to be 
measured, the apparatus pointer observable and the initial state.
This prompts, in the first instance, some observations on the conditions that mea­
surements can satisfy.
• The first is that if the apparatus observable is a density matrix of rank strictly 
greater than 1, then Von Neumann-Luders measurements are impossible. Consider the 
interaction condition (5.2). A Von Neumann-Luders measurement would require that 
T  = ipi. This is clearly impossible. The rank of P ^ j  ® To is equal to 2 and any one- 
to-one measurement cannot change this rank, hence the rank of T  <g> P ^ j  must also be 
equal to 2. As the rank of P ^ ]  is equal to 1, it follows that T  must necessarily be of rank 
2  (as can be easily calculated using the explicit formulation of a Von Neumann-Luders 
measurement in the earlier example).
• The second remark concerns two other important properties that measurements 
can satisfy, repeatability and the property of being a measurement of the first kind. It 
is possible to show that, as for Von Neumann-Luders measurements, no measurement 
can be of the first kind if the initial apparatus state is a density matrix of rank greater 
than 1 , and hence cannot be repeatable, as all repeatable measurements are of the first 
kind. The intuition is simple. A measurement of the first kind is a probabilistic non­
disturbance measurement: take the final object state after a measurement, obtained 
through a partial tracing operation, and subject this state to another measurement of 
the same observable. The end object state after this measurement should exhibit the 
same probability distribution as the initial object state, for all possible initial states of 
the measured object. The fixed weights of the non-trivial density operator taken as the 
apparatus starting state make this impossible.
More precisely, a measurement of an observable A  is of the first kind if the prob­
ability for a result being in a subset X  of the set of all possible results is the same
before and after a measurement. Therefore, for a  state T§ E 7 [+ (H§), for an initial
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state Tm E T *  (Hm) and for all such subsets X
(5 *3) Pts (x ) = Pns{U(Ts®TM))(X) ,
where 1l§ is the operation of partial tracing the apparatus system away.
As an example, consider a system in an initial state <p = ^2i otnpi, where the ipis are 
eigenstates of a discrete self-adjoint hermitean operator A  representing the observable 
to be measured (and form an orthonormal basis for 'Hm). The spectral resolution of the 
operator is given by A  =  aif\pi]- Such a system undergoes a measurement, for which 
there is a pointer observable Z  whose spectral resolution is given by Z  = Yli 
starting state of the measured system is given by a density operator T  =  J2j=1 ,2
A generic unitary measurement U  will map the state P^j 0 T to the state U ~ l  (P^j <8 > 
T )U .  This state will be
Tf  =  U ~ l (P[(p]<Z>T)U =  ] T  WjP['£i ai'p’®iJ>i\
j = 1,2
with (p[ orthogonal for different j 1 s. (5.3) tells us that, for example, if X  =  {ui} then 
the probability given by T r ^ jP ^ P ^ ] ]  is equal to |a i | 2  and this must be equal to 
Tr-ws[7 £ § ( £ / - 1  ( ^ ] ® T ) [ / ) ^ ] ]  if the measurement is to be a measurement of the first 
kind.
To calculate this probability first write $  =  PijWh with. Piji =  (fii)- 
The final state T f  is then equal to
i= i>2
As the ipi form an orthonormal set it is easy to see that
(Tf ) =  Y  wj ' 5 2 \ a i\2 p [E?=iPiji<Pi\ 
j = 1,2 *
Now multiplying this state by P ^ ]  yields the operator
Y  W3 Y ,  \a i\2\Pijl\2P[<Pi]
j = 1,2 i
whose trace is
(5 .4 ) Y
j=1,2 i
We want to investigate under what conditions this is equal to |ori|2.
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Suppose (p = <pi; then |a i |2 =  1 and (5.4) becomes ]Cj=i,2  wj\fiiji\2’ From the fact 
that (3{ji =  ^ <^ | (pi), this is clearly equal to 1 if and only if, for one of the two possible 
values of j ,  Wj =  |/?iji|2 =  1, while for the other value of j  we set the constants to 0. 
This shows that, for a discrete, non-degenerate observable A, the initial state of the 
apparatus has to be a pure state if we are to be able to define a measurement possessing 
the first kind property (and hence the repeatability property).
• Finally it is clear that, if the unitary mapping W  generating the measurement is 
uniquely fixed by the initial state of the apparatus being of rank n  in the case when 
dim(?{§) =  n, then it follows that if dim('HM) =  m, m > n, and the rank of the initial 
apparatus state is greater than n  then no measurement of any kind is possible if the 
pointer observable is non-degenerate.
Even assuming degeneracy of the pointer observable, a common physical situation, 
there are cases where a unitary mapping W  cannot be found. An example will be useful 
to illustrate the point. Suppose dim('Hs) =  2 and dim('HM) =  3: the observable to be 
measured is a spin direction, represented by an operator whose eigenstates belong to 
the set {v?i,<P2 }> the pointer observable’s eigenstates belong to {V>i,ifo, fo } , with ipi 
indicating a result compatible with V>2 indicating <P2 - Further, let the initial state of 
the measured system be tp — 22*=i,2 ^ d  the initial state of the apparatus is a den­
sity operator £)?=i w^[iPQy written in its spectral resolution. A unitary measurement 
will have the form
(5.5) U =  ^ * 0 ^ 1  (*))(# 0 ^ * ) +  ^ 2  ( < # 0 ^ o |  (*)>(v*0^3 ),
i=1,2 1=1,2
3 = 1 ,2
the Vf’s being an arbitrary orthonormal pair in 'Hg.
Now U((p 0  iPq) =  S i  Vj 0  ips so that the apparatus points to ‘nothing’. Clearly 
there is no way to satisfy any sort of interaction condition for the third component of 
the initial pointer state: for the initial apparatus state fina-l pointer state will
have to be ipz regardless of what the initial object state is, and so can’t be taken to be 
properly pointing to anything.
In particular, since interaction conditions are implied by the probability repro­
ducibility condition, failure of the former implies failure of the latter. Suppose for 
example that the initial apparatus state for a measurement of <p is the density opera- 
tor Tm =  then the probability reproducibility condition requires the final
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probabilities to be captured by the formula T r [ I < S ) P ^ U ® T m )U*] for i =  1, 2. But 
a ‘portion’ of these probabilities will be lost in the interaction with the initial state 
Pty§] to the final state ips. From this it follows that definition of a unitary measurement 
is impossible in such situations. The reasoning can easily be seen to generalise to cases 
where dim('HM) i 1 ndim(H§), where n £ N.
This may seem a somewhat surprising result. It is in fact implicit in the construction 
adopted for the operator W  in (2.10), where the completion terms in the case when the 
index for the partial isometries W i exceeds n  have a form which is very different from 
the initial partial isometry and its ‘natural’ conjugates; the argument just presented 
shows that this is necessarily the case when dim(^M) #  ndim('Hs), if we want to 
preserve unitarity. This really highlights the need to examine the question of how the 
minimal partial isometry is completed. In other results, unitary operators such as W  
are just assumed to be arbitrary completions of a partial isometry, but the structure 
of completions is not examined in any detail. In the present analysis it is now evident 
that this structure is very important.
Note also that this result is independent of both
1. the method for constructing the unitary operator
2. and the way in which the initial nonpure density operator for the apparatus 
system is resolved.
The first claim highlights the fact that, when writing down a unitary evolution, for 
example, for the system in the case just discussed, (5.5) is not the only option. There 
will be different measurements satisfying, for example, the property that one of the 
partial isometries W J yields a Von Neumann-Luders measurement on the appropriate 
subset of the set of states; one could start with a partial isometry W l , or with W 2, 
and complete these into a unitary operator. Yet the problem will remain if the rank of 
the initial density operator is greater that the dimension of the object space.
The second stresses the independence of the result from cases like the following: if 
the initial state of the apparatus were to be in a density operator some of whose weights 
appeared with multiplicity greater than 1, one could rewrite the initial state perhaps 
in some way that might avoid the problem. However suppose that Tm =  S |= i  w3 -^ [^  
with W2 =  wz =  w. Then write the initial state of the apparatus as a density operator 
with weights w\ and (twice) w, where the projectors making up the density operators 
do not include These projectors will, nevertheless, be projections on a linear
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combination of 2j and P^3], so the evolution will still generate problems because of 
the effect of the term P[TP%] when calculating probabilities. It is well known, in any case, 
that the evolution of density operators is independent of how they are decomposed.
• The non-unique decomposability of density operators, on the other hand, raises 
another conceptual problem for the definition of bijective, trace preserving measure­
ments: on which decomposition of the initial apparatus density operator should the 
measurement operator be based?
It might be suggested that, given that unitary measurement operators are naturally 
defined through an orthonormal set of apparatus vector states, the correct procedure 
to follow is to rely on an orthonormal decomposition of the initial apparatus density 
operator. It is true that in the case when multiplicities are present in the initial ap­
paratus state this does not select a unique basis. In a sense this does not make much 
difference. Suppose that we have a case of Tm having weights with multiplicities as 
described above, now in a measurement of an object system having three genuinely dif­
ferent eigenstates of the measured observable. Then the initial object plus apparatus 
state will be
3 3
T =  5 D ^ p [v®^] = H wi p iv®<iy
j = l  J=1
with jP^ij =  P^ij and and P ^  projections on orthogonal linear combinations of 
'tpQ and tpQ. This would give the following two choices (out of an infinity of possible 
ones) for a measurement evolution:
(5.6a) U  =  ^  ( * ) ) ( # '
t = l , . . .  ,3 
3 = 1....... 3
and
(5.6b) U  =  (  V>* ® Col (*))(#' ® fa )
* = 1 ........3
3 =1 3
It is easy to see that the result of applying (5.6a) or (5.6b) to T  will be the same.
• On the other hand the non-unique decomposability of mixtures would present 
genuine problems for arguments which might seek to avoid the problem generated by 
evolutions such as (5.5). These arguments could claim that, when the initial apparatus 
state is a density operator, it is correct to treat the measurement process as different 
measurements for the different initial pure states making up the initial apparatus state,
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each having their own unitary measurement associated with them and each evolving 
independently of one another. After all the problem is generated by the fact that 
unitary evolutions satisfying the probability reproducibility condition must depend on 
the initial apparatus state, as well as on the object and pointer observables. In the case 
when the initial state is a pure state there are, as we have seen earlier, plenty of these 
unitary operators: we need a basis of initial observables for the apparatus space H m 
in order to define a unitary operator, but only one vector in the basis is relevant to the 
measurement, the rest can be chosen at random. When the initial state is not pure, 
more and more vectors become relevant to the measurement operator as the rank of 
the density matrix increases, until we have the case described above, when no unitary 
premeasurement can be defined. We can, on the other hand, claim that, for every pure 
state decomposing the density matrix, there is a different unitary operator describing 
the evolution.
Note that it would then be irrelevant whether the decompositions were orthogonal or 
not: the idea would be not to define a single unitary operator, thus presenting us with a 
choice like the one between (5.6a) and (5.6b). Rather a different unitary operator would 
be responsible for the measurement evolution of each component Furthermore
these could be chosen so that they all give rise to same final state: assuming ip = 
Y%=i a i ® the final states for the object +  apparatus initial state, could be
P[£n again through operators such as (5.6a) and (5.6b).
This strategy has the problem of committing itself to saying what the initial appa­
ratus pure states are, if the claim of individual evolutions with pure apparatus states 
is to make sense. Arguably, in the case where the apparatus system is initially in a 
proper mixture (i.e. in a case where we know what the different pure states making 
up the mixture are), the problem will not arise: the one measurement will in fact be 
three measurements, each determined by operators fixed solely by the pure state rep­
resenting, case by case, the initial apparatus state. The other option is of course that 
the initial density operator might admit of an ignorance interpretation, so that in fact 
the density operator is the state of a system which is really in a pure state, it’s just 
that we don’t know which.
But there are cases for which a density operator does not admit of an ignorance 
interpretation, and indeed, as we saw in the last chapter, there is a view about how 
to interpret density operators associated with a quantum system which treats them
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purely as statistical states, and downplays the information about which states the 
system might be in. In such cases we cannot define different measurements for different 
possible initial apparatus states. If, for example, we accept the interpretation of states 
that Stein advocates, there is no such thing as really pure initial states underlying 
a nonpure density operator. If mother nature really works like quantum mechanics 
tells us, and we accept this interpretation, then the problem just discussed cannot be 
avoided.
The topics of the preceding discussion challenge the quantum theory of measure­
ment, as characterised in subsection 2.2 of this chapter by unitary measurements satis­
fying the probability reproducibility condition, by suggesting a class of cases in which 
it would fail to model measurement results.
At first glance this may seem little more than a curiosity. But it is not difficult 
to think of at least a thought experiment exemplifying it. Suppose we have a  photon 
for which we are trying to measure polarisation (a two-level system) by coupling it to 
a pointer system, in this case an atom’s magnetic moment described by a three level 
system. Possible unitary premeasurement couplings for this system will be characterised 
by Theorem 3.2, therefore for an atom suitably prepared in an initial state, perhaps 
entangled with an environment, the situation just described can theoretically arise if 
the initial apparatus state is a density operator of rank three. This would entail that 
either unitarity/bijectivity, or the probability reproducibility condition, would have to 
be given up if a case of this kind is to admit of a quantum mechanical analysis.
On the other hand, a measurement defined as
(5-7>
with W * a partial isometry on a set W§ ® C M§ (characterised as in part
(i) of Theorem 3.2), one of the allowable projections in the possible decompo­
sitions of the initial apparatus state, determining a standard conjugation action on 
Ti'i'Hs ® %m)? and 1/||W J ($)|| a (non-constant) normalisation factor, would avoid 
all of the above problems. Suppose we have an initial object +  apparatus state 
Y?j=\P[<p\ ® a measurement W 1 defined as in (5.7) will map PW\ ® P WJ] t0 a 
final state in such a way that the probability reproducibility condition will be satis­
fied, and will map 2  ^ \h>\ ® ^[ip] *° ° ^ er w01^  it treats the initial state 
£™=i P[<p] ® P^j] as if it were simply 0  PK ]’ therefore avoiding all of the above
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problems, associated with the fact that the initial apparatus state was a  density oper­
ator.
However it is unclear why in such a case we should regard any one W? as the 
appropriate operator from which to construct a measurement on 7^ + (M§ <8> 'Hm)- These 
partially isometric operators are normally defined through initial apparatus states; if the 
initial state is a  nonpure density operator, why should the corresponding measurement 
be defined by one specific pure state as we have just done? And if so, which pure state 
is physically relevant? Again, if the initial apparatus state consists of a proper mixture 
we can at least claim that the underlying apparatus state is a specific pure state, though 
of course the problem here emerges precisely because in so many situations we cannot 
assume that a density operator does denote a proper mixture. There are, in such cases, 
many more than one partial isometry to choose from, and no good reason to choose a 
specific one. The claim that the partial isometry captures what is basic, the ‘core’, of 
the measurement process, would lose its force.
On the other hand, W 1 and any one of its ‘completions’ such as W  defined in 
equation (4.1) also avoid the problems discussed in this section. In particular W  is a 
completion in the sense that it is trace-preserving on all elements of 7 ^  <8> "Hm)-
It cannot be, as we have seen, an invertible map, but then neither are the mapping 
defined in equation (5.7), nor W 1. Its advantage over these is that it can be defined 
for any initial apparatus state whatsoever.
Note how different a role the problems raised in this section play, with respect to 
the account of measurements that quantum mechanics gives, when confronted with 
the criticisms of this account discussed in chapter 1. There the criticisms argue from 
the richness of the experimental situation to the deficiency of the theoretical account, 
but they fail to show that what is going on in the real measurements is (negatively) 
relevant to the theoretical questions that underlie the quantum mechanical accounts 
of measurements. The problem discussed in this chapter, however, while it may not 
correspond to any measurement actually performed, puts forward a possible case where 
it is impossible to answer the questions of the theoretical accounts, given the parameters 
imposed by the probability reproducibility condition and unitarity.
The latter conditions, as I have pointed out in this chapter, are an important part of 
providing interpretations of quantum mechanics. Their role in the attempts to provide 
an interpretation of quantum mechanics have been justified in a number of ways. For
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the probability reproducibility condition I have pointed out, in particular, that weak­
ening it leads to possible measurements which count as measurements of incompatible 
observables. This does not mean that, if we relax the probability reproducibility con­
dition, it is possible to construct unitary measurements which are joint measurements 
of incompatible observables, but rather that there are unitary measurements which 
transmit information from the object to the apparatus from which we would not be 
able to distinguish which of a number of incompatible observables are being measured. 
As many interpretations of quantum theory seek to describe measurements which en­
able us to read object properties from apparatus properties, they cannot accept such 
a weakening of the condition without ending up in a position where they can’t assign 
precise properties.
As for unitarity, as I have already remarked, its role in the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics is related to a demand for deterministic theories. Without getting into the 
issues of determinism (extensively treated by Earman [30]) it is clear that, if we want 
quantum mechanics to be something like a deterministic theory, we need some condition 
like unitarity (Earman in fact discusses how the unitarity of the Schrodinger evolution 
is sufficient for the evolution being deterministic, unlike what happens in classical 
mechanics and special relativity).
The counterexample highlights a conflict between assuming both unitarity and 
probability reproducibility for an evolution on the space Hs to account for
the example within something like the present framework, we must give up one of the 
two conditions. As such it offers little in the way of suggestions about what actual 
measurements in quantum mechanics are like, but is very informative about the limita­
tions of the assumptions we impose when trying to address the interpretive questions 
raised by quantum measurement.
6. Conclusions
This Chapter has reviewed four types of measurement mappings: the partial isom­
etry W 1, its unitary completion W , and the two non-invertible operations W 1 and W  
defined on T *  (Ms <S> /H m)-
W 1 is a contractive partial isometry on %§ <8 > “H m* defined with respect to a mea­
sured system observable, a pointer observable and an initial vector state ipQ £ % m? 
and the mapping it generates on the set of states 7]+ ("H§ <8 > %m) is denoted by W XD.
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This operator satisfies the standard interaction conditions for measurements under all 
circumstances, it cannot objectify the pointer observable, and is obviously not unitary. 
Interaction conditions are satisfied under all circumstances, including when the initial 
apparatus state is a nonpure density operator for which the ignorance interpretation 
of mixtures is inapplicable. However, it is difficult to see, as I have argued, on what 
physical grounds this operator, defined with respect to only one pure state, should be 
the appropriate measurement when the initial apparatus state is composed of a convex 
combination of pure states. What makes this possible description of a measurement 
interesting, in the case when the initial state is a  pure state, is the fact that it captures 
all that is relevant in the interaction. Measurements depend crucially on the infor­
mation represented by the initial apparatus state, and when the latter is a pure state 
such information is fully used in constructing W 1: this is the unique common part to 
all unitary operators which are completions of it. When the initial state is nonpure, 
this feature of W 1 (in its normalised version W 1) is lost: it is no longer unique at all, 
and the feature which makes it physically interesting in the former case, its property 
of being the common core of all possible unitary measurements, no longer obtains.
W  is a unitary completion of W 1 characterised by Theorem 3.2, and the map­
ping it generates on the set of states is denoted by It satisfies the probability
reproducibility condition, but fails to objectify the pointer observable and fails to sat­
isfy the interaction conditions (and therefore the probability reproducibility condition) 
when dim(%M) ^  n dim(?{§) and the initial apparatus state Tm has rank such that 
Rk(T§) 7  ^ ndim(?{§). As I have discussed in the previous section, no unitary mea­
surement can satisfy the probability reproducibility condition in such cases, no matter 
which W 1 we start from, no matter how we complete it.
W 1 is a positive, contractive partial isometry on the set of states <8 > Hm)*
It is a mapping composed of a sum of pure positive convex operations of Davies type 
3, which map all states to a pure projector (as a projection operator would), it satis­
fies the probability reproducibility condition, it achieves objectification of the pointer 
observable, but it clearly is not a one-to-one mapping. It is effectively a generalisation 
of Von Neumann’s type I  evolutions. No such map can be generalised to a one-to-one 
mapping on the set of states.
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However a trace preserving completion W  on 7[+ (%s can be defined which
will not violate the probability reproducibility condition in the manner that W  does, un­
der any possible initial apparatus state, including ones which emerge when d im ^ M )  #  
ndim('Hs). While this map cannot be a bijection, it avoids the problem of the last sec­
tion, always satisfying the probability reproducibility condition, and it does so relying 
on all the information encoded in the initial apparatus state, rather than having to 
argue for one state of the decomposition of the initial apparatus state as being in some 
sense the relevant one, which we have to do both for W lD and for W 1. Interestingly, it 
also satisfies the objectification condition; by giving up unitarity/bijectivity, it avoids 
both the problems discussed in the previous chapter and in this one.
The difference between mappings like W  and those like W d is a part of the in­
solubility results and of the work of Busch et al. on objectification of measurements, 
which was extensively discussed in the previous chapter. The standard requirements 
made on maps that describe quantum measurements is that, as well as satisfying the 
probability reproducibility condition, they yield final states satisfying objectification 
(this is achieved by a mapping like W )  and that they be one-to-one (this is realised 
with a mapping like W d )- It is by now totally clear how these two requirements are 
contradictory, so long as one is confined to working with a Hilbert space like 7is
On the other hand, results like [14, Thm. 6.3.1], the approach based on superse­
lection rules (on this see, for example, Hepp [49] and Beltrametti and Cassinelli [5]) 
and Fine’s work on “interactions with an aspect” [40] show that all the above require­
ments for measurements can be satisfied by setting one of the two spaces in the tensor 
product to be the representation of an algebra of commutative observables (either for 
the system or the apparatus). This approach has its own problems (see amongst others 
[1 0 , 50, 80]); it can nevertheless be seen, from a mathematical point of view, as an 
attempt to identify the subsets of T i’i'Hs <8 > 'Hm) on which two mappings like W  and 
W d are equivalent, in the sense of yielding the same result when applied to the same 
state. I will discuss some of the issues raised by these analyses in the next chapter, 
specifically in the context of Fine’s work.
CHAPTER 4
Algebraic Approaches in 
F ine’s Solution to the M easurem ent Problem
This chapter looks at Fine’s solution to the measurement problem, developed in a recent 
series of papers [40, 42, 43]. It shows how it can be reinterpreted in the framework 
of Algebraic Quantum Theory, something that Fine has advocated him se lf as a means 
of motivating his solution [40]. Such a reinterpretation leads to problems as it shows 
the solution to be equivalent, from the mathematical point of view, to assuming a 
superselection rule for one of the subsystems. Fine’s account might then be open to 
the standard criticisms levied against superselection rules. These criticisms are reviewed 
and their impact and tenability vis-a-vis Fine’s work is assessed. The chapter concludes 
with a further discussion of whether this solution, while being in itself straightforward, 
is lacking in physical justification regardless of whether it is motivated by assuming a 
superselection rule; this will be done by considering two further criticisms that can be 
made of it.
It is natural, on the back of the discussion in the previous chapter, to study Fine’s 
proposed solution to the measurement problem. Recall how the previous chapter iden­
tified two kinds of mapping: the first, essentially the one characterised by Beltrametti, 
Cassinelli and Lahti [6 ], is unitary and satisfies the probability reproducibility conditions 
the second satisfies objectification of the pointer observable. It is possible to identify 
subspaces of the tensored object +  apparatus Hilbert space 'Hs where the two
kinds of mappings coincide, and where as a consequence all three properties (unitarity, 
probability reproducibility and objectification) can be satisfied, if the composite system 
is thought to be restricted to one of said subspaces. Fine’s solution, as will become 
apparent in the rest of this chapter, selects just one such subspace as the appropriate 
subspace to analyse quantum measurements.
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1. Fine’s Solution to the Measurement Problem
The question, once again, is: How does quantum mechanics account for the fact 
that quantum measuring processes actually produce results? Up to now this thesis 
has been mainly concerned with providing an exhaustive explanation of what the con­
ceptual problem is, and how it manifests itself in the physical theory. Several results 
have been proved, and the upshot of the previous discussion is that most of the condi­
tions which are assumed in framing the measurement problem lead to some difficulties. 
Having discussed how objectification and the probability reproducibility condition lead 
to problems, this chapter now considers some proposed solutions to the measurement 
problem. It considers in particular one of the solutions which relax the condition of the 
coupled systems being composed of two proper quantum systems, where a proper quan­
tum system is a system whose observables are represented by the full set of bounded, 
self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space and whose states are represented by the posi­
tive, trace class one and self-adjoint density operators on said Hilbert space.
Usually such relaxations are achieved by arguing for the presence of a superselection 
rule. The focus of the present discussion, on the other hand, is Fine’s proposal for a 
solution of the quantum measurement problem. Prima facie Fine’s solution does not 
seem to rely on relaxing the condition that coupled systems be made of proper quantum 
systems; this is certainly not an explicit part of the argument. However it is soon 
apparent that formally that is what the solution amounts to, particularly through the 
investigation of some suggestions that Fine himself makes. This leads to the discussion 
of problems associated with superselection solutions in the slightly different context of 
Fine’s work, and leads to a number of arguments that can be made against it. The idea 
is to try to understand what kind of argument is needed to support Fine’s proposal, 
and whether such an argument can be given.
As is customary, and by now familiar, Fine considers the measurement process as 
an interaction between an object system S upon which a measurement is performed, 
and a measuring apparatus, ML The measurement interaction is treated in the space 
Tis ® Hmi ('Hs and two Hilbert spaces) and is described by a unitary transforma­
tion U such that
( i.i) 7I+ (fts ® Km) 3 V  ® W  A U (V  ® W )U ~l =  F,
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where V  G 7[+ (%$) is the initial state of the object (as usual a density operator on /H§) 
and W  G 7J+(^m ) is the state of the measurement apparatus before the measurement 
takes place. U transforms the initial state V  ® W  into F  = U(V  <8 > W )U ~l , the final 
state after measurement. Suppose the observable E  is being measured and that it is 
represented by an operator E  with projections En onto its eigenstates. Also suppose 
that there is a pointer observable, represented by the operator Q, and projections Qn 
for this pointer indicating that En has been measured. Then the first requirement for 
this measurement is taken to be
(1.2) Prob(£n, V) =  Prob(J <g> Qn, F),
which is the usual probability reproducibility condition in its simplified form: the 
probability of finding En given the initial state V  should equal the probability of finding 
the pointer position Qn given the final state F. The second requirement is taken to 
be that measurements have definite results, i.e. the objectification requirement: F  is 
a density operator admitting a resolution over projectors Pn 0  Qn, which display no 
interference between pointer eigenstates and where Pn is any projection operator on 
Us. Assume, without loss of generality for the present discussion, that Qn has no 
multiple eigenstates. This means formally that
(1*3) F — wmnP\Pm®Qn]i wmn = 1-
n mn
Insolubility theorems, as discussed at length in Chapter 2 , show that (1.1), (1.2) and
(1.3) in general lead to a contradiction. Hence this approach does not account for 
quantum measurements.
Fine gives the following informal characterisation of the requirements for his at­
tempted solution:
1 . The Rule of Silence [formally (1.3)]: there is in quantum mechanics what Fine 
calls the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, which says that it is possible to assign as a 
value the eigenvalue of an operator E  to a system that is in the eigenstate of 
that same operator. The Rule of Silence forbids us to speak of a value for that 
operator when the system is not in an eigenstate of it, or in a density operator 
decomposable over such eigenstates.
2. Unitary Dynamics [formally (1.1)]: measurement should be modelled by a uni­
tary evolution given by a Schrodinger-type operator.
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3. The requirement that the apparatus after measurement can distinguish proba­
bilistically distinct initial object states (w.r.t. E) [formally (1.2)].
4. Fine’s own addition to this list: if the object is initially in the state V  and the 
apparatus is in the state W , the measurement interaction should start with the 
state V  <S> W .
Past solutions to the measurement problem have involved modifications of the first 
two requirements. For instance modifying the first leads to hidden variable theories or 
Everett-type interpretations, modifying the second is related to non-unitary evolutions 
and the theory of open systems. Fine’s proposal is that we should modify the fourth 
requirement: if the object is initially in the state V  and the apparatus is initially in 
state W, the initial state of the interaction should look like
VE ®W,
where Ve  is the so-called “.E-aspect” of the V-state. What then is V#? Fine introduces
an equivalence relation on the set of states in a system in the following way. For any
two states V  and V ' and any observable E, V  and V ' are said to be E-equivalent,
written V  =  V7, in the following case:
E
(1.4) V  = V ' <*==» Prob(V, E) =  Prob(F', E).
E
For every operator E  this does indeed partition states into equivalence classes, which
Fine denotes by \V ]e  for the class of all states satisfying V  = V '. “This relation”,
E
he says, “lumps together pure states with mixed states, provided they yield the same 
probability distribution for E ” [40, page 493].
To see what this equivalence relation actually does to a set of states, pure and 
mixed, consider the set of all such states for a spin- \  system. The states of this system 
(normally represented by the complex Hilbert space C2) can be visualised by a “ball” 
in R3, for which the surface sphere S 2 is identified with the pure states and the points 
inside the sphere are identified with the mixed states (for details see, for instance, [7]). 
The equivalence classes given by Fine’s relation are then picked out by intersections of 
parallel planes with the “ball”, such planes being perpendicular to one of the diameters 
of the sphere. The two points at which the diameter intersects the surface of the sphere 
represent the two eigenstates of the operator corresponding to the observable E  to be 
measured, say P+i and P - 1 , which for simplicity we assume to be non-trivial (that is,
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not equal to a multiple of the identity operator on the object Hilbert space C2). For 
Fine these equivalence classes group together all those states which respond in the same 
manner to a measurement of the observable E  (see figure 1).
p
not p
FIGURE 1. The unit ball and a section picked out by Fine’s equivalence relation
In interacting with an object to be measured, the measuring apparatus responds 
only to certain physical aspects of the object, namely those that are relevant to the ob­
servable E  to be measured. This is crucial in providing the motivation for determining 
Fine’s initial object state Ve . As the Rule of Silence forbids talk of possessed values 
by the object, the only thing left for it to respond to is the probability distribution 
associated with the state of the object and the observable E. But then all the states 
grouped in the above described equivalence classes have the same probability distribu­
tion; hence the measurement apparatus interacts with all of them in the same way on 
Fine’s account. Hence we can select from this equivalence class a specific representative 
Ve  for all the states in it. In order to solve the measurement problem, this represen­
tative will be the density operator defined over the pure states which are eigenstates of 
the observable to be measured (one such state is always contained in the equivalence 
class).
It is clear that, if the initial state of an object is either an eigenstate of the measured 
observable or a mixture of such eigenstates, then it is possible to describe the transition 
to the appropriate final state by means of a unitary evolution. For instance, in the case 
of an ideal measurement, unitary operators which satisfy the probability reproducibility 
condition, discussed in chapter 3, are defined as operators which map an initial state 
P[(Pi] ® P[rp0], 'Pi an eigenstate of the measured observable and -00 the initial apparatus 
state, to a final state ® Pj^], where ipi is the pointer eigenstate indicating that
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the value associated with the object observable eigenstate (pi has been measured. So 
any initial state of the form ^  W iP ^  ® P[if>Q\ is mapped, by convexity, to a final state 
J2i wiP[<pi] ® -P[^]. The problem is solved.
Two ideas are involved in Fine’s solution to the measurement problem. The first is 
that we ought to be fairly pragmatic about how we choose to model physical processes 
in general. The standard way of treating the interaction of two systems is to start with 
the system in a state which is the product of the states of the components. But why 
should we do this if it has failed to give the right (i.e. observed) answer in certain 
classes of situations? We ought to be prepared to modify this if it doesn’t work.
The second is the idea of interacting with an aspect, which underpins the whole 
strategy. W hat is it that we know in general about an observable for a given state? If 
we stick to the interpretative rules that Fine outlines, then we cannot say that we know 
specific values all the time. What we can know are probability distributions. These are 
in some way physically recognised by the measuring instruments, which filter out, in a 
measurement, all the physical features that are not relevant to the particular kind of 
observation being made.
Fine’s idea is original in asking what quantum measurement interactions might 
actually be doing, something not very common in discussions of the quantum measure­
ment problem. He tries to solve the problem of measurement by providing an answer to 
this, through the idea of a selective interaction. Measurements at the quantum level are 
interactions where an apparatus records only certain, ‘selective’, aspects of the object 
it is measuring. This seems intuitively plausible from our patterns of observation. We 
observe contextually and if we concentrate on some aspect of what we observe we miss 
out many other features. It is also true that measuring instruments, like a  weighing 
scale, ignore shape and size. Fine uses this idea to derive his conclusions about the 
states to assign to the system to be measured.
2. Algebraic Quantum Theory and Fine’s Solution
In his first paper on this topic [40] Fine mentions the algebraic approach to quantum 
mechanics as possibly providing a rationale for the particular procedure which models 
the measurement process. I want to explore this further.
What Fine means by a rationale is that there ought to be a subalgebra of an algebra 
of operators as defined in Algebraic Quantum Theory, which does the job of “picking
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out” the appropriate restriction on the states of a measured system. This section 
shows how it is possible to define an algebra such that a set of states can be associated 
with it according to the definition of a quantum system in Algebraic Quantum Theory. 
It will be clear how this set of states corresponds to Fine’s restricted set. The system 
composed by the algebra and the states can be used to provide a model for measurement 
interactions equivalent to Fine’s. The present discussion will also highlight in which 
way Fine’s modification of the ‘initial state’ condition can be thought of as equivalent 
to the modification of the ‘quantum systems’ condition.
Fine’s pragmatism about modelling certain interactions is well served by the def­
inition of a system in Algebraic Quantum Theory. In this definition no particular 
constraints are placed on what the observables ought to be, and no particular represen­
tation of states and observables is privileged above others. The only requirement that 
is given basically ensures that you have enough to calculate expectation values, while 
not having so much that you might create confusion or redundancy. A system is defined 
as an algebra satisfying certain postulates, together with a set of states which is “full” 
with respect to the algebra. States here are intended as maps from the operators in 
the algebra to the real numbers, which give you expectation values for these operators.
The crucial idea is that the set of states should be full. There will be lots of different 
functions mapping the operators to the real numbers. Full sets select a subset of these 
functions satisfying certain criteria. There are different equivalent definitions of the 
term full: in Rieckers [71] we find that a convex subset So of the set of states S  is full 
(with respect to the algebra A  on which it is defined) if a G A  and (</?; a) > 0, for all 
ip G So, implies a > 0, that is fullness is defined in terms of positivity. Kadison [51] 
defines a set of states to be full if and only if it is a(S, A)-dense in S(A). However, in 
order to discuss this it is best to stick to Segal’s definition [76]. Segal defines a convex 
subset to be full if and only if, for every pair of distinct observables, there exists at least 
one state for which these observables have different expectation values. Segal shows 
how, for all systems, it is possible to find a full set of pure states.
E x a m p le  4.1. Suppose we define our set of observables to be the set O of 2 x 2 
real matrices
o b \  
c d J
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with ad—be ^  0, and our states to be the set T  of functions <pXjy := O -* R+ =  ax+dy, 
x ,y  > 0, x  + y = 1. Clearly none of these states can distinguish between any of the 
observables where a and d are fixed, and b and c are variable, as the states calculate 
the expectation values using only a and d. So this set of states for our observables is 
not full.
If a set of states is not full with respect to some algebra, this means that we have 
observables whose expectation values cannot be distinguished (maybe infinitely many, 
as in the previous example). The set of observables in a quantum system is normally 
the set of all self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert Space and the set of states is the set of 
density operators (positive, trace class 1 operators on the same Hilbert Space). Given 
any pair of observables, there is always a state that will yield a  different expectation 
value for these observables, so the set of density operators is full. But, for a given 
measurement interaction, Fine restricts the possible states that can be assigned to a 
system to be measured, to a set essentially like that in example (4.1), and these states 
will no longer form a full set. Relative to that interaction there will be observables which 
cannot be distinguished and, given the states we have, they will be for all purposes the 
same observable. If, as in Fine’s case, we want to restrict the set of states that we want 
to assign to a system, then the set of observables that can be distinguished in such a 
system will also be restricted and it is not difficult to see what they will be.
E x a m p le  4.2. Suppose we restrict the set of observables from the previous exam­
ple to the set
o () \
O b )
Now any two different observables A \ and can only differ in a or in b. If they 
differ in a, then the state <p\?o =  a x  1  +  6 x 0  will lead to different expectation values 
for A\ and Ai\ if they differ in 6 , then <po,i =  o x 0  +  6 x l  again will give different 
expectation values. The set of states T  is then full with respect to the restriction on 
the observables that we have outlined.
Practically the same happens to the algebra of observables for the quantum sys­
tem in Fine’s solution to the measurement problem. The restriction in example (4.2) 
leaves us with a commutative algebra of observables. The observables all share the
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same eigenstates. In Fine’s solution for quantum measurement we start from a set of 
observables which we can represent as matrices written in the basis of the observable 
that we want to measure:
a b + ic 
b — ic d
Fine’s allowed states can be expressed as in example (4.1) and hence, if we fix a 
and <2, none of the observables so defined can be distinguished by these states. The 
restriction leads to the subalgebra of observables which commute with the observable 
which we want to measure, i.e. all operators with b =  c =  0.
2.1. A n exam ple for s p in - | system s. The following properties define a C*- 
algebra.
D efinition  4.1. 1 . A  is a  distributive and associative algebra over C if A  is
a linear vector space over C and has an associative product which satisfies for 
A* € C and a*, b € A
(A ioi -t- \ 2a2ib — A1O16 +  \ 2a2b 
6 (A ifli +  A2U2) — Ai&ai 4- A2&02*
2 . A is a Banach *-algebra if it is an algebra with a norm, i.e. there is a mapping
|| || : A  -)• M+
with (o, b 6  A, A € C)
(2.1) ||a|| =  0 <=> a — 0
(2.2) l|a +  &ll < M l +  ||6||
(2.3) ||Aa|| =  |A| ||a||
(2.4) M  < \\a\\\\b\\.
Furthermore, A  has to be complete with respect to the norm topology. Finally, 
there exists a mapping
* :A ->  A,
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called an involution, with
(2.5)
(2.6)
(2.7)
(2.8)
(a +  b)* =  cl* +  b*
(A a)* =  A*a*
(ab)*  =  b*a*.
(a*)* =  a
3. A  is a C*-algebra if
(a) A  is a Banach *-algebra
(b) ||a*fl|| =  ||a||2, Vo E A.
D e f in i t io n  4.2. Let A  be a C*-algebra. A state is defined as a functional
<p : cl E A  G C
which satisfies the following properties:
1. ( y>; Aioi +  A2o2 > =  Ai(<p; a \ ) +  A2(y>; o2 )
o>i e  A, A* e  C
2. (<p;a*a)>0, VaEA
S  denotes the set of all states. This set is a convex set. The elements of this set 
that are not expressible as a convex combination of any states are called pure states.
D e f in i t io n  4.3. A convex subset So of S  is full (with respect to A ), if for all 
a, b £ A , a  •£ 6 , there exists a state E So such ( V5; ° ) ^  ( ^ 5  &)•
D e f in i t io n  4.4. The pair (^ 4sa» <So), *^ sa the self-adjoint part of a (C'*)-algebra, 
So a full set of states, is called a description (model) of a (class of) quantum system(s).
Note in particular that under the restriction of A  to .Asa, the states map elements of 
the restricted set (which is n o t  a subalgebra) to R; ( y>; a ) corresponds to the expectation 
value of a  for the state <p. As* does, however, uniquely determine every state in S: if 
S  is full with respect to .Asa, it is also full with respect to A. It should be stressed 
that Definition 4.2 is not the only way in which states for a quantum system might be 
defined, and that different ways might lead to different sets of states when the Hilbert 
space we are considering is infinite dimensional. For the purpose of discussing Fine’s
3. <¥>;!) =  1.
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solution to the quantum measurement problem, however, we will only deal with an 
example involving finite dimensional systems.
2.2. A lgebraic approaches to  F ine’s solution. The set of states that axe rel-
description, is not full with respect to the set of bounded hermitean operators on the 
spin space. These states correspond to the functions
V?: A  -» R =  Tr(pa),
Consider two observables A  and B, one with Hr =  fT/ =  0, the other with Hr ^  0, 
say. It is easy to see that no such state will be able to distinguish between the two.
Fine’s question can now be phrased in the following way: is there some algebra 
(hopefully a  subalgebra of the C'-algebra from which the quantum system is defined) 
with a full set of states isomorphic to the one Fine picks out? The answer is yes.
Consider the set of ordered pairs (a, 6 ) of complex numbers. Define scalar multi­
plication of the elements of this set by a complex number as A (a, 6 ) =  (Aa, A6 ). Define 
addition by (a i , 6 i) + (0 2 5 6 2 ) =  (0 1 + 0 2 , 6 1 + 6 2 )5  and multiplication by (o i,6 i)(o 2 , 6 2 ) =  
(0 1 0 2 , 6 1 6 2 ). This is indeed an algebra according to the above definition1. It will be 
denoted by C.
Now consider the mapping
where the operation | • | yields the absolute value of a complex number. This is a norm 
for the above algebra.
P r o o f . Check conditions (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4).
• (2.1) requires that ||(o ,6 )|| =  0 +=+ (a ,6 ) =  0, i.e a =  6  =  0. This is clearly 
the case.
1As a consequence of this it also satisfies Segal’s postulates I, as stated in [76].
evant in the case of a measurement of spin in a spin-^ system, according to Fine’s
where
x +  y =  1, and
P H r — iH i 
Hr +  iH j q
|| || : (a, 6 ) R f =  max[|a|, |6 |],
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•  (2 .2 ) requires that ||(ai + 0.2 , bi +&2 )|| < 11 (<2 1 , 6 1 ) 11 -4-11 (0 2 , 6 2 ) 11 - Suppose without 
loss of generality that the number on the left hand side is |ai +  0 2 1- Two cases 
arise:
1 .
m a x [ |a i |, |6 i |]  =  |a*|, < =  1 ,2 .
Then ||(ai +  <1 2 ,6 1  +  6 2 )!! <  ||(a i ,6 i) || +  ||(a2 >&2 )|| holds if and only if 
|ai + 0 2 ! <  |ai| + 1<2219 which holds as a property for the operation of taking 
absolute values of complex numbers.
2. In the second case, one of |6 i| or I&2 I is greater than the respective |a j|; 
suppose it is |&i|. It clearly follows that |6 i| +  |o2 | >  |o i| +  |a2 | the latter 
being of course greater than or equal to |ai + 0 2 !, as we have just seen. 
This completes the proof.
• (2.3) requires that ||(Aa,A6 )|| =  |A| ||(a ,6 )||. Clearly the case as, for any two 
complex numbers z  and s', \z • z'\ = \z\\z'\.
• The proof of (2.4) is similar to that of (2.2). □
We define the involution for the algebra C to be the operation (a, 6 )* =  (a, 6 ), where 
a is the complex conjugate of a. This obviously satisfies all the postulates described 
above for such maps, as the operation of complex conjugation is an automorphism 
of C  The *-algebra condition then becomes, when this involution map is adopted, 
||(aa, 6 6 )|| =  ||(a ,6 )||2. Now suppose |a| >  |6 |, then ||(a ,6 )|| =  |a| and ||(a ,6 ) | | 2  =  |a|2. 
If H  > |6 | then |aa| >  |6 6 | and ||(aa ,6 6 )|| =  |ao|. But |aa| =  |a| • |a| =  |a| • |a| =  |a|2, 
and the condition is satisfied, so the algebra is a C*-algebra.
The states for this algebra are the linear functions from the algebra to the complex 
numbers. Consider the functions defined by
So 3 : (a, 6 ) -> C =  ax  +  6 y,
with R 3 x ,y  > 0 and x  +  y — 1. These are indeed states according to the conditions 
laid out in Def. 2.2: ( <p; A *A ) =  |a|2 a; +  \b\2y > 0 clearly, which fulfils the positivity 
condition; (<£>; 1 ) = x  + y = 1 , satisfying the normalisation condition; and
( {Px,y\ (AlOl +  A2 fl2 » A1 6 1  +  A2 6 2 ) ) =  (AiOi +  \ 2d2 )x +  (A1 6 1  +  A2 &2 )y
Al(v?x,yj (oi5^l) ) +  ^2(ipx,y i (g2j&2) ) =  AiOiX +  \2CL2X +  Ai&iy +  \ 2 b 2 y
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which axe clearly equal, so linearity is satisfied. Note that there are only two pure 
states, tpifi and y?o,i-
This set of states is full with respect to C. Suppose we have two different elements 
of TZ, A \ and A 2 , say. If they differ in the first complex number, then <pifo will lead to 
different expectation values for A\ and A 2; if they differ in the second number, then 
<po,i again will give different expectation values. So it is always possible to find a  state 
for differing elements of C that will give different expectation values, and hence the set 
of states is full. It is worth noting also that these functions exhaust all the possible 
states for the system.
The self-adjoint part of the algebra C, namely the subset Csa of the algebra which 
is invariant under the involution operation, together with this set of states So, forms by 
definition a  quantum system. What do the representations of the algebra C look like? 
I will briefly show that, through a GNS construction, we can reach the two possible 
representations of this algebra (one is irreducible, the other is not). Through these 
representations we obtain a Hilbert space realisation of the quantum system (Csa,<So). 
The GNS method of constructing representations for algebras with sets of states relies 
on the calculation of left ideals for the algebra. A state is fixed and the representation 
is constructed with respect to that state. It is a  theorem of the theory of quantum 
algebras that such a representation is irreducible if and only if the corresponding state 
is pure. In our case there will be two representations that arise from the algebra: one 
for the pure states and one for the mixed ones. This highlights the structural features 
of this algebra.
Once a state ip G So is chosen, the first part of the GNS construction consists of 
calculating the set
I (p = {A zC :{ tp -,A * A )= 0 } ,
which is provably a left ideal of the algebra. For present purposes, take the state to be
ip 1 1 . Then IWl , consists of all the elements (a, b) of C for which 
2  * 2 h'h
(n i;(|a|M6|2)) = ! ^  + ^  = 0.
The only way in which this equality can be satisfied is if a =  b =  0, hence  ^ =  
{(0,0)}. Now write
$ a =  A + Iv^ .
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The set C /I^^  ^ =  { $ , 4  : A  E C} with scalar product given by
=  (<Pk V,A*B)
2 ’ 2
is a Hilbert Space. The mapping
 ^*”*
given by A  -> 71^   ^(A),
links every A  with a bounded operator on C /I^^  and is easily seen to be a *- 
morphism.
Furthermore let $ i =  $ , I being the element (1,1) of the algebra, then
(2.9) (V kV ,A )  =  (¥>i,i;1 *A) =  {Qu * a ) =
and $  can easily be shown to be cyclic2.
The Hilbert space is easily seen to be isomorphic to C2, and the representation of 
the algebra on this space is given by the following set of 2 x 2 complex matrices on C2:
* ) = ( 0  |  , o, 6  6  C
The involution operation is easily seen to be equivalent to the adjoint operation on 
these matrices.
This representation is not irreducible, because it is based on a mixed state. To 
obtain an irreducible representation we can repeat the above procedure for one of the 
two pure states of the system. It is easily seen3  that this representation will yield the 
set of linear maps on C. This is an irreducible representation. W hat this shows is that 
the first representation is made of two copies of the irreducible representation which 
act independently of one another on two subspaces of C2. This means, in quantum 
mechanical terms, that nothing like an interference term can arise in this system. The 
first representation has the property that for every unit vector $  e  W the state tp 
defined by
(¥>; (a, b) ) =  ($, icv ^  (a, &)$)
2The condition of being cyclic, as well as condition (2.9), axe standardly satisfied by representations 
constructed through the GNS scheme, though they need not concern us explicitly here.
3From the fact that I v in this case will have a continuum of elements of the algebra in it.
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is a state in Sq. Consider the representation of (a, b)
and $  =  (x, y) with
Then
x 2 + y2 _  1
=  (x,y)(ax,by) =
2 2
Put x ' =  j ,  ?/ =  then x ' +  =  1 and x', j/' >  0, and clearly defines a
state. This means that the representation is a representation for (C,So) and a fortiori 
for the quantum system (Asa >£())•
2.3. A n answ er to  F in e ’s question. It is worth emphasising that the quantum 
system defined by the self-adjoint part of C together with the states Sq is a system 
that can model Fine’s selective interaction measurements, as its states have the same 
structure as Fine’s equivalence classes.
We have just seen, from an abstract point of view, what the algebra induced by 
Fine’s restriction on states will be. But remember that Fine’s original question concern­
ing algebraic approaches was the following: is it possible to find an algebra containing 
a subalgebra that in some sense induces the restriction on the states? I have just 
shown that there is an algebra that has a full set of states which is isomorphic to Fine’s 
equivalence classes. What is the algebra that can have this as a subalgebra?
The answer in the case just discussed is simple, and in general relies on the so-called 
Gelfand-Naimark theorem (see [45] and [32, p. 375]). This result states that all C*~ 
algebras are ‘concrete’, i.e. they can be realised as a C*-subalgebra of the C'*-algebra 
of bounded operators on a Hilbert space %. The obvious algebra for the example is the 
algebra of bounded operators on C2. This algebra (over the field of complex numbers) 
is linearly generated by the following operators:
(2.10)
(2 .11) Oy = and cr, —
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the identity operator on C2 and the Pauli spin matrices. The subalgebra of operators
is linearly generated by the two operators
and
0 - 1
1 0
and is the subalgebra of operators commuting with the spin x  observable
0 -1
1 0
Note that this subalgebra contains no smaller subalgebras within it: a subalgebra must
linearly generates the subalgebra commuting with ox. In particular, Fine’s remark that 
the algebra of observables which axe functions of a given observable, F (E ), is different 
from the algebra of observables commuting with a given observable is not always correct 
[40, p. 502-503]: it fails in particular when the observable is maximal, in which case 
the two are equal. Fine wants to argue that there is a subset of all the bounded, self- 
adjoint operators of a quantum system (the usual observables), which justifies selecting 
the states he does for the object system. At the same time he does not want this subset 
to be the set of all observables commuting with the observable to be measured. This 
will become important later on, when I argue that the fact that this does not hold in 
important cases constitutes a problem for the solution presented.
In sum, the answer to Fine’s question is the following: given a Hilbert space, and an 
observable to be measured on the object modelled in such a space, the restriction from 
the algebra of bounded operators on the Hilbert space to the subalgebra of observables 
commuting with the observable to be measured induces Fine’s restriction to the states 
he argues are to be assigned to the object in his proposed solution to the measurement
This line of reasoning does more: it also provides a rationale for why the assigned
measured observable, something which Fine thinks is decided pragmatically: “If E-
then how can we justify using any one of them, say W (E ) [the density operator over
be closed under matrix multiplication as well as addition, but o j =  I so that aax +  /?<r2
problem.
states should be expressed as density operators decomposed over eigenvalues of the
equivalent states are actually identical relative to the subsystem represented by T (E ),
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object observable eigenstates], as opposed to any other, say W? I think the only answer 
can be that ^-equivalence warrants using one or another state, indifferently, provided 
that the particular use yields satisfactory results” [40, p. 502]. Under such a restriction 
of the algebra of relevant observables, eigenstates of the measured observable are the 
only pure states remaining4: there is no state W  left in the algebra, there are only such 
pure states and the convex combinations of them5.
3. Arguing for the algebraic rationale
At this stage I will address two issues. The first thing to deal with is whether 
there is any scope for an algebraic account to back up Fine’s proposed solution to 
the measurement problem, and what problems it might lead to. This, from a formal 
point of view, involves looking at Fine’s solution from the standpoint exposed in the 
previous section. This means, for instance, that we have to think of the quantum 
mechanical object system not as an ordinary quantum system, but as a  system for 
which considerably fewer observables and states are defined. Otherwise the suggestion 
that we are looking at this from the algebraic point of view is vacuous. The algebraic 
definition of a quantum system is very weak when compared, for instance, to the 
idea that quantum mechanics should be modelled by a quantum system of bounded 
operators on a Hilbert Space: this latter system satisfies the algebraic definition, but so 
do infinitely many others. What Fine calls “precedents and rules of thumb” come into 
play in deciding what quantum model is applicable to which physical system. First 
of all I will explain, in this section, why an algebraic justification of Fine’s strategy 
amounts to a justification by means of a superselection rule. I will then examine in the 
next section whether questions that arise with respect to superselection rules can pose 
problems for Fine’s solution to the measurement problem. Finally in section 5 I will 
consider whether precedents and rules of thumb can sufficiently back up Fine’s strategy, 
independently of whether its justification comes from algebraic quantum mechanics.
4This can be seen in many different ways. For example they are the only states which are eigenstates 
of some observable of the system; they are the only states which have probability one with respect to
some (non-trivial) observables, and so on.
5 Another way of looking at this is to think that a pure state can be used to represent an ensemble
which cannot be split, in accordance with D’Espagnat’s definition of splitting. Then it is easy to see 
that, in the presence of a superselection rule as in Fine’s examples, the only pure states are eigenstates 
of the measured object observable [27, p. 63, Remark 1],
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As anticipated on page 140, the discussion of the previous section implies that, 
if we try to give an algebraic rationale to the solution, then what Fine has done is 
formally, though not necessarily in the details of the argument, equivalent to imposing 
a superselection rule, therefore modifying the condition that the object and apparatus 
systems both be proper quantum systems. Simply put, superselection rules forbid 
superpositions between certain pure states by first restricting the set of observables. 
This is usually done by claiming that all operators which are to count as observables 
must commute with a certain operator for the system (the superselection operator), 
thereby revoking the status of observables for operators which normally would represent 
observables, namely those that do not commute with the superselection operator. The 
set of states for the larger algebra of operators containing all original observables now 
contains states which are equivalent with each other with respect to the observables to 
which the superselection rule restricts us. This leads to an equivalence class just like 
Fine’s. While the starting point is the opposite of Fine’s, in that the restriction begins 
at the level of observables rather than at the level of states, the end result is formally 
the same.
I mean this in at least two senses. First of all, if we attempt to justify Fine’s 
strategy by appeal to an algebraic argument, we clearly are in the same position as if 
we assumed a superselection rule to apply on the object space when, and only when, a 
measurement is being carried out. We might, on the other hand, want to argue that the 
states we assign when measurements are being carried out represent physical states of 
the object’s aspects, rather that of the object itself. Nevertheless the object’s aspects 
have a state structure equivalent to that imposed by a superselection rule.
It is worth stressing again that it is the same from a formal point of view. The math­
ematical model of the object system that is relevant in the solution of the measurement 
problem that Fine proposes is the same, when accounted for by algebraic reasoning, 
as a model induced by a superselection rule on the object system with the measured 
observable counting as the superselection operator. Because this does not necessarily 
imply that we have exactly the same physical case as we would with a superselection 
rule, it is worth considering in some detail whether objections to superselection rules 
straightforwardly carry over to objections to Fine’s account. There are, however, at 
least some differences between Fine’s strategy and superselection rules which clearly 
cannot rescue Fine.
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First of all, it might be argued that Fine thinks measurement evolutions look at 
aspects, not states, and that states axe therefore still distinguishable, while aspects 
are not. This strategy might seek to block the inference that we are dealing with 
something formally equivalent to a superselection rule in quantum measurements by 
claiming that there still is a fact of the matter about which state the system is in while 
a measurement is performed. This seems to me to fail in at least two ways. Firstly, if we 
treat aspects in measurement, it is completely irrelevant to measurements themselves 
whether there are still states attached to object systems or not, for we ignore them 
completely when accounting for measurements: all the relevant information is encoded 
in the representatives of aspects and all the final information about the state of the 
object system after the measurement is recovered from the final evolved aspect If we 
don’t deduce the final object state in this way, then we don’t solve the measurement 
problem according to the rules Fine sets out.
Secondly, therefore, if someone were to object that there are two ‘facts of the 
matter’, so to speak, about a system in measurement, namely what state it is in, and 
what aspect it is in, then the present account should be read as an analysis of the 
object aspect +  apparatus interaction. As this is all that is used in Fine’s account of 
measurement, a critique of this analysis will be a critique of Fine’s solution regardless. 
Also we might add that there is simply no way of assigning a state to the object 
during measurement from any of the physical information available in this process, in 
fact the whole idea of modelling measurements through aspects is that all information 
about the original state is lost in the measurement process, apart from the probabilistic 
information relative to the measured object observable. This seems to make it rather 
hard to tell what the state of the object system, as distinct from its aspect, might be 
in the measurement process.
A second objection to the formal identification of the algebraic justification of Fine’s 
state restriction with a superselection rule might be that superselection rules represent 
prohibitions for certain superpositions to exist (Nature just doesn’t allow these states 
to arise), while Fine’s interaction with an aspect is the result of knowledge of a specific 
causal process, and it is this causal process that backs up the restriction of the alge­
bra. While this might be true, it is hard to see what bearing this would have on any 
problematic aspects of the formal scheme that we are dealing with here. If the formal 
model is inconsistent or contradictory or unable to deal with the problem at hand in
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any sense, it matters little what kind of story we give for its adoption. In the next parts 
I will be raising problems for the formal aspect that becomes relevant if we try to use 
algebraic quantum mechanics to justify Fine’s solution. Of course any problems that 
emerge here will not by themselves rule out Fine’s solution, but only a reconceptuali­
sation of it in terms of algebras. The distinct arguments that lead to Fine’s solution, 
the causal arguments about interactions with aspects, will be dealt with in section 5 .
We have just seen at the end of the previous section, on page 149 that Fine in his 
original paper tentatively proposes a distinction between two subsets of the algebra of 
observables of a system: the function algebra associated with an observable E  and the 
algebra of operators commuting with E, the latter being the set analysed in the previous 
section; the two are supposed to be different, and it is the first such subset that should 
be of help in defining states for measurement the way that Fine does. But in our 
case, if the function algebra is the subalgebra generated from E  by the usual operations 
of addition and multiplication, it is the same as the commutative subalgebra discussed 
earlier. The reason for wanting to identify different such subsets is that the set of 
all operators commuting with a given one contains observables which are qualitatively 
different to the original one, rather than just, for example, being multiples of it.
This makes things complicated: instead of finding a rationale for assigning states 
in the way that Fine does, we find that in so doing we have effectively imposed a 
superselection rule, and invoking superselection rules in order to solve the measurement 
problem has many difficulties. Note that the problems thrown up by this formal analogy 
are not solely technical, but also philosophical. There is nothing wrong with Fine’s 
strategy if the aim is to find a way of redefining conditions (1)—(4) in such a way that 
they are consistent. The objections against Fine’s solution have a flavour of “good, 
but not good enough”, the solution is felt to be cheap, or ad hoc. Implicitly, in raising 
such points, the argument is that the measurement problem is not summarised by the 
requirement of modifying (1)—(4) to make them consistent; the implication is that there 
is more to the measurement problem than doing just this.
Recall how the first chapter argues, amongst other things, that measurement is 
about answering two kinds of questions, about property assignment and unitary evo­
lutions. Chapters 2  and 3 have picked on two important conditions which emerge in 
discussions of these questions: they are, in this chapter, condition (1 .2 ), the probability 
reproducibility condition; and condition (1.3), or objectification, which Fine calls the
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Rule of Silence. However, the general unease about Fine’s solution suggests that it is 
not sufficient to find ways of dealing with these conditions. The ways must also be 
acceptable in some other sense, for instance by being physically motivated, rather than 
just mathematically consistent. Much of the unease with superselection rules as a solu­
tion to the measurement problem arises precisely because measurement superselection 
rules often seem to be not so well motivated, and a lot of work has gone into providing 
such motivations in terms of well understood physical processes which might generate 
them. Fine’s solution should be appraised in the same way.
The first step is to ask what kinds of answers Fine’s solution gives to the two
‘technical’ questions characterised in Chapter 1: the answers are that properties are 
assigned according to the eigenvalue-eigenstate rule and the interaction evolutions axe 
deterministic. On top of this there is an important ‘metaquestion’ to tackle: what is 
so special about quantum measurement? This question will in some sense affect the 
answers to the first ones: a discussion of it requires arguing whether measurement is a 
special process in quantum mechanics, a process that requires separate treatments in 
some sense from other kinds of interactions, and showing quite how different the process 
is. However the connection is not total: for example different modal interpretations 
give the same kind of technical answers to the two questions in Chapter 1 , though they 
have different view as to how special quantum measurement is.
There is a  sense in which measurement is trivially going to be a special interaction: 
it relies on different Hamiltonians than other interactions do. This would obviously be 
the case with interpretations of the measurement process such as Everett’s. In many 
interpretations, however, there is more ‘specialisation’ to measurement than just being 
described by a different kind of Hamiltonian- In collapse solutions, for example, a 
standard linear Hamiltonian evolution of the object +  apparatus system is followed 
by a non-linear evolution. When invoking a superselection rule (in the indirect way in 
which Fine does it as much as, I think, in other superselection approaches) it is also
necessary to admit that there is something peculiar about measurement.
For example, in the Coleman-Hepp scheme (see, for instance, [49]), further dis­
cussed by Bub [1 2 ], suppose that the measurement system, contrary to any other sys­
tem in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, is properly modelled by an infinite number 
of Hilbert spaces all direct summed together. In the most recent and perhaps most 
interesting defence of a superselection solution to these issues, Landsmann [61] argues
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that we have in measurement a particular physical process of decoherence which gives 
rise to superselection rules. Fine effectively says that what is special about measure­
ment is that the measurement interaction only involves aspects of the quantum system. 
Therefore it is the nature of a measurement interaction that the appropriate way of 
representing such interactions different from what it would usually be.
It is important to think of these solutions to the measurement problem as singling 
out measurement processes and to give a justification as to why this is an acceptable 
procedure. This is suggested by the general unwillingness of many to accept descrip­
tions of systems with superselection rules at face value, as quantum systems on a par 
with the standard model of a Hilbert space and its associated set of self-adjoint oper­
ators. The point here has been made by Beltrametti and Cassinelli [5] and reiterated 
by Van Fraassen. Somehow, potential empirical evidence of quantum behaviour with 
interferences warrants description by a Hilbert space and its associated operators, as is 
the case with claims of macroscopic superposition; but empirical evidence of absence of 
interference is not warrant enough for asserting a superselection rule. This is because 
such liberal use of superselection rules would allow us to call all classical phenomena 
de facto quantum phenomena: “classical behaviour could never disconfirm quantum 
predictions [80, p. 266]”.
Superselection rules and their like ought, in this picture, to be deducible from some 
less objectionable condition6. It shouldn’t be possible to invoke them just because 
phenomena suggest their presence, as most classical behaviour would then suggest, in 
a sense, the presence of a superselection rule. If this is reason enough to assume these 
rules then it is thought that there is no problem with showing that classical mechanics 
is just a special case of quantum mechanics.
This should make it clear that providing a solution to the measurement problem 
requires a little more work than just establishing an axiom scheme which is a consis­
tent modification of (l)-(4). The solution also involves, for instance, defending the 
modification of the axioms from possible criticisms.
With regards to Fine’s solution and its formal rationale in terms of algebraic quan­
tum mechanics, a number of objections against superselection solutions to the measure­
ment problem have a bearing on this, and some other objections can arise. The next
6 A good example of this is Wan and Fountain’s derivation of a superselection rule for supercurrents 
governed by the Josephson equation [84].
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section will consider these objections and see whether Fine might be able to answer 
them. Assuming that a reply to this might be that we can drop the attem pt to provide 
such a rationale, I will then look specifically at Fine’s arguments to the effect that mea­
surement is a special physical process in order to raise other problems, independent of 
the rationale.
4. Problems for Fine and Superselection
One standard problem that people have with adopting superselection rules arises 
just as much in Fine’s proposal.
When we have a superselection rule, our state space is split into supersectors; states 
in different supersectors cannot exist in superpositions with one another. The unitary 
evolution generated by a self-adjoint operator O on a Hilbert space has an interesting 
property: it will not map any superposition of eigenstates of the self-adjoint operator 
O into an eigenstate of O and it will not map an eigenstate of O into a superposition 
of said eigenstates. Consider the consequence of applying a superselection rule to 
the apparatus space of an object +  apparatus system Hg <g> Hm, by selecting a self- 
adjoint superselection operator II ® P , where P  is the apparatus pointer observable. By 
definition this rule will have as a consequence that the only observables for the pointer 
system commute with I ® P , and hence share the property just described with I <8 > P. 
Thus a state which is in a superselection sector, which is defined by the eigenstates 
of I ® P  cannot be mapped out of this sector by any unitary operators generated by 
observables.
Now suppose that we have an initial state with Hg 3 <p =  The initial
state of the apparatus ifto might be an eigenstate of the pointer observable recording 
that no observation has been made. If it is an eigenstate of the pointer observable, 
and if the pointer observable is a superselection operator, then, by the well known fact 
outlined in the previous paragraph, no Hamiltonian representing an observable can 
generate an evolution mapping this state into a state which has anything other than 
ipo as a pointer “substate” in the subsystem H i .  The unitary operator which will 
map the initial state to the appropriate final state which can count as a measurement 
must then be generated by a self-adjoint operator which is not an observable. Normally 
one regards the self-adjoint operator generating the unitary evolution of a system as 
the energy of the system, in this state the composite system Tig The problem
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then is that either the energy of the total system is not an observable, or the evolution 
of the system ® "H m in measurement is not dictated by an operator representing 
the energy of the system. This has been thought by many to be an objection to the 
superselection account; Hughes [50, 9.7], for instance, has argued this.
Suppose we try to finesse this by regarding xpo to be a superposition of pointer 
reading states, H m B ip = Piipi, and pointing out that, as only the pure states lie 
in supersectors Hs <8 > ipi, all states must be expressed as convex combinations of these 
states. Then the initial state before the measurement interaction will be 
Now the initial state is already split along the correct supersectors, and we could claim 
that some sort of solution is at hand. But the probability reproducibility condition will 
fail. We have to change the probabilities |/?j| 2 in the measurement evolution to reflect 
the probabilities given through </?, and it is well known that we still can’t do it if the 
Hamiltonian of the system is an operator which is an observable.
On the other hand some people claim that it is not necessarily clear what observable 
the self-adjoint operator generating the evolution of the system Tis ® is supposed 
to represent. I t ’s not the case that the quantity that we are trying to measure within 
the system (its energy, say) is not an observable for the joint system. Suppose the 
observable measured on Hs is E. Then E  ® Im is an observable for the joint system, 
whatever superselection rule we impose on the system It is the Hamiltonian
describing the interaction between the two systems which is not an observable of the 
system. But the interpretation of such a Hamiltonian is not so straightforward, and 
there are examples from classical mechanics, for example, where the Hamiltonian of 
the classical system does not represent its energy. Wan has long made this latter point 
in several papers, recently in a joint paper with Harrison [83]; Landsmann [61] also 
thinks this is not such a fatal problem, though his point is less convincing.
The issue, however, is still unresolved; quantum mechanics is very much based on 
the idea that energy observables dictate evolutions of systems. If they are not so dic­
tated in other theories this does not seem sufficient reason for why they shouldn’t be 
in quantum mechanics. And even in the case that the Hamiltonian oddity is accepted, 
Hughes argues that it still offers no account of why a superselection rule operates with 
respect to certain macroscopic systems, but not others. Many arguments for superse­
lection rules explain these in terms of the fact that they are macroscopic. But certain
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macroscopic systems (Hughes’s example is a pot of liquid helium) do not exhibit be­
haviour consistent with a superselection rule. Yet measurement invariably does. There 
still is no answer to the question: “What is so special about Quantum Measurement”?
Van Fraassen [80] further points out that superselection rules might entail different 
empirical predictions in many ways in quantum mechanics; this need not be a problem, 
but will require careful assessment of what we do when applying them. Perhaps, in the 
case of standard pointer superselection rules, the only option really is to give up trying 
to absolutely define what counts as macroscopic and microscopic and turn this into 
an empirical fact: measurements exhibit macroscopic behaviour, Josephson junctions 
(perhaps) and liquid helium pots do not, and that is all there is to it. There still is need 
for an argument, however, as to why classical mechanics isn’t trivially a special case of 
quantum mechanics, given that, as pointed out in the previous section, most classical 
behaviour would then suggest, in a sense, the presence of a superselection rule.
This problem affects Fine’s restriction of states, as justified through algebraic quan­
tum mechanics, and the corresponding superselection rule it entails, just as much. The 
solution needs to explain, just as much as a  solution based on superselection rules, what 
basis there is for a state evolution determined by a Hamiltonian for the system which 
is not an observable, or why this should not be relevant in such solution. Suppose that 
Fine decides that the problem with Hamiltonians is not so desperate after all, it is still 
the case that an algebraic reformulation of the solution achieves little in the way of 
providing a rationale of Fine’s state selection, for we cannot show that there is a justi­
fication for the state selection unless we give a justification for the algebraic restriction. 
This we cannot do without addressing more closely the question of interactions with an 
aspect, what the interactions are, how they really do apply, in the same sense, as I have 
claimed in the previous paragraph, that we have to carefully assess how superselection 
rules apply.
A more delicate question is whether, quite apart from an explicit appeal to an 
algebraic reformulation of Fine’s solution, the latter implies a  superselection rule on 
the object system anyway. In a  sense, the restriction on states that Fine advocates 
necessarily restricts observables in the way that is done in a superselection rule, effec­
tively acting as Ockham’s razor: it is not possible to tell that there are observables 
of the system other than the ones that would remain after a superselection rule is im­
posed, so on what basis can we assume them to be there? Note that the point here
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is not that we have a problem in deciding when we have a measurement, or whether 
the object state before a measurement is properly represented by probabilistic aspects; 
it’s about whether, given that we know a measurement is about to take place and we 
have assigned an aspect state, we can tell whether there are any other observables for 
this system other than the restricted set of observables commuting with the measured 
object observable.
One fact is clear: given that we have certain representations of object aspects at the 
beginning of a measurement, then there is no way that in those states we can distinguish 
an observable which does not commute with the measured object observable from one 
that does7. A further consequence of this is that the claim that what the measurement 
evolution on the combined system is about is interacting with an aspect
cannot easily be substantiated by appeal to some straightforward relationship between 
the observable measured on the subsystem %§ and the measurement Hamiltonian on 
Tis ® Hm; we can’t even see the latter!
In any case, we will now leave aside the question of the extent to which Fine’s 
state selection amounts to the same thing as imposing a superselection rule in order 
to consider more closely in the next section the question of interaction with an aspect 
independently of this problem.
5. Two further problems for Fine’s account
Fine [43, p. 281], citing Bell, claims to be looking for an approach to solving the 
measurement problem that satisfies the desideratum that “fundamental theory permit 
exact mathematical formulation” [4, p. 171]. His solution is certainly mathematically 
precise: from the perspective explored in the previous sections it amounts to assuming 
a superselection rule. Von Neumann’s projections, though, are just as mathematically 
precise: there is no problem in understanding their formal properties. The problems 
emerge when trying to gain a physical understanding of what process projections are 
supposed to model, and when trying to interpret this process.
rNote also that another way of putting this is that, just like we pick an equivalence class of states 
with respect to the measured object observable, the reduced set of states we work with also establishes 
an equivalence class on the whole set of self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space, those that cannot be 
distinguished by any one of the states in the restricted set, as shown in example 4.1
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In the same way it is a mistake to judge Fine’s proposals, good or bad as we may
think them to be, on the basis of how precise their mathematical formulation is. What 
is the physics behind these proposals? What interpretive gloss do they put on quantum 
mechanics?
The gloss is explicitly pragmatic; insofar as the pragmatism holds, it is best to steer 
away from the polemics it raises: one person’s pragmatism is another one’s ad hocness. 
I want to take, for the sake of argument, the pragmatism for granted and examine in 
some detail the first question.
The argument in Fine’s solution for why measurement is a physical process de­
serving of special treatment has two components. A measurement of an observable is 
looking for probabilistic information about an observable O in an initial object state 
P[<p\ G Ti'i'Hs), information that is to be transferred to a  final pointer state F u M G
( H m ); this state should emerge by partial tracing of a  final state F  G ®'Hm
with suitable properties. But there is a whole class of object states which yields, via the 
Born rule, the same probabilistic information about O. Were the measurement prob­
lem to be solved, we would expect, for all such object states, initial object +  apparatus 
states formed from them to be mapped onto a final state F  G Hs for which F% M
is always the same.
This is one way of looking at the measurement problem: we want a bijective map­
ping on <8 > 'Hm )-, a generalisation of a unitary operator, but we end up asking
for all these states which yield the same probabilistic information to be mapped to the 
same final state for the apparatus, with appropriate probabilities. The requirements 
force us quite explicitly in the case of ideal measurements to have the same global final 
state for all such measurements when initial states are ^-equivalent. Fine proposes, 
first of all, that all the states that share the same probabilistic information with respect 
to an observable to be measured be assigned the same initial state. Measurement is 
about interacting with an aspect of the system to be measured, namely the aspect con­
cerning the probabilistic information that the measured system yields, and we should 
encode this aspect in a representative state.
Secondly, which state should be the representative state? The answer is “prag­
matic” : we initially assign to the system a state which will guarantee the correct 
outcome at the end. There is more than a similarity with appeal to superselection 
rules here. It is the easy way out, some might say. Put more seriously, we might ask
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what physical basis there is to such an appeal: simply saying that the apparatus system 
interacts with an ‘aspect’ of the object system does not seem, by itself, to provide much 
grounds for changing the states we assign to the object system; if we have a peculiarly 
specific interaction we would normally describe it with a peculiarly specific Hamilton­
ian. Why should a peculiar interaction in the case of measurement be accounted for 
by revising the initial object states, prepared at the beginning in quite a different way? 
On the other hand, as we have seen in previous sections, the idea that algebraic con­
siderations might provide a rationale for Fine doesn’t solve much, as one is left with a 
superselection rule and the need to provide a rationale for that.
A response might be that the specific structure of an interaction is not just modelled 
by a Hamiltonian, but we face the further choice of whether the Hamiltonian is a 
Hamiltonian for the evolution of standard states or of states representing aspects. In 
any case, we need to look a bit more closely at how selective interactions work with 
revising initial object states. I want to raise two problems for Fine’s solution which do 
not strictly depend on assuming that a superselection rule is in operation on the object 
system when a measurement is in progress.
The first problem is related with the selection of representative states, and con­
cerns, for a change, the way that the solution deals with non-ideal measurements. The 
issue has been raised before, by Stairs, and Fine has responded to this. The way the 
issue is discussed in the previous debate concerns approximate measurements, but as 
chapter 1 makes clear, non-ideal measurements need not be interpreted as approximate 
measurements. In this case there is still a problem to discuss.
The second problem raises the possibility that the intuition that lies behind the 
solution, that of interaction with an aspect, is not adequately captured by the formal 
scheme that effects the solution, and so focuses on the first component of Fine’s argu­
ment. This intuition is what really distinguishes Fine’s approach from a superselection 
based scheme, and it wants to be a physical intuition. It forms the basis of the argument 
for modifying the initial state. The claim is essentially that it is hard to see how the 
mathematics invoked by Fine is connected to this intuition, and it is hard because we 
don’t really understand what the Hamiltonian of the joint system is doing, and because 
Fine’s state restriction is restriction to the probabilistic aspect of not one observable, 
but of an infinite number of them, enough in some cases to describe a whole classical 
system.
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5.1. F in e ’s solution and  non-ideal m easurem ents. If the measurement pro­
cess is to be distinguished in Fine’s reading of it by the fact that it formally introduces 
a superselection rule on the observed system at the beginning of measurement, it is to 
be expected that such a rule will stand throughout the measurement process; indeed 
we would not normally expect to be able to switch superselection rules on and off. Still 
in general, even if we don’t tie Fine’s solution to the measurement problem with the 
idea of superselection, it seems reasonable to assume that at least during the whole 
measurement interaction the only features that bear on the evolution of the object sub­
system are those represented by the representative states, from beginning to end of the 
interaction, as one is indeed interacting with an aspect throughout the measurement. 
It is difficult to see why, if such process of interacting with an aspect justifies assigning 
Fine’s representative states at the beginning of the interaction, it should not do so 
throughout the interaction.
This will work well for ideal measurements, but will leave us unable to predict 
the final outcome of some non-ideal measurements. The argument is again somewhat 
similar to the well known and often discussed argument of Albert and Loewer. Stairs 
has raised some questions about possible Albert and Loewer measurements, questions 
that Fine has answered on the basis of a disagreement about the correct way to model 
imperfect measurements. The example I have in mind has more to do with genuinely 
non-ideal measurements, and nothing to do with inaccurate or imperfect measurements: 
rather than considering inaccuracies with measurement operations resulting from de­
tectors ‘misfiring’, I will discuss examples which, if they are to be captured by standard 
quantum measurement techniques at all, must be captured by non-ideal measurements, 
along the lines of the examples in Chapter 1.
Fine claims that we have “interaction with an aspect” or, put in another way, 
“E  selective interaction”. What entitles us to talk of [V]e , as defined above, as the 
appropriate state at the start is at least the fact that this state is going to be transformed 
in a selective way.
I think that we can’t make the E  aspect state selection go away with any kind of 
argument until after the final state has been reached; little seems to change throughout 
the measurement that would make the selective interaction argument go away. This 
would, however, entail that the final object state when a measurement ends will still 
be a mixture of eigenstates of the object observable, as it was at the beginning. A
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non-ideal measurement then will result in a failure to predict the correct final object 
states for certain particular kinds of measurements, like for example destructive photon 
measurements.
To recapitulate what we mean by a non-ideal measurement, consider for example 
the mixed state
* = 1,2
representing the initial state of a  measurement interaction with the initial object state 
1Cz=i,2 \a i\2P[<Pi] being the representative state of <p =  aicpi +  0 :2 ^ 2  E C2 for an observ­
able picked by the set {^ 1 , ^ 2 }- The system is subjected to a  non-ideal measurement 
with the pointer in the initial state yielding
i j= l,2
where
If this is a  non-ideal measurement, the states pi may well not be orthogonal; in 
the case of destructive measurements, as considered initially by Margenau and further 
discussed by Kronz, all such states will be equal to a ‘vacuum’ state </?o, as we have 
seen in chapter 1. Other examples of situations where measurements are necessarily 
non-ideal are discussed by Ruetsche [74] who, in the context of modal interpretations, 
analyses measurements of object system observables represented by operators commut­
ing with operators representing conserved quantities of the system, as a consequence 
of the Wigner-Araki-Yanase result [2, 87]. This result in fact establishes that ideal 
measurements of such object observables are impossible.
Supposing we have an initial photon polarisation state ip =  Q i^i +  <2 2 ^ 2  £ C? and 
we measure an object observable selected by the object system basis {<£>1 , <^ 2 } C C2, 
by means of a pointer observable picked out by the orthonormal basis of the apparatus 
space {^ 1 , ^ 2 } C d 2. At least two things can happen in Fine’s account under a unitary, 
non-ideal measurement evolution U applied to the initial state X)*=i,2
1. The final state has the form
(5.1) M & l  w  >I2* W ^ ] ;
ij= 1,2
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2. the final state has the form
(5-2) £
z=l,2
Note that, for the two states, the final object states are respectively
£  ( £  \<*k(vk\<Pi)\2 ) P[Vi] 
i= 1,2 \fc=l,2 /
and
£  Kl2%]
* = 1,2
which are clearly different states, as can be easily checked by calculating, for instance, 
the transition probability of the two states with respect to P[$xy
In the first case clearly the final state fails to predict in any way what the final object 
state will be: state (5.1) suggests that the final state of the object will be a  density 
operator decomposed by eigenstates of the object observable that is being measured, 
not necessarily what we expect from an irreducibly non-ideal measurement.
On the other hand, the final state might be thought to be (5.2), the correct one for 
predicting the final object state. Then a curious situation arises. Right at the beginning 
of the selective measurement interaction Fine tells us that, as measurements interact 
selectively, we should write object states as mixtures over the measured observables. 
During the selective interaction itself, however, this would have to no longer apply in 
order to have a final state such as the one in (5.2). This in itself would be a strange 
feature of selective interactions, but we could claim that, for pragmatic reasons, state 
assignment is done before the actual interaction arises. It is possible, however, to 
‘freeze-frame’ the interaction, which happens over a period of time from 0 to t, at a 
time t' such that 0 <  t* < t  and ask what is the state at time t \  before the remaining 
part of the selective interaction takes place. At this point there seems little argument 
for not applying the same state assignment rule that we apply at the beginning of the 
interaction. This sort of argument rules out, however, the possibility that the final 
object state be a state other than an eigenstate of the measured object observable, or 
a density operator over such eigenstates.
The problem can be stated as ‘how long should the E  aspect be relevant?’ and 
calls for some reflection. The interesting idea in Fine’s solution, as remarked earlier, is 
that he wants to consider what the measurement interaction is actually doing. Given
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that the postulated nature of the interaction (a ‘selective’ one) is what accounts for the 
solution, the answer to ‘how long should the E  aspect be relevant?’ should be ‘at least 
as long as the measurement is going on and continues to be the kind of interaction that 
involves aspects’, regardless of what happens before or after (and regardless of whether 
we explicitly claim that there is a superselection rule in operation).
This is difficult to assess as the question turns on whether the fact that the interac­
tion relies on aspects at the start truly implies that it relies on aspects all the way. In 
a sense it seems that there need not be any implication of this sort, and it might be a 
purely physical fact that interactions are interactions with an aspect for the first x  ‘in­
stants’, and thereafter cease to be so. Perhaps the interaction only needs x  instants to 
pick out the aspect and then goes its own way, so to speak. While this being physically 
the case would undoubtedly avoid all the problems just described which are associated 
with non-ideal measurements, I think it will need a much more clear analysis of quite 
how measurement operations are interactions with aspects than we have seen so far: 
how would the distinction between what is going on in the first x  instants and what is 
going on afterwards be captured in the formal model? And to what different physically 
well understood, perhaps causal process do these two types of interactions correspond 
to? I actually think that the distinction will be hard to maintain, and will give some 
reasons for this in the next subsection.
As we have just seen, if Fine is forced to concede that interactions are interactions 
with aspects throughout the measurement, this will lead to problems: if measurement 
specifically interacts with E  aspects, what is the argument for saying that it might 
yield something which is informationally useful insofar as it isn’t encoded in the E  
aspect story (like knowledge of the difference between states which share the same 
probability distribution with respect to E ), as happens with the final states after a 
non-ideal interaction? Yet if we selected state (5.2) we would be expecting the final 
state to encode information which is not obtainable in the E  aspect approach: it will 
make a claim for the object state to be in a specific state which is not an E  aspect 
state normally selected by Fine’s argument.
It might be argued that because in the case of non-ideal measurements there is a 
clear case for needing to produce information, at the end of a  measurement, incompat­
ible with the E  aspect of the object subsystem, then we simply shouldn’t in general 
expect the measurement itself to concentrate on and produce an outcome expressed
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only in terms of the E  aspect. But this will leave the E  aspect as relevant only at the 
point of initial state assignment, independent of what happens in the measurement. I 
find this difficult to accept in any case; empirically, and in Fine’s own argument, this is 
not an initial state assigned for any sort of measurement or indeed any interaction, but 
only for a concrete measurement of a very specific observable, and it is the measure­
ment interaction itself which selects the aspect. If we then assume that in measurement 
the object state is not confined to the E  aspect, but is free to produce, for example, 
whatever final state of the object we want compatible with a probabilistic condition 
being satisfied for the final apparatus state, this seems to take away a good deal of the 
force of the argument.
5.2. W h a t a re  m easurem ent evolutions selectively in te rac tin g  w ith ?  The 
second problem for Fine comes from the nature of the measurement operator. If I 
am placed in front of a  final mixture resulting from a measurement and shown the 
measurement interaction operator, I have no idea what observable was being measured 
here. This is because in constructing the measurement interaction operator all I rely 
on is the orthonormal system resulting from an observable, not its eigenvalues. But 
this implies that all observables which share the same set of eigenstates are “measured” 
by the same operator. Normally this is not a very important consideration, perhaps 
wrongly; not much is said about the measurement operator other than the fact that it 
“kicks” pointers into place. Also, as stated by equation (2.4) in Chapter 3, the standard 
account of what makes up a measurement requires that we have, as well as an operator 
characterising the measurement evolution, a function linking the pointer observable’s 
eigenstates, accessible to us by “direct” observation, with the object observable ones, 
thus specifying in full the measured observable, rather than just its eigenstates. I will 
return to this soon.
In Fine’s story we axe told what measurements are supposed to do: a measurement 
effects the recording of a particular aspect of an observable, its probabilistic one. But 
this aspect is common to all observables found in the algebra picked out by a super­
selection rule in the following way. Recall from Chapter 3, page 106 that one of the 
conditions necessary to define a premeasurement operator (which for Fine will be the 
measurement operator) is that there is a fixed orthonormal basis of the object system
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'Hs, made up of eigenstates of the measured observable (where the basis is not necessar­
ily unique if the measured observable is not maximal). This premeasurement operator 
measures all observables which share the orthonormal basis as a set of eigenstates. This 
set of observables forms an algebra picked out by choosing any maximal operator in 
this set to be a superselection operator. This is clearly a commutative algebra, for the 
observables are diagonalised by the same orthonormal basis. The system is therefore 
‘classical’, as can be seen in a number of different ways. For instance the following 
theorem, due to Segal, applies:
T heorem  4.1 (Segal [76]). A commutative system is isomorphic (algebraically and 
metrically) with a system of all real-valued continuous functions on a compact Hausdorff 
space.
More intuitively what is happening is that every algebra of commutative observables 
has a number of properties that indicate its classicality. The sense in which the system 
is classical is given by the fact that all pure states for such a system are dispersion- 
free, or that the set of observables separates the set of probability measures, so that 
the phenomenon of non-unique decomposability of mixtures does not arise for such a 
system, while it is typical of quantum systems.
So the measurement operator can’t be interacting with an aspect of a  particular 
observable, as there is nothing whatsoever in it which distinguishes between an infinite 
set of observables which is, moreover, non-trivial in that it is equivalent to a  classical 
system.
There is a sense in which this is a problem for Fine’s account of measurement, and 
not for other accounts. The unitary operators effecting measurements axe standardly 
derived in the manner discussed in the previous chapter: assume some conditions which 
you think a measurement operator should satisfy, and look for which operators do sat­
isfy this condition. The ‘essentialist’ question, about what the measurements actually 
are, is not even raised. No discussion whatsoever is given of the nature of the interac­
tion. Think of Everett’s solution, or of the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation: what 
is proposed is a rule for property assignment, given that the measurement is charac­
terised by unitary evolutions equivalent to the ones discussed in the previous chapter. 
These measurements happen to be such that the interaction measures a whole big set
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of observables. Whether this is the case or not becomes a matter of empirical investi­
gation, perhaps. And perhaps the function which, in the standard definition of what 
constitutes a measurement, finks eigenstates of the pointer observable to those of the 
object observable, as defined in equation (2.4), has a physical interpretation such that 
a single observable can be said to be measured. But to point out that the unitary 
operator does not select a specific observable is not to make a criticism of the approach 
to solving the measurement problem embodied in Everett’s or Kochen’s work, for no 
assumption is made there about the nature of the interactions.
The very fact that no assumption is made about the physical nature of the mea­
surement interaction might in itself be the basis of a criticism that covers very many 
approaches to quantum measurement; this came up briefly in chapter 1. But that is not 
the argument here. The point here is that Fine builds his solution to the measurement 
problem on a specific intuition. This intuition is that we measure contextually, so that 
if two objects have the same weight (in the everyday sense of the term), this tells us 
very little about the objects as a whole: when we perform a measurement, then, we 
interact only with a specific aspect of the object, the one relevant to its weight. But the 
measurement interactions that are implicitly used in Fine’s solution (those that don’t 
violate (1.2), (1.3) and (1.1)) cannot be assumed to be doing anything of the sort, 
because of the problem just presented: they do not measure energy alone, for instance, 
but a whole set of observables commuting with energy.
Note that this is not meant to be a slide into realist speak. When we assume that 
the Hamiltonian for the harmonic oscillator is a good Hamiltonian to use in certain 
situations, we do so because of its properties, and this can be read in any which way 
we want, as Fine himself has argued in other contexts [39, 41]: such a fact, that 
the Hamiltonian is good for modelling certain systems, is independent of whether we 
argue for this on the basis of its reliability or its closeness to the truth. On similar 
grounds we can argue against measurement operators being good operators to model 
selective interactions. So the point is not that selective interactions don’t  exist, or are 
an unreasonable way of thinking of measurement interactions, but that measurement 
operators picked out by (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) have the wrong sort of properties to do 
justice to the intuitions that Fine invites us to think about.
It is, I think, quite hard to see what interacting with an aspect might mean here. 
Fine himself, in his original paper [40, p. 503], wants to distinguish between interaction
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with an aspect of a single observable from interaction with an aspect characterised as 
the joint measurement of all observables commuting with a  given one; these would be 
two different processes, leading to a theory based on individual measurements on the 
one hand, and to a generalised theory of joint measurements. There is no distinction 
between these two kinds of processes, though, on the analysis given here, for the im­
portant cases in which the observable is maximal, and this includes observables such 
as spin, angular momentum and many others.
Again this creates problems for the selective interaction idea. We can make this 
idea plausible by pointing to common experiences of sense perception. When we try 
to ascertain the colour of an object, we axe not much concerned with its size; similarly 
when we try to measure the hardness of some material we are not worried by its 
colour. But quantum measurement evolutions don’t focus on a specific observable, 
they measure effectively a whole class of them, those that share the same eigenstates. 
This is possibly more confusing as an intuitive physical idea of measurement than 
interaction with an aspect is, and the latter isn’t served well by the former; this is not, 
of course, an argument against the viability of selective interactions as an approach 
to quantum measurements, but an argument about the difficulty of reconciling the 
intuitive motivation and the general argument of the approach with the mathematical 
properties of the operators actually describing the interaction.
6. Conclusions
Fine’s idea is original in asking what quantum measurement might actually be 
doing, something not very common in discussions of quantum measurement. He tries 
to solve the problem of measurement by providing an answer to this, through the idea of 
selective interaction. This seems intuitively plausible from our patterns of observation: 
we observe contextually, if we concentrate on some aspect of what we observe we miss 
out many other features. It is also true that measurements, like weighing, ignore shape 
and size. Fine uses this idea to derive some conclusions about the states to assign to the 
system to be measured, which can be interpreted as a justification for a superselection 
rule.
On the whole, though, I think this does not work. It doesn’t work not because the 
intuitive idea is wrong, but because the formal scheme of quantum measurement as set 
up by Von Neumann bears little relation to the intuitive ideas that Fine suggests. A
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measurement operator is not measuring a specific observable; it is not at all clear what 
physical observable the Hamiltonian generating it stands for; it can assume all sorts of 
different forms, all essentially characterising the same measurement process, as shown 
in chapter 3, Theorem 3.2. All these militate in some way or another against Fine’s 
philosophical argument for selective interaction, but I think the questions remain, and 
remain interesting: what do measurement operators physically stand for? what exactly 
are they supposed to measure? are they a reasonable abstraction of real measurements?
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
It is useful at this stage to briefly review what this thesis has accomplished.
In the first instance, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have proved a series of results, which I 
briefly review.
Chapter 2 expands both the kinds of results known as insolubility proofs of the 
quantum measurement problem, and their scope. I have discussed two new proofs of 
the original result. Neither add mathematically to the scope of the well known results of 
the past forty years. Both, however, highlight important facts about the way in which 
the objectification condition for quantum measurement constrains the possibility of 
transferring probabilistic information about the measured observable from the object 
to the apparatus system through a unitary operator.
The first, detailed in sections 2 and 2.3, shows in a fairly intuitive way how ob­
jectification implies that the probabilities collected from the apparatus system for a 
pointer observable after a measurement has been performed is just the information 
that we could have collected from the apparatus before any measurement had been 
performed on the combined object +  apparatus system. Objectification therefore kills 
off the possibility of any meaningful sense of unitary measurement being possible. The 
second result, detailed in section 4, is a trivial consequence of Theorem 2.7, which 
characterises all unitary operators satisfying objectification. This result shows how the 
previous claim, that a unitary operator satisfying objectification makes no difference 
to probabilities for the pointer observable, is actually possible: in the simplest case, for 
example, the theorem shows the unitary operator to be of the form Us ® Um, with no 
interaction term present.
Another consequence of this result is that, in the course of proving it, I establish 
that the insolubility result due to Fine and Brown is in fact just as valid as other ones 
presented, even without the use of the condition that Brown has called Real Unitary 
Evolution. The discussion of the issues revolving around this particular version of the 
proof is reviewed in section 3.
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Finally the chapter provides, in section 5, a discussion of how the objectification 
condition might be interpreted in the context of unsharp pointer observables, and gives 
a first insolubility proof for this case. This genuinely extends the scope of the original 
proofs.
Chapter 3, on the other hand, addresses the status of the probabilistic condition 
usually assumed to hold for quantum measurement independently of objectification 
holding. It begins with a more specific result, Theorem 3.2 (developed with Gianpiero 
Cattaneo) along the lines of Beltrametti, Cassinelli and Lahti. This characterises, in 
subsection 2.2, unitary operators satisfying the probability reproducibility condition for 
the Hilbert space formalisation of quantum mechanics. Sections 3 and 4 look at how 
this kind of result might be extended to the density operator formalism. A number 
of results are proved, and the general conclusion is that the only one-to-one mappings 
that satisfy the probability reproducibility condition in this context are still the ones 
characterised through Theorem 3.2.
Making use of the analysis of sections 3 and 4, section 5 raises some problems for 
the possible unitary operators satisfying the probability reproducibility condition. In 
particular I show that there are cases for which no such operators can exist, and discuss 
the consequences of this.
Chapter 4 is an analysis and critique of Fine’s solution to the measurement problem. 
The starting point of the chapter is a discussion of a proposal by Fine, to ground his 
solution in an algebraic framework. The formal implications of this are analysed in 
section 2. If we presuppose an algebraic viewpoint, Fine’s solution is equivalent to  the 
imposition of a superselection rule on the object space. The problems that this raises 
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 looks at some other difficulties with Fine’s solution 
which are independent of the appeal to an algebraic grounding.
I want to conclude this work with some remarks on how the material just outlined 
fits in with the view of quantum measurement I have defended in Chapter 1, and 
with some open problems that are raised from this view. Recall that in chapter 1 I 
have defended the view that the discussion of the quantum measurement problem is 
a fundamentally theoretical enterprise. Chapter 2 discusses a classic aspect of such 
work, the consistency proof. The conditions that I analyse there are put forward with 
an attempt to answer the questions I have marked in Chapter 1, about properties and
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dynamics. Prom a theoretical point of view it is crucial to establish whether such 
conditions are consistent. That they are not is, as I have said in conclusion to chapter 
2, crucial in motivating further research on how we might answer the two questions.
Chapter 3 on the other hand provides us with a particular instance of a problem, 
rather than a global no-go theorem. It flags for attention a special class of examples for 
which unitarity and probability reproducibility cannot both hold. The problem here 
is not global inconsistency, as is the case in chapter 2. What we have is a specific 
counterexample, but one which has, in my opinion, greater force against the project of 
the quantum theory of measurement in virtue of originating from a theoretical analysis. 
This does not require us, then, to enter into arguments about the extent to which 
theoretical accounts of measurement mirror real measurements, for the counterexample 
is not drawn from a real measurement situation, but generated internally.
Chapter 4 highlights the difficulty in reconciling the claims of the theoretical anal­
ysis of measurement with what happens in real measurements. Fine’s support for his 
solution depends crucially at a conceptual level on the claim that his solution accounts 
for what happens in real measurements, namely interactions with aspects. The problem 
is that he uses the technical apparatus provided by the standard theoretical account of 
measurement, and it is quite difficult to see in what way this carries out Fine’s interac­
tions. This is because, in general, the quantum theory of measurement pays relatively 
little attention to the nature of the interactions that generate measurements. I think 
this is of no major consequence if the game is to answer questions about properties and 
dynamics. However, if a solution to the measurement problem is built on the claim 
that measurement interactions are of a specific kind, and moreover that this is the kind 
of interaction that one always sees happening in measurement, then it ought to show 
that this is the case.
This is an open problem in general. There is little interest normally in the status 
of quantum measurements as real interactions. I think this is of crucial importance to 
the possible applicability of the formalism of quantum measurement, but also to the 
typically philosophical questions about the relationship between theory and experiment.
Another problem that emerges from the view I put forward in chapter one is of a 
more historical nature. There is no properly developed account of how we have moved 
from discussing interpretations of experiments at the beginning of the century to the 
more abstract topic that is quantum measurement today. If the analogy with Kuhn’s
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description of a thought experiment, briefly alluded to in chapter 1, is to hold, we will 
need to understand this much better.
While this thesis has not addressed these two issues, I think much of the work in it 
leads to them. I hope it will be of use in this way, as well as of value for all the things 
contained in it.
APPENDIX A
Proofs o f Theorems
P roo f  o f  C orollary 2.5. Two mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases must be 
distinguished:
1. <p, <pr are nonorthogonal initial states in %§;
2. (p and tp' are orthogonal.
The first case is the one discussed in Proposition 2.4. This Proposition says that assum­
ing that pointer states with different eigenvalues are present in a possible decomposition 
of the final object +  apparatus state will lead to a violation of unitarity, on the assump­
tion that ( (p\ tp') 0. So the pointer eigenstates decomposing the final state must be
associated with the same set of eigenvalues if unitarity and objectification are to be 
satisfied.
The second case can be treated by considering a third state, for instance
<P±£_
x  i b + ^ i r
which is not orthogonal to the two orthogonal states. Then applying the previous 
argument to <p and x> and then to ip' and x> yields that the pointer eigenstates associated 
with initial states (p and x  are the same, and pointer eigenstates associated with tp1 and 
X are the same. The result then follows for <p and tp1. □
P roof o f  C orollary 2.6. Two cases must be distinguished, according to whe­
ther the pointer observable has multiple eigenvalues or not.
For the first case, consider an orthonormal basis of possible initial states in Hs, for 
instance { ^ i , . . .  , ipn}, such that ( <pi\ <fij) =  0 for i ^  j .  The set of initial pointer states 
{^oi} is also an orthonormal set. Therefore the set of states in m consisting
of vectors of the form <pj 0  'tpoi is also an orthonormal set. Furthermore the subspaces 
spanned by sets <pk 0  t/>o» and <p\ 0  ipoi with k, I fixed and distinct, and i variable, are 
orthogonal subspaces. If the evolution applied to initial states <pk 0  ipoi and <pi 0  V’oi is 
unitary, the final density operators for initial object states <pj with different y’s must 
also span orthogonal spaces.
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Assume that the final states admit of a representation over eigenstates of the pointer 
observable 1 0  Am where the different V'i’s, eigenstates of the pointer observable Am, 
number only m  — 1, and suppose in the first instance that the eigenvalues of Am have 
multiplicity 1. Given Corollary 2.5, it follows that, for initial states <pj, the final object 
+  apparatus states after the measurement evolution will have two different projections 
of the form P[$jk] ® fyn], with i fixed for each j  and k =  1 or 2. Consider one such 
final state corresponding to the case in which j  =  1, i =  1. Then the states (p\k, for 
different k%  must be distinct in order to have distinct projections P[<plk\ ® Ptyi], failure 
to have distinct projections would lead to a violation of conservation of rank.
All other final states must have at least one pointer eigenstate of the form P[$jk] ® 
P^j], k  varying for the different initial states, again because of Corollary 2.5. Consider 
the projections P ^ j  0  P ^ ] ,  j  varying. These projections must be mutually orthog­
onal as they belong to subspaces which are unitarily evolved from initial orthogonal 
subspaces. This implies that the <pj\S must form an orthonormal basis for H§. But 
then the projection P[g>U2] <8> P[^{\ associated with the initial object state j  — I cannot 
be orthogonal to projections of the form P[(pj{] ® Pty>i], j  #  1, as it is distinct from 
P[£i x] 0  P[^x]. This gives a contradiction. Therefore the P ^ j ’s must form a set of m 
distinct, orthogonal projections in the final evolved states.
If the pointer observable Am has multiple eigenvalues, the claims still hold. Note, 
first of all, that the argument of the previous paragraph is not substantially changed if 
we have tp\ appearing twice as an eigenstate of Am in the final state for an initial object 
state <£i, and tp2 appearing in the final state for some <p2 , where xpi and tp2 share the 
same eigenvalue and are not orthogonal. What happens if on the other hand tp\ and tp2 
appear as pointer eigenstates indicating the same eigenvalue, and are orthogonal? A 
straightforward application of the argument in Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.5 shows 
that, if tpi and tp2 appear in any one final apparatus state decomposition, then they 
must appear in all of them. Separate arguments can then be made for them, similar to 
the ones just given in the previous paragraph.
As for the second part of the claim, suppose that we do have two pointer eigenstates 
tpi and tp2 G 'Hm appearing in the decomposition of the final state, which are eigenstates 
of Am associated with the same eigenvalue and are not orthogonal. Then we clearly have 
two projections in the decomposition over distinct vectors in 'Hm, which however are 
not orthogonal. An orthogonal resolution of the final state, spanned by the projections
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containing ip\ and must exist, however, by the same reasoning given on page 70. 
This finally establishes the result. □
PROOF OF T h eo r em  2.7. [=►]: The previous results, culminating in Corollary 2.6, 
establish that if a unitary operator U  : Tis 0  [ipo,]* -» “Hg ® [i>ijk\ijk  satisfies objecti­
fication, then it must map an orthonormal basis <pj ® ^oi to the orthonormal basis 
Y?k=i Wj ® V’y'j where i, j  and I axe variable and ( ipijk\ ipi'jk ) =  0 for all i ir and 
any j ,  k.
For a fixed, the Vfyfc’s must be eigenstates of the same eigenvalue of the apparatus 
pointer observable Am, for if they were not the initial object state a\<p\ 4* ot2<f2 would,
. Jl
when coupled to ipoa, be mapped to the final state (]£fc=i ai<Piik®'lPnk)+{'I2k=i a 2Vi2k® 
which can only be an eigenstate of I ® Am if ipn and ipi2 are eigenstates of Am 
associated to the same eigenvalue.
Then, for a, b fixed,
U
U ((pb ® ipoa) =  ^ 2  (fiabk ® Tpabk 
k= 1
=  5 Z  «  Vb\ <Pb)(<Pabk) ® ( ^0a| fpOa ) Wa«b))
k
= J2  (W^  ® WM«&) (f t  ® fta). 
k
Repeating this for each a, b and using linearity shows that (4.1) holds.
The operators composing U  in (4.1) are clearly partial isometries; the proof is given 
for one of them. Consider W 3^  =  ( f t l  (*) Xftftc)- Its action on any operator a f t  is 
given by ( f t |  a<pb )(<Pabc) = « ( f t l  VbH Vabc) = a $abc, so the operator is unitary as a 
mapping from [ft] to [ft&c]-
Also for any vector 2*€/ where I  =  {1 ,... , 6 — 1, b 4 -1 ,...  , m},
< f t l  ^2 ) (Vabc) =  ^2 a^  Vb\ & )('Pabc) =  0;
I /  I
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the operator is clearly linear. It follows that WSo6e is indeed a partial isometry. Next, 
note that 
k
53 ( #7 ® ^0i | ( 0 j  0  IpOi) ) ((pijk 0  V'ufc) =  53 ®
fc=l &
= E ®w*W“)
k
= E ® ^ o»),
k
establishing (4.2). It is easy to show that any two such operators W, W ' are partial 
isometries, and that ( W ($)| W'ijSi) ) =  0.
[■$=]: Consider U given by (4.1). U is then obviously linear. In order to show that 
it is unitary, consider an arbitrary vector $  E Hs ® [V’oi]»- Then
ihwii2- /  E E W'V®H'IV(*)
/=1 n h= 1
5 = 1 , . . .  ,m
li
E E wV®wrlV(®)
*=1....» fc=l
/.<=1.....» /l= l fc=l
= 53 ($)><^i®^0z| ($))( 5 Zvfgh®^fgh
f,i=1 ,... ,n  \  /l
5 , j = l , . . .  ,m
=  5 3  <^  0 ^ 0il ® ^0i| ($ ))
,n
= ini2.
'y ] tyijk 0
Therefore U is an isometry.
Furthermore U is one-to-one and onto: given any E Tis <S> [VfyfelyJfe ° f  tbe form
V  =  5 3  S  “ijW ijk 0  Ajk
*=i....» fc=l
J= l , . . .  ,171
there is a unique $  E % s0  such that U($) =  \&, namely
$  =  5 3  aijV j 0  i-
,n
That £7 satisfies objectification is straightforward by its definition.
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Now suppose the partial isometries W Mijk axe the same for all j ’s and fc’s. Then 
(  U \  n ( m u \
u =  E E^V ® ^ = E  EE^%* ®^M«-
*= 1 ,... ,n  \k=l /  t=l \j= lk= lj=1,... ,m
It is necessary to show that Jlk=i ^ Sijk is a unitary operator on ‘H§. The 
condition that
Jc=l <k=l
for $  G “Hs ® [V7o*]i and for each j  ^  /  clearly implies that
/ e ^ V m
jfc=i
(/s ® p^.]) ( 5 3  (v ti  ^)(<?ifc® V’/c))
) = o
k= 1 /
for each <p G H§, from which it is easy to show that VFSijfc =  C/f is a unitary
operator on %§.
A similar argument applies for the case in which all U f are equal to a  unitary 
operator Us and establishes the final claim. □
PROOF OF T h e o r e m  3 .2 .  T h e  probability  reproducib ility  con d ition  (2 .3 ) is  easily  
estab lish ed  for W 1 by n otin g  th a t
( Wl (<p® ® P ^ W 1 (<p ® t i ) )
= (  E < ^ * l
\  h
= ( v l  P [ViX P )-
Also trivially "Hs ® [ip J] :=  {<P ® : V7 € Hs, a  G C} is a  subspace of H s
indeed, V</?i ® (ai^o)> • • • > <Pn ® (an^o) e  ® ftAoL one Sets <Pi ® (<*1^ 0 ) + . . .  +  v?n ® 
(<*n^o) =  «l(^l® ^o)+* • -+<Xn(<Pn®1po) =  (<*m)®^(}+. • -+teW n)® ^0 =  • •+
«n<Pn) Wol; furthermore V/? G C, /% i ® (ai^o)l =  <Pi ® [(/to luo l £ ®
[t/>J]. In similar fashion it can be proved that Us® [ipl]'L := {y?®c*V,o’"L : V9 ^  ^S» a  G C, 
with any unit vector orthogonal to ip\ ((^o| )  =  0)L is ulso a subspace of
%s ® WrM'
Moreover, V<£,<£ G U s ,  V(a^J) G [ipl], V (/^J,_L) G [^J]-1-
(<£® (a^o)| <P ® (Pipl ’±0) )  = a p ( < p  | ^ ) (^ o |  ^o’J' )  =  0 
concluding that (W§ ® [^J]) -L (^S ® [V’o]"*')'
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Note that dim (Hs <8> Wm) =  dim (H§) • d im (Hm ) ? dim (W§ ® [^J]) =  dim CH§), 
and that it is also true that dim (H§ ® [^J]*L) =  dim(Hg) • [dim('HM) — 1], so that 
dim (Hs ® 'Hm ) =  dim (H§ ® [V’J]) +  dim (Hs ® finally concluding that
Hs ® U m = ('Hs ® [$ ] )  e  (« S  ® [$ ] x )  •
Let <p =  anpi +  . . .  4- an(pn € Hs, and atp\ e  [^J]l then
W 1 {ip ® (a^J)) =  W 1 {0L0Li(ipi ® ^o) +  • • • +  ® V>o))
(0.1) =  ® ^ i)  + . . .  +  a a n(^ i ® ipn)
where the last equality follows from conditions (2.5) and the probability reproducibility 
condition (2.1). From (0.1) and the above Lemma it follows that
I I W H v ’ ®  ( o ^ o ) ) l l 2 = | a < * l | 2 • Wv>\ ® V > i | |2 +  - - -  +  | a o : n |2 • \\<pl ®
( 0 .2 )  = N 2 - ( l “ i l 2 +  - - -  +  K I 2 )
But, mating use of the fact that H^jll =  1 it is also the case that
(0.3) \]<p® (o^o)ll2 =  M 2 • IMI • W ill2 =  M 2 • ( M 2 + . . .  +  K l 2)
A comparison of (0.2) and (0.3) yields the conclusion that W 1 is an isometry on the 
subspace Hs  ®
On the other hand, W l {<pi®V,o’"L) k  easdy seen to be the null vector 0 E W§ ® 'Hm-, 
so that Vy? =  otnp\ +  . . .  +  ocn(pn G H§ and V/?‘0o,'L G [^o]*1
W l  (y> ® (/3i/>o"L)) =  P a iW 'fa  ® ^ ’x ) +  • • • +  PanW l (<pn ® ^ - x ) =  0 
establishing the partial isometric and null properties.
Let us denote by {ui =  <pi ® • • • > wn =  <Pn ® ^ o) by {ui =  (p\ ® V>i,. . .  , un =  - 
<p\ <g> ipn} the two (non complete) orthonormal systems of Hs ® W-M of the previous 
Lemma. Then, for all VP G it is clear that W 1^ )  =  (u*| \P)ui from
which it follows that
p ^ * ) i i 2 =  ( X > * m s *
\ f c = i
n
£ > * i  v )u i
i= l
(0.4) =  £  (i**|*>(ui | * ) ( t t t | u 4)
i,k=l
(0.5) <  ||* ||2
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where the last (Bessel) inequality is a consequence of the fact that {u,}/ is not complete
as an orthonormal system of vectors in This shows the contractive property
and completes the proof of part (i).
It remains to show that the operator W  =  W 1 -f W l,± +  W 1' is unitary. This
a complete orthonormal system. By working as in (0.4) above from this completeness 
condition it follows that V4> € %§ < 8 > | | W ( $ ) | |  =  ||$ ||, i.e. W  is an isometry. 
Secondly, for any & =  2 ? = ? a »^ * there exists $  =  &iui 6
such that W ($) =  let the u*’s belong to one of the sets (2.6b), (2.7b), (2.7c) and 
let the U{ belong to one of the sets (2.6a), (2.7a), the claim then follows. Therefore W  
is onto. Prom these two results it follows that W  is unitary. □
P roof of T heorem 3.5. To establish the first claim, consider a state
The proof that W 1,J~ is a conjugate contractive partial isometry (that is, an isometry 
on Hs ® [V,o]J_ and the null operator on H§ <8> [V’oD satisfying (2.5) and (2.1) is similar, 
having noticed that W ly± is defined on the basis of the orthonormal, not complete sets 
(2.7a) and (2.7b). A similar proof can establish that W l> is a  partial isometry.
is easily done in two stages. First of all the previous lemma shows that the union of 
the orthonormal, non-complete systems defining the operators W 1, W 1*1- and W 1' is
n
i=1
on T('Hs), where =  au<pi +  . . .  +  annpn and Ylj=i \aji\2 — 1- Then
n
Now consider the state W X(T  <g> P[ipQ])- This is equal to
so the right hand side of (3.5) is equal to
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By convexity, repeated application of (3.1) to the products P[<pk] I  leaves the calculation
i= 1
) p b!>i
<k=1 i= 1 I
hence (3.5) holds. Next let
n
Ts =  ^ 2  w 'PW'iY Wi + . . .  + wn = l
i= i
be a trace one operator on 9is, and consider the density matrix 7§ 0  P ^ 0] € 7 ^  (91). 
Then W 1(T§ 0  P[rp0]) yields the density matrix
j =l \ i = l
( p f e ]  ®  P fc I )
Calculating the inner products the result is
(*)
(PIV,) ® (  E  ® %>])
\ l = l  >
=  W iP tvQ ^  ^ m C ^ o I ^ o ] )  b y  (3 -1)
n
=  u;i|aji|2 by Lemma 3.4
i= l
Hence the total result of applying the mapping W 1 is
n /  n \
E I IZ^ K'il2 I (*fo] ®-fyj])
j  = 1 \*=1 /
This is a density matrix in 7 ^ (9i§ ®Hm) with the tensored projectors corresponding 
to orthogonal projectors on 9L§ 0  H m - Hence the total trace can be calculated by 
simply adding together the coefficients, giving
t  = i>  ( e  m 2) = i > =1
j = i  \* = i  /  i= i  \ j = i  /  *=i
hence W 1 is trace preserving on the subset T(9L§)
The second part of the claim is established in a similar manner, by noticing that in 
(*), for all T  e  T(9is) 0  ( P ^ ) 1- one has to calculate terms such as Tr-^M[P^0]P^±j], 
clearly equal to 0.
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As for the last claim, consider a trace one operator T  given by
n  n
T  -  S  Wii PWi) 0  PWj\' 2  Wii  =  1?
*J=i *d=i
where is defined as before and ipj =  (3jipo +  Pj-ipQ, tpQ denoting without loss of
generality the vectors obtained by projecting ipj onto the subspace of Hm orthogonal
to and \(3j\2 +  \/3j-\2 =  1.
In order to obtain W 1(T), calculate the coefficients
(P[VJc] ® %>]) [ 5 3
*J=1
Rewriting this as 
it is easy to show that the coefficients will be equal to
53
*J=1
We then have that
= 53 53 WtfMW ] (Jfoj ® PlMh
k= 1 \ i j = l
the trace of which clearly is
53 13 tu«iQ«i2ifti2) •
*=1 \*d=1
Prom this it follows that
= E w i0 i \2 E i“«i2
i j = 1 \fc=l J
n
— ^   ^ |/5j| ^  1
i j = 1
where clearly the equality holds if and only if |/?i|2 =  . . .  =  \(3n \2 — 1, which completes 
the proof. □
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